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Abstract
This thesis investigates the role of investor sentiment in the stock market. Previous
literature indicates that conventional finance theory fails to explain variations in stock
returns in a growing number of cases. However, recent behavioural finance studies
have found that investor sentiment exhibits superior performance in explaining stock
market anomalies. This thesis addresses three controversial topics in finance from the
perspective of investor sentiment, in three separate empirical chapters.
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3), I examine the relationship between cross-
sectional variations in stock returns and investor sentiment via multiple conditional
models. I find that investor sentiment predicts many variations in returns of opaque
stocks relative to translucent stocks. Also, I show that returns of stocks with high
volatility, small capitalisations, low profitability, low dividend payments, low tangibility,
low book-to-market ratios and low growth rates exhibit great exposure to investor
sentiment. Moreover, I find that opaque stock returns are negatively correlated with
investor sentiment, implying that higher levels of sentiment result in lower future
returns to opaque stocks. My results remain robust after controlling for additional
systematic risk factors, such as size, value and momentum.
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) investigates the predictive power of
investor sentiment in time-series returns. I find that the traditional positive mean-
variance trade-off of stock returns holds in low-sentiment periods, but breaks down
in high-sentiment periods; that is, the relationship in high-sentiment periods can be
either negative or insignificant. Besides, I find that investors’ preference for (positive)
(co-)skewness also predicts future stock returns. Similar to (co-)variance, my results
show that (co-)skewness is positively priced in bearish markets but negatively priced
in bullish markets. Last, I further find that the underperformance of small and high
book-to-market ratio stocks in the high-sentiment regime is mainly attributed to (co-
)skewness, not (co-)variance.
viii
In extension to the first two empirical chapters, the last chapter of this thesis
(Chapter 5) extends my discussion on investor sentiment to more practical financial
issues. In particular, I explore the role of investor sentiment in the formation of
market bubbles and crises and I find that stock price moves along with path-dependent
sentiment dynamics during bubbles and crises. In particular, I show that consecutive
sentiment increases relate to extended periods of increasing overvaluation, followed
by price corrections. In addition, medium-term increases in sentiment precede strong
positive future returns, while prolonged periods of increasing sentiment precede negative
returns. In contrast, market return responses to short-term consecutive sentiment
decrease in crises and recessions. Besides, I show that all these results only hold
for opaque portfolios (such as small, risky and unprofitable portfolios). Surprisingly,
my results indicate that the path-dependent relation between sentiment dynamics
and stock returns is statistically significant in bubbles only for high book-to-market
portfolios, while low book-to-market portfolios show significant relationships in crises.
Moreover, by applying a Markov regime-switching model in real cases including the
1999 High-Tech Bubble and the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, I find that higher investor
sentiment produces lower market returns in extremely volatile periods. Further, I doc-
ument a significant inverse relationship between market returns and investor sentiment;
specifically, I show that shocks to market returns result in contemporaneous changes
in market sentiment and this effect is more prominent in crises and recessions. The
results in this thesis establish a close connection between conventional and behavioural
finance and offer new implications to the relationship between investor sentiment and
three controversial finance topics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Classical finance theory has formed the basis for most finance research for a long
time but has come under scrutiny over the past a few decades. A growing number of
studies find that well-accepted finance propositions cannot adequately explain the real
market performance. For example, there is considerable evidence showing that stock
prices movement is predictable, to a certain extent, which contradicts the efficient
market hypothesis (EMH). To be specific, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) found that
the stock market is not rationally priced, evidenced by a steady decline of the market
value since the late 1960s. Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) noted that the
justified variations in future dividends could not sufficiently explain excessive market
volatility. Besides these, an initial paper by Banz (1981) challenged the efficiency of
the famous Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965) in explaining security market returns, arguing, instead, that small
stocks usually earn excessive returns over large stocks. After a few years, Fama and
French (1993) formalised this size effect by constructing a size risk factor which plays a
systematic role in the formation of stock returns. Also, they further suggested that the
value factor (i.e., securities with higher book-to-market ratios exhibit higher returns
relative to low book-to-market ratio stocks) can also predict stock’s prices systemati-
cally. More examples of stock market puzzles include that Cooper et al. (2008) found
that companies that grow more aggressively on total assets earn lower subsequent
stock returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) introduced the momentum effect in
financial asset pricing, indicating that high recent-past returns forecast high future re-
turns. This effect offers strong contrary evidence to the random walk process and EMH.
Given the poor performance of the conventional finance framework in solving finan-
cial market puzzles, economists and researchers tend to seek alternative methods that
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can better capture the nature of financial market movements. Interestingly, researchers
found that some psychological models are unexpectedly useful in explaining behaviour
in speculative markets. For example, Arrow (1982) suggested that the ‘irrational
decision making’ model developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed great
explanatory power for financial market performance. Other researchers such as Kindle-
berger and Manias (1989) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985) also posited significant
impacts of psychological components in security prices. The success of psychological
models in predicting stock market returns arouses the interest of an increasing number
of researchers to figure out what psychological element truly affects stock prices. With
the emergence and maturing of the behavioural finance, the effect of human causes
more attention.
Traditionally, researchers build financial models or theories based on the fundamen-
tal assumption of the efficient market, that is, people in the market are homogeneous.
However, this description of investors is not necessarily accurate. It is inappropriate to
format the behaviour of every market participant uniformly since everyone is a unique
entity. Excessive optimism or pessimism of each leads investors to make biased asset
valuations, and limits to arbitrage hinder the exploitation and ultimate correction of
asset mispricing. In reality, investors, no matter rational or irrational, often perform
irrational acts, intentionally or unintentionally. For example, investors are sometimes
forced to place their valuations based on their private information when the availability
of public information is limited (Brunnermeier, 2001; Muth, 1960). Besides, investors
also exhibit strong herding behaviour, that is, to follow the market trend or other
investors’ behaviour, when the access to other market information is restricted. For
example, Shleifer and Summers (1990) argued that when investors possess less observ-
able information, they normally follow the market trend or ‘what others do’ because
they believe other investors may have better access to information. Consequently,
investors who place valuations following the behaviour of other investors rather than
the expected value of future cash flows drive prices further away from fundamentals.
Moreover, investors who hold different understandings, even concerning the same piece
of information, may also lead to possible divergent estimations of the value of an
asset. All these examples indicate robust irrational exuberance within financial mar-
kets, implying that not every investor conducts investment activities on a rational basis.
Over the past few decades, researchers introduced the concept of investor sentiment,
which portrays investors’ beliefs and expectations about future cash flows, to formalise
3the effect of irrational exuberance in security markets.1 However, extant literature
holds controversial opinions on the role of irrationals and investor sentiment in fi-
nancial markets. In particular, researchers who support the importance of irrational
investors argue that irrational investment creates enormous noise in the market and
drives stock prices away from fundamentals. For example, as early as 1936, Keynes
(1936) had already considered the impact of the irrational component in the pricing
process of financial assets. Kyle (1985) and Black (1986) found that irrational investors
who typically act on noisy signals (‘noise’ traders) create risk in the asset-pricing
process and strongly deter the ability of rational arbitrageurs betting against them.
Shleifer and Summers (1990) and De Long et al. (1990) formalised the role of irra-
tional investors in the price formation of an asset by arguing that the risk associated
with irrational trading is systematic in financial markets. Also, they found that ir-
rationals are highly likely to be driven by sentiment. On the other hand, arguments
against the role of investor sentiment in price formation point out that even if some
investors are irrational, their trading behaviour will be offset by rational arbitrageurs,
and thus, has a minor effect on the asset-pricing process (Fama, 1965; Friedman, 1953).2
This thesis focuses on the role of investor sentiment in asset pricing from several
different aspects. Specifically, this empirical research aims to address three crucial
financial issues: cross-sectional variations in security returns concerning investor sen-
timent (Chapter 3), skewness preference and investment sentiment in asset pricing
(Chapter 4), and predicting bubble and recession conditions with investment sentiment
(Chapter 5). Based on the extant sentiment-based literature, this study sheds new
light on inferences for these ‘hot’ financial issues.
Research Questions and Motivations
Traditionally, conventional finance theory is formed on the basis of full rationality
among investors. However, there is considerable evidence showing that investors are
not fully rational and irrational exuberance leads to the failure of conventional theory
1The word ‘sentiment’ is officially defined as ‘a thought, opinion, or idea based on a feeling about
a situation, or a way of thinking about something’ by the Cambridge Dictionary. In the context of
finance, the sentiment of an investor reflects his or her expectation about the financial market.
2These arguments have been proved inaccurate by later studies that indicate that given the
existence of irrational investors in financial markets, arbitragers’ ability to correct security market
mispricings is also restricted resulting persistent divergence of stock prices (De Long et al., 1990;
Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
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in explaining stock market performance (e.g. Black, 1986; De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer
and Summers, 1990). The classical models of behavioural finance indicated multiple
aspects of investors’ irrational factors like overconfidence, herd behavior and informa-
tion asymmetry (Daniel et al., 1998; Hong et al., 2000; Shleifer and Summers, 1990;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Motivated by a general idea that irrational exuberance
causes significant misvaluations of equities, I construct three research questions to
figure out the role of investor sentiment in financial markets.
Research Question 1
Can investor sentiment explain cross-sectional variations in security returns, given the
content of investor sentiment?
The cross-sectional variation in stock returns has been one of the hottest financial
debates over many years and remains unresolved. Researchers have found that certain
stocks exhibit more considerable variations in their returns relative to others with
parallel characteristics. For example, Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1993) found
persistent return premiums on small (over large) company stocks. Besides, Fama and
French found that firms with higher book-to-market ratios generate higher returns in
stocks relative to firms with low book-to-market ratios. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
also found that firms with poor past performance suffer persistent declines in stock
prices.3 Despite the great efforts made by earlier studies, researchers have not, however,
found a precious, intuitive explanation for these cross-sectional return anomalies.
Recent sentiment-related literature has found that there exist relationships between
investor sentiment and certain cross-sectional market anomalies. In particular, re-
searchers have found that investor sentiment explains a proportion of the cross-sectional
variations in some security returns. For example, Neal and Wheatley (1998) indicated
that the discounts on closed-end funds, which is one of the sentiment proxies, predict
premiums. Brown and Cliff (2005) found the survey-based sentiment proxy affects
asset valuations and argued that large stocks are more exposed to investor sentiment.
Pontiff (1997) revealed that returns of the closed-end funds are much more volatile
than assets. Hence, in the extension of existing studies, this research thesis examines
3Further examples of cross-sectional financial market anomalies include financial distress (Campbell
et al., 2008), net stock issues (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Ritter, 1991), growth opportunity (Cooper
et al., 2008) and net operating assets (Hirshleifer et al., 2004).
5how a series of cross-sectional variations in security returns is connected to investor
sentiment. In addition, I attempt to untangle the various degree of this impact on firm
returns via firm opacity.
This research question is motivated by the coherent relationship between firm
opacity and relative difficulty of valuation. Intuitively, high levels of firm opacity
increase information asymmetry between firms and investors and consequently enhance
the difficulty of valuation. In addition, this effect should be twofold. First, opaque
firms often have information asymmetry issues between firms and investors and high
levels of firm opacity makes it difficult for investors to assess the real value of stocks.
Hence, investors have to rely more on a personal judgment or ‘follow the market’ to
estimate the value of opaque stocks, resulting in more substantial variations in security
returns (Brunnermeier, 2001; Muth, 1960). Second, higher levels of firm opacity also
increase the difficulty for arbitrageurs to correct the current mispricings because of the
short-sale impediment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Shleifer and Summers, 1990). As a
consequence, misvaluations associated with these stocks are typically difficult to correct.
Based on these assumptions, I hypothesise that returns of opaque firm stocks
are more prone to investment sentiment. In addition, I characterise firm opacity
on the basis of accounting variables including volatility, size, profitability, dividends,
tangibility and growth opportunity, and further hypothesise that holding everything
else constant, securities of firms with small size, high volatility, low profitability, low
dividend payments, low tangibility, low book-to-market ratios and high growth rates
are more exposed to investor sentiment.
Research Question 2
How effective are the conventional mean-variance relationships in explaining security
returns in the context of investor sentiment?
&
How do investor preferences for skewness affect the predictability of the mean-variance
framework for future returns, given the content of investor sentiment?
Along with the cross-sectional puzzles in asset pricing, there also exist some time-
series puzzles in security returns. Lots of literature showed that the well-accepted
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positive trade-off between portfolio risk and expected returns proposed by Markowitz
(1952) does not always hold in reality (Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Miller et al., 1972).
Inspired by Yu and Yuan (2011), the second empirical chapter of this thesis explores the
conditions under which the classical mean-variance relationship might hold, after ac-
counting for the effect of investor sentiment. Additionally, I expand the two-dimensional
framework to a three-dimensional model by including the higher moment of security
returns, skewness, in the asset-pricing process, to further explore how investor skewness
preference affects stock returns in the context of investor sentiment.
The general motivations of this research topic are described as follows. First, the
traditional mean-variance framework, which states that an asset’s expected return is
positively correlated with its risk, actually performs poorly in predicting real stock
returns. In particular, the existing literature indicates mixed results on the relationship
between stock returns and risk, rather than a positive trade-off (Brandt and Kang, 2004;
Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Miller et al., 1972). Second, researchers have found that
investors also fail to hold a well-diversified market portfolio. Instead, investors prefer
to include only an individual or small group of stocks in their portfolios sometimes
(Conine and Tamarkin, 1981; Kelly, 1995; Mitton and Vorkink, 2007; Van Horne et al.,
1975). This lack of diversification remains unexplainable, as holding an undiversified
portfolio increases the overall volatility to investors without rewarding them with extra
returns. Third, the extant literature indicates that investors have strong preferences
for positively skewed stocks (Arditti, 1967; Scott and Horvath, 1980), and moreover,
incorporating skewness in the asset-pricing process reduces investors’ propensity to
diversify (Conine and Tamarkin, 1981; Simkowitz and Beedles, 1978). Hence, the
puzzles associated with the lack of diversification and skewness preference among
investors give rise to thinking about the potential impact of investor sentiment.
The goal of my second empirical chapter is to establish the linkage between the
empirical finance issues of the mean-variance relation and systematic (co-)skewness
via investor sentiment. In a general sense, investors choose to include extra (positive)
skewness in their portfolios by sacrificing part of the benefits from diversification
only if the benefit associated with additional skewness is greater than the cost of
undiversification. If this is not the case, investors require higher premiums for including
extra skewness in their portfolios. Referring to such behaviour regarding investors’
risk aversion, (positive) skewness becomes favourable only for risk-seeking investors,
as higher positive skewness increases the likelihood of extreme positive gains (Mitton
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put more weight on the benefits of diversification over skewness, as including extra
skewness increases total portfolio risk for investors. Further, recent literature indicates
that investors’ risk aversion is closely aligned with investor sentiment (Bams et al.,
2017; Wolff et al., 2014). These studies found that high-sentiment periods present low
risk aversion while low sentiment predicts high risk aversion. Hence, taking all these
empirical evidence together, my research attempts to establish the connection between
the conventional mean-variance relation, skewness preference and investor sentiment,
with the purpose of providing more intuitive explanations for these topical asset-pricing
issues.
I develop several hypotheses to address the relationship between investor sentiment
and mean-variance-skewness trade-off. First, I hypothesise that without considering
the impact of skewness preference, the classical (positive) mean-variance relationship
in equity returns holds only in low-sentiment periods (high risk aversion) but turns
negative in high-sentiment periods (low risk aversion). In addition, the low-sentiment
relationship remains, but the high-sentiment relationship breaks down to insignificance
after incorporating the effect of investors’ preference for skewness. More importantly,
the relationship between skewness preference and stock return is also hypothesised to
be positive in the low-sentiment regime but turns negative in bullish markets. Last, I
predict that skewness preference is the most priced in highly sentiment-sensitive, small
and high book-to-market portfolios.
Research Question 3
How does investor sentiment contribute to the variations in security returns under
extreme market conditions such as bubbles and crises?
While the first two empirical chapters focus on solving two empirical asset-pricing
puzzles, the last empirical chapter extends the discussion on investor sentiment to more
practical financial issues. To be specific, I explore how investor sentiment contributes
to special market events such as financial bubbles and crisis (recessions).
In the real world, financial market bubbles and the ensuing crises cause significant
adverse impacts on both financial markets and the whole economy. Earlier studies
posited the importance of irrational components in empirical speculative bubbles
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and the subsequent recessions, but few of them detailedly quantified the effect of
the irrational component in the return-generating process of an asset (Abreu and
Brunnermeier, 2003; Canterbery, 1999; Kindleberger and Manias, 1989; Lux, 1995); as
such, it is worth further investigating the role that the irrational component plays in
such financial events. In addition, given the tremendous adverse influence of a financial
market bubble and the ensuing crisis on both investors and the economy, it is vital to
figure out a way to predict it and then, to prevent it.
My research differs from the existing mainstream bubble- or crisis-related literature
in the following aspects. First, my study explores the impact of investor sentiment in
the formation of asset returns during both bubbles and recessions. Second, previous
studies concentrated on the causes, consequences and effects of historical financial bub-
bles or crises, but left little space for the influence of investor sentiment in these events.
Third, my research is constructed on the basis of both simulated and real financial
cases. Because of the high instability of financial bubbles and crises, simulation helps
capture the nature and spirit of these events while real case studies assist in verifying
the validity of the results from simulation tests. Apart from the above distinctions
vis-à-vis previous studies, this thesis also examines the reverse relationship between
security returns and investor sentiment; that is, whether shocks to market returns
impose impacts on shaping investor sentiment. As far as I am concerned, this relation
has been investigated by few researchers.
I test four main hypotheses in this empirical chapter. First, in bubbles, investor
sentiment generates positive stock returns in the early and medium stage but negative
returns in later periods. In contrast, in recessions, investor sentiment produces negative
stock returns in the early stage but positive returns in later periods of crises and reces-
sions. These two hypotheses predict that stock prices follow certain path-dependent
dynamics during both bubbles and crises (and the subsequent recessions). Third,
investor sentiment negatively (positively) relates to stock returns during extremely
volatile (stable) periods. Last, market returns contemporaneously affect investor
sentiment; an increase (decrease) in market returns has also increased the optimism
(pessimism) of investor sentiment.
Overall, my research explores three crucial controversial topics in finance, including
the cross-sectional variations in security returns, the mean-variance trade-off and
skewness preference, and the asset pricing process in financial bubbles and crises, from
9the perspective of investor sentiment. Given the general motivation that conventional
finance theory is no longer effective in explaining financial market performance in
intuitive ways, this thesis re-investigates some of the puzzled issues from the perspective
of behavioural finance, and investor sentiment in particular. Based on the existing
sentiment-related literature, this research develops a set of empirical test models aimed
at offering insightful results and explanations of these historical financial puzzles.
Key Methodologies Covered In The Thesis
To address each research question in my thesis, I develop multiple empirical tests
on the basis of the models introduced by earlier empirical studies. In particular, to
investigate the relationship between investor sentiment and cross-sectional variations
in security returns, I employ a few conditional multiple risk-factor models, such as
the conditional alpha as well as long-short portfolio regressions. In addition, I also
create a set of sentiment-related portfolios based on the return sensitivity of each
individual stock to investor sentiment, allowing for the cross-sectional comparison
within each firm characteristic. It is advantageous to apply these conditional models in
my empirical tests of the relationship between investor sentiment and cross-sectional
variations in security returns since the conditional-based framework captures the nature
of time-varying impacts of investor sentiment on security returns.
To specify the role of investors’ skewness preference in asset pricing after controlling
for the effect of investor sentiment, I construct a series of two-regime models by parti-
tioning the sample period into two mutually exclusive sentiment regimes, reflecting high
and low sentiment, based on the measure of investor sentiment at each point of time.
This two-regime framework also helps identify the performance of skewness preference
in the return-generating process under different sentiment conditions. The reason why
my research might achieve superior results over existing asset-pricing literature on
this topic is that the two-regime framework captures the underlying time-varying risk
aversion among investors.
Unlike the first two research questions, the major difficulty in addressing the
relationship between investor sentiment and security returns in financial market bub-
bles and crises is the infrequency and instability of financial bubbles and crises. To
overcome this problem, I employ a path-dependent dynamic model to capture the
spirit of sentiment dynamics at different stages during both bubbles and crises. In
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addition, I include a classical Markov regime-switching model to account for the effect
of changing parameters such as means and variances at different stages through the
periods of market bubbles and recessions. In extension to the simulation approach, I
offer further analyses of two real cases of financial market bubbles and recessions, the
1990s High Technology Bubble and the 2007 Global Financial Crisis to address my
research questions. Besides, to explore the contemporaneous relation between stock
returns and investor sentiment, I employ a structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
model combined with a series of the impulse response and forecast error variance
decomposition analyses to facilitate my demonstration.
Data Collection
The data in all empirical chapters of this thesis cover a consistent sample period, from
January 1987 to December 2010, including all common stocks listed on the NYSE
and AMEX stock exchange with at least a 72-month return history.4 Unlike other
relevant studies, the reason that I choose to start from the late 1980s is that there
was a great influx of new investors, such as pension funds, into the market during the
1980s and the increased demand from these new investors was more likely to capture
the behaviour of irrationals (Katzenbach, 1987). The market crash on 19 October 1987
offers crystal clear evidence on the role of irrational components in the stock market
during the 1980s. As argued by Shleifer and Summers (1990), the stock in the effi-
cient markets hypothesis crashed along with the rest of the market on October 19, 1987.
To measure investor sentiment, I selected the composite index created by Baker and
Wurgler (2006) as my measurement of investor sentiment, which is widely considered
the most popular sentiment proxy to date. Baker and Wurgler (2006) constructed this
index by separating the principal component from six sentiment proxies, including
the closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average
first-day return of IPOs, the equity share in new issues and the dividend premium.
4The criterion of the 72-month return history is set to match a 60-month rolling window and a
one-year portfolio construction period.
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Summary of My Empirical Findings
When investigating the cross-sectional relationship between investor sentiment and
stock returns, I show that stocks of firms with higher opacity are more exposed to
investment sentiment. In particular, I find stocks with high volatility, small capital-
isations, low profitability, low dividend payments and low tangibility exhibit higher
sentiment sensitivity. Besides, I find that stock returns for opaque firms are negatively
correlated with investor sentiment, indicating that higher investor sentiment results in
lower subsequent returns for this type of stock. These findings, together with existing
sentiment-related literature, explain a considerable proportion of the underperformance
of certain opaque stocks in bullish markets. Moreover, my results show that stocks
with high book-to-market ratios or low sales growth rates suffer more significant losses
from sentiment risk in high-sentiment periods but generate higher returns in bearish
markets relative to low book-to-market or high growth rate stocks. This finding offers
contrary evidence to previous studies, such as Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Berger
and Turtle (2012), in terms of the relationship between value premiums and investor
sentiment. However, all these relationships hold only for opaque stocks; no apparent
patterns are observed for less-opaque firms.
Regarding the second research question of this thesis addressing the relationship be-
tween mean variance-skewness trade-off and investor sentiment, I find the conventional
positive mean-variance relation strongly holds in low-sentiment periods but breaks
down in high-sentiment periods. In addition, I show that investor risk aversion changes
with investor sentiment over time, where high (low) sentiment predicts low (high)
risk aversion. This finding implies that the mean-variance relation holds only in the
period of high risk aversion, which is consistent with the fundamental assumption of
the mean-variance proposition. Moreover, I find that skewness preference is positively
priced in the low-sentiment regime (high risk aversion) but significantly negatively
priced in high-sentiment periods (low risk aversion). This result reveals that excessive
skewness reduces subsequent returns in high-sentiment periods, which aligns with
empirical suggestions that positively skewed stocks commonly exhibit lower future
returns (Arditti, 1967; Blau et al., 2016; Blau, 2017; Scott and Horvath, 1980). In
contrast, this result also indicates that investors alter relative valuations of the benefits
of diversification and holding extra (positive) skewness across time depending on their
risk aversion and investor sentiment.
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The empirical results of the third research question shed new light on the role
investor sentiment plays in predicting the subsequent market and asset return during
extreme market conditions such as financial bubbles and crises. First, I find that
cumulative changes in investor sentiment relate to extended periods of increasing over-
valuation, followed by price corrections. This finding implies that the intense buying
pressure in the early stage of a financial bubble generates positive market returns; but
as the bubble persist, the rate of sentiment accumulation slows and market return
retreats to negative territory. The economic intuition behind this finding is that when
a bubble starts to build, more money flows into the market as long as investors achieve
‘euphoria’ from their investments, resulting in upward buying pressure and rising stock
prices; however, as bubbles persist, any decline in market returns is considered a signal
to sell, and thus, the increased selling pressure drives down stock prices, leading to
negative future returns. Moreover, I show that investors respond quickly to short-term
consecutive decreases in investor sentiment, which implies that investors respond more
quickly to market declines than market rises. This finding is consistent with the growing
loss aversion of investors when facing potential losses.
Besides, I find that the path-dependent dynamic relation between future excess
returns and investor sentiment only hold for opaque portfolios (such as small, risky
and unprofitable portfolios). Stocks of firms with relatively lower opacity show less
significant results. This finding offers supportive complementary evidence to my results
in Chapter 3 which show that opaque stocks are more susceptible to investor sentiment.
Additionally, another interesting pattern observed from my empirical results is that
the relationship between investor sentiment and future returns for book-to-market
portfolios varies across market conditions; in particular, I find the relationship is
statistically significant in bubbles only for high book-to-market portfolios, while low
book-to-market portfolios show significant relationships in crises.
Furthermore, this empirical chapter also finds some intuitive results from exam-
ples of real financial bubbles and crises, including the 1999 High-Tech Bubble and
the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. First, with the assistance of a three-state Markov
regime-switching model, I find that investor sentiment generates negative returns
during periods of excessive volatility but positive returns when the market is relatively
stable. Moreover, investor sentiment is the most negatively priced when the market is
more volatile. As argued by the extant literature that market bubbles and crises are
associated with extreme market volatilities (e.g. Froot and Obstfeld, 1991; Wu, 1997),
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my results imply that investor sentiment generates significant negative future returns
during extremely volatile periods in bubbles and crises. This relationship, however,
becomes insignificant when the test is re-applied to the whole sample, strengthening
my argument that investor sentiment generates negative returns only in extremely
volatile periods.
Another important finding of this thesis is that I find market returns contribute
to the formation of investor sentiment. In particular, I find market returns impose a
positive contemporaneous impact on investor sentiment by applying a structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) framework. In addition, this effect is stronger in crisis periods,
but not so evident in bubbles. Consistent with investors’ aversion to potential losses,
this finding indicates that investors are more sensitive to adverse market shocks.
Contribution
The main contributions of this research thesis are summarised as the following. First,
consistent with earlier studies that reveal that investor sentiment contains a market-
wide component (e.g. Antoniou et al., 2010; Brown, 1999; Livnat and Petrovits, 2009;
Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Yu and Yuan, 2011), my research provides additional
evidence for the role that investor sentiment plays in the asset-pricing process. In
particular, this thesis demonstrates that investor sentiment indeed explains a great
proportion of variations in security returns. Hence, as an implication for future asset-
pricing research, it may be advantageous to consider more about the investor sentiment
risk.
Second, this thesis complements existing asset-pricing literature with respect to
investors’ risk aversion by showing that investors’ risk aversion varies with investor
sentiment across time. Consistent with many recent studies such as Wolff et al. (2014)
and Bams et al. (2017), my thesis indicates that higher (lower) level of market sentiment
reflects lower (higher) investors’ risk aversion. To the best of my knowledge, few studies
have touched on this point before. However, the contribution of this finding goes far
beyond this. Since many earlier finance studies are constructed on an unconditional
base with the assumption of full rationality or constant risk aversion among investors
(such as the mean-variance relation of security returns), this thesis provides an intuitive
explanation for the failure of such conventional finance theories in explaining security
returns; that is, investors are not invariably rational or risk-averse over time. In real
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financial markets, investor risk aversion varies depending on their sentiment, and lower
risk aversion allows investors to accept excessive risk without requiring compensation.
Third, my research complements the present literature exploring the influence of
investor sentiment in asset pricing by offering additional evidence on the role that
investor sentiment plays in explaining stock market anomalies. In particular, this
research thesis demonstrates the influence of investor sentiment in explaining both
cross-sectional and time-series variations in security and market returns. Additionally, I
provide novel explanations for controversial asset-pricing puzzles, such as cross-sectional
variations in stock returns and the validity of the mean-variance proposition from the
perspective of investor sentiment.
Fourth, my research specifies the contribution of investor sentiment to market
returns during extreme market conditions such as bubbles and crises. In particular, this
thesis portrays the empirical importance of investor sentiment in financial bubbles and
crises from the perspective of both simulations and real case analyses; both of these anal-
yses indicate consistent results. In addition, unlike the mainstream sentiment-related
asset-pricing literature, which focuses on the predictive power of investor sentiment on
market returns, this research thesis also indicates a significant impact of market returns
on the formation of investor sentiment, especially during periods of crises and recessions.
In conclusion, this research thesis makes a significant contribution to both the
asset-pricing and behavioural finance literature. By establishing a close connection
between asset pricing and investor sentiment, I find investor sentiment plays a vital role
in describing and forming both the cross-sectional and time-series returns of an asset.
In addition, my research indicates that asset-pricing models which incorporate investor
sentiment as an explanatory variable far outperform models that do not include investor
sentiment (e.g., the comparison between the one-regime and two-regime models in
Chapter 4). Hence, my results reveal that descriptively accurate models of expected
returns need to better incorporate investor sentiment. In future financial studies, a
better understanding of sentiment seems likely to shed light on the time-series patterns
in security returns and firm characteristics that appear to be conditionally relevant to
share prices.
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Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 summarises the literature foundation
on which my research is built. Chapter 3 addresses the issues between cross-sectional
variations in security returns and investor sentiment with respect to firm opacity. The
second research question, relating to the role of skewness preference in asset pricing
in the context of investor sentiment, is addressed in Chapter 4. The last empirical
chapter, Chapter 5, describes the contribution of investor sentiment to financial market
bubbles and crises. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides potential implications
for future research.
.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews the relevant literature related to my research. It begins with
a general discussion of the difference between conventional and behavioural finance.
In particular, I concentrate on the literature which portrays the relative benefits
of behavioural finance over conventional theories. Moreover, this chapter covers a
wide range of studies, including both earlier and recent ones. Further, this chapter
also specifies the critical literature that is most related to my study. The main ob-
jective of the chapter is to offer the reader a systematic overview of ‘what has been
done by previous behavioural finance studies’ and ‘what remains to be further explored’.
The subsequent subsections are structured as follows. Section 2.1 begins with a
brief introduction to the distinction between conventional and behavioural finance. In
particular, this section provides an answer to the question of why an increasing number
of researchers switched from conventional finance to a behavioural finance approach.
Section 2.2 revises the critical literature in relation to behavioural finance and investor
sentiment, in particular, over the past few decades. Section 2.3 establishes a close
connection between extant literature and my research. Section 2.4 offers a discussion
on more recent related literature.
2.1 Conventional or Behavioural?
Traditionally, researchers built financial models or theories on the basis of the hypothe-
sis of an efficient securities market. In particular, they all agreed on the fundamental
assumption that people in security markets are entirely rational and thus stock prices
in markets should efficiently reflect all available information (Fama, 1965). One of the
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drawbacks shared by these studies is that they left no role for irrationals in financial
markets. For example, Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965) argued that the impact from
irrationals can be ultimately eradicated by rational arbitrageurs via manipulation, as
rational arbitrageurs will eventually correct any mispricings caused by irrationals. In
addition, as stated by the maximum utility theory, all investors in the market should
diversify to optimise the statistical properties of their portfolios, resulting in a market
equilibrium price equaling the discounted value of expected future cash flows. In other
words, prices should equal fundamentals.
However, a number of researchers find that certain asset prices do not necessarily
reflect fundamentals all the time. For example, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) found
that the market value has steadily declined since the late 1960s because of the inflation
effect. Lease et al. (1974) indicated that individual investors failed to diversify their
portfolios; instead, preferring to hold a small group of stocks instead of the market
portfolio. Pritchett and Summers (1996) found that existing statistical tests perform
poorly when evaluating market efficiency as market valuations can substantially deviate
from rational expectations of future cash flows. Besides these, others have also noted
that the classical finance theory fails to explain a wide range of market anomalies.
For example, the initial study by Banz (1981) suggested that the traditional CAPM
developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) fails to explain the excessive returns on
small firms’ securities. In addition, Banz (1981) found that small stocks on the NYSE
have higher stock returns relative to large firm stocks. A later research paper by Fama
and French (1993) further indicated that premiums on returns of small stocks over
large ones prevail within the whole security market, and thus, should be considered an
additional systematic risk factor (in addition to market risk). Moreover, Fama and
French (1993) suggested a significant value factor in explaining asset returns.1 Further
examples of stock market puzzles include Novy-Marx (2010) finding that securities
of firms with higher profitability earn higher returns than unprofitable ones. Cooper
et al. (2008) found companies that grow more aggressively their total assets earn lower
subsequent returns on their stocks. Hence, the failure of the orthodox finance theory
encourages researchers to find an alternative way to explain stock market performance.
1Fama and French’s three-factor model has been widely used in financial asset-pricing process; this
model has been further expanded to a four-factor model with the addition of extra momentum factor
by Carhart (1997) and to a five-factor model with the addition of a liquidity factor by Pástor and
Stambaugh (2003).
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Over the past few decades, the general discussion on behavioural finance, and
on investor sentiment particularly, has attracted considerable attention from finance
researchers for its relative superiority over conventional theories in solving security
market puzzles. To be specific, newly constructed financial models which incorporate
psychological components are found to have stronger explanatory power on predicting
future security returns than classical ones. Unlike the conventional theory, behavioural
finance theory amplifies the influence of irrationals in financial markets and indicates
that investors do not always follow the maximum utility theory when constructing
their portfolios (Black, 1986; Brown, 1999; De Long et al., 1990). Also, researchers
find that arbitrageurs fail to correct market mispricings in the first place.
There is considerable evidence on the role of irrationals in financial markets. For
example, Black (1986) argued that irrational investors who typically act on noisy
signals instead of information create enormous noise, resulting in high levels of market
inefficiency. The findings of Black (1986) overthrow the conclusion made by Friedman
(1953) and Fama (1965) that the importance of irrational investors is negligibly small
in the price formation process as rational arbitrageurs will ultimately correct any
mispricing opportunities. Moreover, De Long et al. (1990) provided further evidence
on the importance of irrational investors in financial markets. In particular, they found
that investors with heterogeneous stochastic beliefs often drive price away from funda-
mentals and thus generate additional risks to both themselves and rational investors.
Hence, the authors argued that investors who bear such risks have to be compensated
by a corresponding risk premium. More importantly, De Long et al. (1990) also found
that irrationals are more easily driven by their own sentiment. These early studies have
blazed a trail for research on irrationals’ behaviour and further aroused a great deal of
academic interest in exploring the impact of investor sentiment in financial markets.
2.2 Idiosyncratic or Systematic?
The question of whether investor sentiment is idiosyncratic or systematic has been
debated for a long time. Intuitively, if investor sentiment contains only an idiosyncratic
component, it means that this type of risk can be fully eliminated by diversification, in
theory. Hence, the risk associated with investor sentiment would be of less interest.
In contrast, if sentiment includes a market component, bearing such a risk has to be
compensated by an additional risk premium, and more importantly, including such a
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risk component in the asset-pricing process may also affect the risk premium associated
with other risk factors. Earlier studies indicated mixed results on this question. For
example, Elton et al. (1998) argued that investor sentiment should be treated as an
idiosyncratic risk rather than a systematic risk, as its impact will be embodied by other
systematic risks. Specifically, their results suggest a positive relation between small
stock returns and investor sentiment using a two-risk-factor model, but a negative
sensitivity when the model is expanded to a multi-factor model. Hence, they believed
that the impact from investor sentiment risk can be diluted by other systematic risks.
In addition, their paper found no evidence of small investor sentiment being a vital
pricing factor for subsequent returns. Elton et al. (1998) findings provided strong
evidence against the conclusion from an earlier study by Lee et al. (1991) who suggested
a market price for investor sentiment. In contrast with Elton et al. (1998), Lee et al.
(1991) found that investor sentiment explains much of the variance for returns of
closed-end funds and small stocks. Moreover, they ascertained that small investor
sentiment, measured by a change in the discount on closed-end funds, is a significant
component in the asset-pricing process and thus requires additional risk premiums.
Brown (1999) suggested a similar result to Lee et al. (1991); in particular, Brown
(1999) found that irrational investors always behave coherently when facing noisy
signals and thus cause significant systematic risks, where noisy signals refer to investor
sentiment and risk is volatility. This paper showed that investor sentiment has a close
relationship with closed-end fund volatility and this relationship remains robust even
after controlling for market volatility changes and discounts on closed-end funds. In
my review of the extant literature, I found that the vast majority of researchers agree
with the investor sentiment being a systematic rather than an idiosyncratic risk since
significant evidence is found showing that exposure to investor sentiment contains
a significant market-wide component and helps to explain much of the variations in
security returns. Therefore, it should be of interest to further investigate the impact of
sentiment in the asset-pricing process.
Further examples related to the market-wide component in investor sentiment
may be summarised as follows. Following Kyle (1985) and Black (1986), Shleifer and
Summers (1990) employed a noise trader approach to test the efficiency of the market
and found that arbitrageurs do not necessarily react to price deviations in markets
caused by uninformed demand because of limits to arbitrage. Moreover, they pointed
out that both fundamental risks and unpredictability from future prices limit the
ability to arbitrage. Campbell and Kyle (1993) found a similar result. In particular,
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the authors found that ‘noise traders’ interact with rational investors, significantly
affecting market prices. Campbell and Kyle (1993) argued that the risk associated with
irrational investment strongly deters rationals from placing speculative bets against
them. A later study by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provided further demonstrations on
limits to arbitrage, finding that arbitraging against irrationals is extraordinarily costly
and risky due to the great volatility resulting from irrational transactions. Also, the
authors suggested that this type of risk cannot be eliminated through diversification
because of its market-wide impact, and thus, professional arbitrageurs intentionally
avoid incredibly volatile positions even if such positions offer relatively high averaged
returns. Lee et al. (2002) proved that investors are a significant factor in explaining
stock returns and conditional volatility. Moreover, they found a contemporaneous
positive relation between investor sentiment and excess returns.
2.3 Literature Related to My Study
2.3.1 Cross-Sectional Variation in Stock Returns
For many years, as discussed above, researchers found supportive evidence for the
notion that a common time-varying sentiment component exerts market-wide effects
on stock prices.2 Given the crucial influence of investor sentiment in stock markets, it
is important to price investor sentiment appropriately in the asset-pricing process, as
it affects both asset returns and other risk premiums.
Precedent literature showed that there exists a wide range of financial market
anomalies that still remain unsolved by conventional finance theory. These market
anomalies, however, have been proved by recent studies to have a close relationship
with investor sentiment. For example, Neal and Wheatley (1998) examined the fore-
castability of three sentiment measures of stock returns and found that discounts on
closed-end funds, one of their proxies for sentiment, predict size premiums. Brown and
Cliff (2005) considered the impact of sentiment on cross-sectional size portfolios by
regressing long-horizon returns on economic explanatory variables as well as lagged
sentiment and found that returns of large stocks tend to be more exposed to investor
sentiment than small stock returns. Besides, referring to the value effect, extant
2As a reminder, important literature that addresses the issue of market-wide sentiment includes
De Long et al. (1990), Shleifer and Summers (1990), Lee et al. (1991), Barberis et al. (1998), Shiller
(2000a), Brown and Cliff (2004, 2005), and Yuan (2005).
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literature suggests mixed results on the impact of investor sentiment on stocks with
different book-to-market ratios. For example, Lakonishok et al. (1994) argued that
the high rates of return associated with securities with high book-to-market ratios
are contributed by investors who mis-extrapolate the past earnings growth rates of
firms. Specifically, they asserted that for stocks with high book-to-market ratios,
investors are overoptimistic regarding firms with the good previous-year performance
but overpessimistic regarding firms that performed poorly in the previous year. In
addition, Lakonishok et al. (1994) argued that stocks with low book-to-market ratios
‘charm’ investors, and thus, investors push prices far above the fundamentals, which
results in lower subsequent returns. Despite the wide spectrum of results offered by
existing studies, the vast majority of these draw a common conclusion: that investor
sentiment has strong predictive power in terms of cross-sectional variations in security
returns.
Apart from the evidence above, Baker and Wurgler (2006) collected and rephrased
the scattered results from earlier empirical work to provide more intuitive inferences
on the relationship between sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns. In particular,
they tested the relationship between investor sentiment and a set of cross-sectional
characteristics and found that small, young, high volatility, low profitability, non-
dividend-paying, extreme growth and distressed stocks are more exposed to investor
sentiment. Moreover, they indicated that firms with opaque characteristics earn lower
subsequent returns in high-sentiment periods, and this pattern attenuates and reverses
in low-sentiment periods. In extension to Baker and Wurgler (2006), Berger and
Turtle (2012) also found consistent results. Specifically, they tested the conditional
relationship between cross-sectional stock returns and investor sentiment via multiple
risk factor models and found the predictive power of investor sentiment on security
returns remains after controlling for additional systematic risk factors. Hence, based
on these two studies, my research further explores the coherent relationship between
investor sentiment and cross-sectional variations in stock returns with respect to firm
opacity, for more intuitive inferences.
There are two possible explanations for the relationship between cross-sectional
variations in opaque stock returns and investor sentiment. First, the higher level
of firm opacity increases information asymmetry between investors and firms and
consequently enhances the difficulties in valuation. Ravi and Hong (2014) argued that
when the information asymmetry between investors and a particular firm is higher, all
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investors are largely uninformed. Hence, to capture the nature of cross-sectional firm
opacity, I select a set of firm characteristics including size, risk, profitability, dividends,
tangibility and growth opportunity, where all these variables are suggested as indicators
of information asymmetry by the existing accounting literature.3 For example, Chari
et al. (1988) argued that firm size is an important proxy for information asymmetry
and found higher abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date for small
firms but no abnormal returns for large firms. Aboody and Lev (2000) found a close
relationship between research and development and insider gains. In particular, they
found firms with intensive research and development exhibit more massive insider
gains and thus research and development significantly predict information asymmetry. 4
Another source of the widespread cross-sectional variations in opaque stock returns
is the short-sale impediments in financial markets. Stambaugh et al. (2012) argued
that institutional constraints, arbitrage risk, behavioural biases of traders and trading
costs contribute to the huge short-sale impediments and thus limit the ability for
arbitrage. Numerous studies have argued that limited arbitrage causes mispricings.
For example, Shleifer and Summers (1990) argued that it is, in fact, risky, not riskless,
to arbitrage against irrational investors in financial markets. The fundamental risk
and risk from irrationals increase the total risks for arbitraging activities and thus
limit the ability for arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicated a similar risk that
might limit financial market arbitrage: that traders who short a stock in the belief that
the stock is currently overvalued and thus its price will eventually fall in the future.
However, if future prices increase further, traders suffer huge losses when liquidating.
In addition, Baker and Wurgler (2006) concluded that mispricing results from the
interaction of an uninformed demand shock and limits to arbitrage. Based on these
two propositions, it may be advantageous to investigate the relationship between cross-
sectional variations in stock returns with respect to firm opacity and investor sentiment.
3Tangibility includes two variables (property, plant and equipment and research and development)
and growth opportunity is measured by book-to-market ratio and sales growth rate.
4Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) indicated the volatility of stock returns as a proxy for
information asymmetry. Aboody and Lev (2000) suggested the relevance of property, plant and
equipment but indicated a weaker predict power relative to research and development. Earning as
a proxy for information asymmetry was introduced by Collins et al. (1997), Francis and Schipper
(1999), and Ely and Waymire (1999). Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) documented the effect of earnings
and dividends, while Richardson (2000) suggested the relevance of book-to-market ratios and sales
growth rate.
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2.3.2 Skewness Preference in Asset Pricing
Apart from the cross-sectional puzzle in security returns, existing literature also sug-
gests that conventional asset pricing models fail to explain time-series variations in
stock returns. There is considerable evidence showing that earlier asset-pricing models,
such as mean-variance framework proposed by Markowitz (1952) and the Capital
Asset Pricing Model developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), cannot forecast
real market movement. For example, Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Miller et al.
(1972) found inconsistent relationships between the expected return of a stock and the
associated risk relative to the implied mean-variance relation in the CAPM. Brandt and
Kang (2004) employed a latent VAR process investigating both the contemporaneous
and intertemporal relationships between mean and conditional variance and found a
strong negative, not positive, mean-variance relation. Some earlier research also found
similar negative correlations in mean-variance trade-offs of stock returns (Campbell,
1987; Nelson, 1991; Whitelaw, 1994). Beyond these two results, other researchers
indicated an otherwise double-sided correlation between expected security returns and
variances. For example, Harvey (2001) argued that the mean-variance trade-off is
strongly sensitive to the specification of conditional models and thus can be either
positive or negative. Roll and Ross (1994) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1995) found
little connection between the sample mean returns and estimated betas due to the
failure of the efficient market hypothesis.
As a result, some of the latest literature has shown a great deal of interest in
exploring the role of skewness, the third moment of stock prices, in elucidating the
time-series variations of returns. For example, Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) argued
that the efficiency of the traditional CAPM in explaining security market returns is
subject to multiple assumptions, such as the performance measurement as well as
market efficiency. Moreover, they found that skewness is a significant pricing fac-
tor other than the variance in security returns. Dittmar (2002) suggested a similar
result, indicating the importance of skewness in determining future stock returns. Har-
vey and Siddique (2000) found that conditional skewness explains the cross-sectional
variation in security returns even after controlling for the size and book-to-market effect.
Moreover, some sentiment-related literature found that investors sometimes exhibit
a strong skewness preference over a well-diversified portfolio. For example, Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) found that some investors would rather sacrifice part of their utility
to include more positively skewed stocks in their portfolios. Mitton and Vorkink (2007)
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found that investors with heterogeneous preferences for skewness choose to undiversify
their portfolios to achieve potential extreme positive returns. Besides, the authors
demonstrated that the violation of the conventional mean-variance framework can
be primarily explained by investors’ strong preferences for skewness, both systematic
(co-skewness) and idiosyncratic (skewness). Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) and Conine
and Tamarkin (1981) found similar results, indicating that investors intentionally hold
undiversified portfolios when skewness risk is taken into consideration. Arditti (1967)
and Scott and Horvath (1980) also found that investors have strong preferences for
positively skewed stocks.
However, existing studies indicate mixed results on the price of skewness preference
in asset pricing. For example, Kapadia (2006) found that the cross-sectional skewness
explains a considerable part of the common time-variation and the premiums associated
with firms with high idiosyncratic volatility. Also, the author indicated that sensitivity
to cross-sectional skewness is related to the underperformance of IPOs and small
growth stocks due to investors’ strong preference for skewness. Lastly, Kapadia placed
a negative valuation on the market skewness in the asset-pricing process. However,
Adrian and Rosenberg (2008) and Harvey and Siddique (2000) predicted a positive
premium associated with market skewness risk. Therefore, there remain large gaps in
this area for researchers to further investigate the role of skewness in asset pricing.
Further, as the majority of previous literature on this topic is constructed on the
basis of rational models, introducing the role of irrational investors in the return
generating process might be beneficial and completely reverse previous findings. For
example, Mitton and Vorkink (2007) argued that both co-skewness and idiosyncratic
skewness can affect equilibrium prices in the context of heterogeneous preferences.
However, this result significantly contrasts with the predictions made by traditional
asset-pricing models, which assume full diversification for all investors. Therefore, it is
of great interest to reconsider the impact of skewness in asset pricing by simultaneously
accounting for the influence of irrational investors.
2.3.3 The Role of Investor Sentiment in Bubbles and Crises
Stock market crises or bubbles have historically been one of the most significant chal-
lenges for economists, researchers and regulators, because of their tremendous and
contagious influence on the economy. Authorities have endeavoured a great effort
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to the prediction and prevention of financial market bubbles and crises and recent
studies unveil a great importance of irrational components in such events. For exam-
ple, Kindleberger and Manias (1989) specified a psychological and irrational factor
in explaining historical financial bubbles and crises, while Lux (1995) introduced an
innovative framework that formalises herd behaviour or mutual mimetic contagion in
speculative markets. Also, he found that the emergence of bubbles is a ‘self-organising’
process among irrationals in the market.
Moreover, other studies indicated that unsophisticated investors (such as young
and inexperienced investors), which is also a significant component of irrationality,
contribute a considerable proportion to the inflation of market bubbles, as they are
more risk-seeking and radical relative to their counterparts. For example, Chevalier
and Ellison (1999) suggested that young investors have more incentives to herd, that
is, to follow others’ investment decisions, especially under extreme market conditions.
Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) showed that young and inexperienced investors generally have
higher expectations about market returns and are more likely to trade aggressively.
Brennan (2004) proposed that increased stock market participation by individuals
with little investment experience was the major factor behind the High-Tech Bubble.
Greenwood and Nagel (2009) found that young managers conduct more speculative
transactions relative to older colleagues. Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2006) offered
an intuitive discussion on the relationship between behavioural factors, in particular,
sentiment, and bubbles. In particular, they described speculative bubble episodes as
mirror images of extremely high-sentiment periods centred on small, growth, young
and unprofitable stocks. Moreover, during high-sentiment episodes, the high propensity
for speculation allows investors to take the high-end estimation of stock prices, while
when sentiment is low, they place pessimistic valuations on stock prices. They also
suggested that their composite sentiment indexes, as described in previous chapters,
visibly align with historical accounts of bubbles and crashes. As described previously,
investors’ risk tolerance might vary across time, and it would be interesting to further
investigate how the role of investor sentiment changes in extreme market conditions,
that is, bubbles and crises.
However, there are two difficulties that may deter this endeavour. First, bullish
and bearish markets are common while bubbles or crises (recessions) are not. Lux
(1995) argued that bubbles or crises are not stationary in reality. The phenomenon that
bubbles grow and burst, followed by crises, will not last forever. Hence, the specificity
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of these events increases the difficulties for researchers to study and generalise results.
Second, the cut point of a starting and ending period for a bubble or crisis is not clearly
defined. Lack of forecastability for bubbles and crises makes it extremely challenging to
identify a bubble at the beginning, or the time it bursts. Most evidence and conclusions
drawn from historical bubbles or crises by existing studies are achieved on an ex post,
rather than ex ante, basis.
Apart from these, previous studies rarely employed empirical analysis approaches
to examine bubbles or crises due to the instability of these events. Instead, earlier
researchers constructed a variety of theoretical frameworks aimed at capturing the
nature of a bubble or crisis. For example, the theoretical framework proposed by Lux
(1995) modelled the mutual mimetic contagion process among speculative investors
during bubbles. In essence, assuming there is no other source of information available
to investors except market prices, a speculator will quickly react to what other investors
do in the market, as they believe that others’ behaviour reflects better information
about future developments of the market and thus reveal information. This proposition
also applies to crises or recessions. More recent work by Mikhed and Zemčík (2009)
investigated cointegration between prices and fundamentals to assess when prices truly
reflect fundamentals. In theory, if the price deviates far from its fundamentals, it is
highly likely there is a bubble in the market.5 Another paper by Chiang et al. (2011)
also proposed a similar framework to identify bubbles. In sum, extant literature offers
heuristic ideas to identify speculative bubbles or crises in financial markets, but few
papers have drawn inferable conclusions on the role of investor sentiment in bubbles
and crises.
2.4 Insights from Recent Studies
Latest literature offers more novel and insightful views on the role of investor sentiment
in financial markets. Among all of the studies, there is one crucial aspect that many
researchers focus on is how to find a suitable proxy for investor sentiment. Huang
et al. (2015) established an innovative composite index to proxy investor sentiment. In
contrast to the well-known sentiment created by Baker and Wurgler (2006), Huang
5This framework is constructed on the basis of Campbell (1987) proposition that stationarity
between financial assets and their cash flows should be of the same order of integration and if they are
both non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences, the two series should be cointegrated.
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et al. (2015) constructed the index the opposite way. In particular, they separated out
the common noise in a group of investor sentiment proxies, and treated the rest as an
indicator for investor sentiment. By applying this composite sentiment index to the
return generating process, they found strong superiority of this sentiment index over
any existing sentiment indexes including the composite index proposed by Baker and
Wurgler (2006) in both in- and out-of-sample predictions. Da et al. (2014) constructed
a Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index as a new
measure of investor sentiment, which aggregates the volume of queries related to
certain household concerns such as ‘recession’ and ‘unemployment’. When applying
this index to the prediction of stock returns, the authors found significant predictive
power for short-term return reversals, a temporary increase in volatilities as well as
mutual fund outflows from equity funds to bond funds. Besides these studies, rather
than investigating the impact of market-wide sentiment, Aboody et al. (2018) targeted
the relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment, measured by short-term
overnight rate persistence rather than market sentiment, and stock returns, and found
harder-to-value firms have stronger short-term persistence. This finding is consistent
with existing evidence that harder-to-value firms are more exposed to market-wide
investor sentiment. Similarly, Cornell et al. (2017) indicated that high-quality account-
ing information mitigates sentiment-related mispricing. In particular, they found that
during high-sentiment periods, financial analysts typically issue more favourable recom-
mendations on firms that are more difficult to value, resulting in lower subsequent stock
returns of these firms. Their findings offer an alternative explanation to the question of
why stocks of firms with higher opacity are more likely to be mispriced. McLean and
Zhao (2014) found that the external financing cost of a company varies across time
and market recession and low investor sentiment generate additional external financing
costs to investors. Kim et al. (2014) found that higher levels of divergence among
investors’ opinions produce lower subsequent returns in high-sentiment periods, but
have no significant effect on future stock market returns during low-sentiment periods.
Further, recent studies indicate that investors’ preference for (positive) skewness is
also correlated with investor sentiment. For example, Aissia (2014) investigated the
irrational component of agent behaviour towards IPO lotteries, to provide empirical
evidence on investors’ preference for stocks with lottery-like features, that is, stocks
with positively skewed returns, and investor sentiment. Also, Aissia showed that
skewness preference and sentiment effect are stronger during periods with favourable
market conditions. Green and Hwang (2011) found IPOs with high expected skewness
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exhibit higher first-day abnormal returns and negative long-run subsequent returns.
They also implied that first-day IPO returns are related to investors’ preference for
skewness. Fong (2015) argued that individuals are attracted to lottery stocks because
they are risk-seeking and sentiment-prone. Besides, he also ascertained that the puzzle
associated with the preference for lottery stock can only be explained by unusual risk
preferences and the propensity for individual investors to trade on sentiment. Blau
(2017) showed that the overoptimism among investors strengthens investors’ preference
for positive skewness and the underperformance of positively skewed stocks is shown
to be primarily driven by periods of high investor sentiment. These studies provide
solid background support to my research.
There are also some new papers have discussed the relationship between irrational
exuberance and market bubbles or crashes. For example, Shu and Chang (2015) found
that the formation of bubbles and crashes can be adequately explained by investor
sentiment. Furthermore, this paper indicated that after relaxing the assumption of
investor rationality, the conventional Lucas Jr (1978) asset-pricing model well captures
the relationships among investor sentiment, asset prices and expected returns and the
nature of some market anomalies such as high volatility. Prieto and Perote (2017) sug-
gested that investor incentives to herd increase the forecasted volatility and contribute
to the bubble inflation and this effect is mitigated when more information about the
expected market movement is provided to investors.
To conclude, recent studies offer relatively novel evidence to previous sentiment-
related literature from a variety of financial aspects but one of the points that all these
papers agree on is that is that investor sentiment has significant predictive power on
future returns. Aligning these studies, the rest of this research thesis addresses three
critical topics in finance from the perspective of investor sentiment.

Chapter 3
Cross-Sectional Variations in
Stock Returns with Respect to
Firm Opacity and Investor
Sentiment
Abstract
This chapter employs multiple conditional frameworks to demonstrate the coherent
relationship between investor sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns with respect
to firm opacity. I show that opaque firm stocks are more prone to investor sentiment
relative to translucent stocks, because of the great difficulty in valuation and the
limited ability for arbitrage. In addition, I find that investor sentiment explains a
considerable proportion of the cross-sectional risk premium of opaque firms, including
those with small capitalisations, high volatility, low profitability, low dividends and
less investment tangibility at lower market sentiment levels. Moreover, I show that
investor sentiment remains significant in the asset-pricing process of opaque portfolios
after additional risk factors are controlled. In terms of book-to-market portfolios, I find
that the impact of investor sentiment is slightly stronger for the high-end, not low-end,
book-to-market ratio portfolios. In particular, I show that the marginal performance
of high book-to-market ratio portfolios at lower sentiment levels is greater than that of
low book-to-market portfolios, which explains much of the cross-sectional premium
associated with the value factor. This finding is contrary to the extant literature with
respect to the role of investor sentiment on returns of book-to-market portfolios. The
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findings of this chapter offer, partially, intuitive reasons for the failure of the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama and French’s factor model in regards to
explaining cross-sectional premiums in security returns of opaque firms. My empirical
results are robust after controlling for additional systematic risk factors such as size,
value and momentum.
3.1 Introduction
The efficient market proposition has formed the basis for most financial research for
a long time. Despite the widespread allegiance to the notion of market efficiency,
some research found contradictory evidence to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH),
as it fails to explain a broad range of market anomalies over time. The failure of
conventional asset pricing models (such as CAPM) has engrossed an increasing number
of researchers to investigate the essential ingredients of such anomalies. For example,
Fama and French (1993) found that size and value factors are another two impor-
tant elements other than the market risk in the asset-pricing process and all these
variables are not eliminable through diversification. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
introduced the momentum effect to asset pricing, which indicated that higher past
returns typically forecast high future returns. Campbell et al. (2008) argued that firms
in financial distress, that is, with high failure probability, have lower subsequent returns.
This chapter investigates how the cross-sectional variation in security returns is
connected to investor sentiment. Many recent studies in behavioural finance showed
that a group of market anomalies are firmly related to investor sentiment (Kothari
and Shanken, 1997; Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Shiller, 1981, 2000b). My research does
not repeatedly examine the issue of whether investor sentiment explains returns, but
instead, attempt to untangle the various degrees of this impact on firm returns via
firm opacity. Since it has been well documented that the risk associated with investor
sentiment is systematic rather than idiosyncratic (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007;
Brown, 1999; De Long et al., 1990), it should be of great interest to identify which
specific firm characteristics lead firms to greater exposure to investor sentiment risk.1
1Other studies that address the systematic component of investor sentiment include Yuan (2005),
Baker andWurgler (2006, 2007), Kaniel et al. (2008), Kumar and Lee (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina
(2006), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), and Frazzini and Lamont (2008).
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Recent studies showed that the cross-sectional relationship between investor senti-
ment and stock returns depends on certain firm characteristics. For example, Lee et al.
(1991) found that small stock returns are significantly positively related to investor
sentiment, although this relation might weaken over time. Ho and Hung (2009) found
that investor sentiment captures the impacts of size, value, liquidity and momentum
on individual stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) argued that small, young and
unprofitable firms are more susceptible to investor sentiment. Cornelli et al. (2006)
noted that high-when-issued market prices preceding IPOs (indicating over-optimism)
strongly predict first-day aftermarket prices, while low prices (indicating excessive
pessimism) do not have predictive power. In extension to current studies, the primary
objective of this chapter is to investigate the coherent relationship between the cross-
sectional stock return and investor sentiment.
In practice, if a company can disclose more information to the public, it should
then provide fewer difficulties for investors to evaluate the value of the company as
everyone in the market has equal access to the same information. Hence, the valuation
placed on stocks of this company among investors must be relatively accurate and
consistent. However, firms with higher opacity present a risk of valuation to investors
as investors have to value the stock of the company through their own information
and expectations. As a result, investors are more likely to be swayed by investor
sentiment when it comes to valuing the company. Furthermore, the higher level of
opacity also limits rational arbitrageurs’ ability to arbitrage, which deters them from
correcting mispricings in the market and thus results in further deviations of stock
prices. Hence, it can be reasonably inferred that the extent of disclosure of a company’s
information, which is equivalent to the company’s opacity, determines whether the
stock of the company is fairly priced or not. Baker and Wurgler (2006) concluded these
two factors, which cause stock market mispricing, as uninformed demand shocks and
limits to arbitrage.2 On the other hand, investor sentiment, which represents investors’
expectation about the market and future cash flows, determines how investors place
valuations when the access to information is limited. Hence, investors with different
interpretations about the current market performance may place different valuations.
In particular, optimistic investors normally place relatively higher valuations than
pessimistic investors over the same stock. Therefore, since higher level firm opacity
increases investors’ risk for valuation, the equity price of an opaque company should
2A great number of studies have well documented the role of limited arbitrage on the mispricing
of individual stocks, including Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Shleifer and Summers (1990), Baker and
Wurgler (2006, 2007) and Barber et al. (2008).
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be more susceptible to investor sentiment than to a translucent company.
Based on such background, this research aims at investigating the underlying con-
nection between investor sentiment and security returns via firm opacity. In particular,
I predict that firms with higher opacity are more exposed to investor sentiment. More-
over, I characterise firm opacity on the basis of several accounting variables including
firm size, volatility risk, profitability, dividends, tangibility,3 growth opportunity and
relative performance of stocks where all these variables are considered indicators of
firm opacity (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Collins et al., 1997; Ely and Waymire, 1999;
Francis and Schipper, 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Richardson, 2000;
Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986).4 Additionally, I predict that the sentiment impact
is positive on size, net earnings, dividends and tangibility but negative on volatility
risk. The intuition behind these relationships is that firms with small capitalisations,
high volatility, low profitability, low dividend payments and low tangibility reveal less
information to investors than their counterparts and thus increase the difficulty for
pricing. Further, for the growth opportunity, I hypothesise a U-shaped relationship
between investor sentiment and stock returns. To be specific, taking book-to-market
ratio as an indicator of growth opportunity, I expect that the sentiment impact is
more pronounced for less fairly valued stocks such as stocks with extreme high and
low book-to-market ratios respectively than fairly priced stocks (i.e., those with book-
to-market ratios close to one). This hypothesis is constructed based on two intuitive
explanations. First, by definition, prices of a stock reflect investor expectations about
future cash flows, and thus, a differential between the market price and the book value
indicates a mispricing of a security. Hence, either a higher or lower book-to-market
ratio reflects a deviation of stock prices from its fundamentals. Second, the extant
literature indicates that irrational investors cause mispricing opportunities in stock
prices (Brown, 1999; De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Summers, 1990). Therefore, I
expect a higher sentiment exposure on stocks with a higher differential between market
price and book value of equity.
The data used in this study cover a sample period from January 1987 to December
2010, including all common stocks with at least a 72-month return history from the
3The characteristic tangibility is defined by two indicators: property, plant and equipment (PPE)
and research and development (R&D).
4Empirical studies found that these variables are closely related to corporate information asymmetry
and display opaque characteristics in general.
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NYSE and AMEX stock exchanges.5 This period is particularly interesting, as there
was an influx of new investors, such as pension funds, into the stock market, and thus,
the market performance across this period is likely to capture the influence of irrationals
(Katzenbach, 1987). All firm-level data are drawn from the merged CRSP/Compustat
database, and all risk factors are collected from the Kenneth R. French’s Data Library.
The accounting variables are defined following the specification of Baker and Wurgler
(2006). Moreover, for the measure of investor sentiment, I selected the composite
sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) as my target sentiment variable.6
The empirical analysis begins with an examination of the opacity characteristics
of stocks that display the highest sensitivity to contemporaneous sentiment changes.
Considering a proxy for market sentiment as a given information variable, this initial
step of the research design examines the extent to which various risk factors may
exaggerate or understate the impacts of investor sentiment on stock returns.
In a sense, if a risk factor can be totally subsumed by other risk factors, then it
should be of less interest to further investigate the impact of such risk factor. In the
context of my research, if multiple risk factors can perfectly explain the cross-sectional
variation in returns of sentiment-prone stocks, then the remaining interest of continuing
to study the impact of investor sentiment on stock returns investment sentiment risk
would be tiny.
To investigate the relationship between investor sentiment and cross-sectional return
variation in stocks concerning firm opacity, I create a set of portfolios based on the
return sensitivity to the market sentiment of each individual stock and compare the
cross-sectional difference for certain firm characteristics. My results indicate a strong
cross-sectional relationship between stock returns and investor sentiment. Specifically,
I find that stocks that are more sensitive to investment sentiment exhibit opaque char-
acteristics, such as small capitalisations, high volatility, low net earnings and dividends,
and relatively low tangibility. More importantly, this relationship remains statistically
and economically significant after controlling for size, value and momentum factors.
5In the empirical analysis of this chapter, I use a 60-month rolling window to construct sentiment
sensitivity portfolios. In the subsequent chapter, my empirical framework requires a period of
12-months to generate portfolio returns.
6The BW sentiment index is a composite index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) that
captures the principal components of six popular proxies for investor sentiment, including the closed-
end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, first-day IPO returns, number of IPOs, the share of equity
and dividend premium.
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Further, my results imply that investor sentiment gives rise to systematic rather than id-
iosyncratic risk to investors, and thus, should be compensated by a higher risk premium.
To gauge how much previous sentiment contributes to the current rate of return,
I measure the conditional marginal performance of portfolio returns, captured by a
conditional alpha, with a two-step conditional model developed by Jha et al. (2009)
and Berger and Turtle (2012). This model allows me to identify the additional risk
premium associated with a given level of market sentiment. The intuition behind this
approach is, assuming all other risk factors are set to zero, the marginal performance at
a given level of market sentiment is merely the aggregation of the unconditional alpha
and the product of sentiment sensitivity and a given level of relative sentiment measure.
The resultant conditional alpha is then a time varying measure of the mispricing caused
by the sentiment level in any portfolio. My empirical results show that the conditional
alphas of stock returns (after controlling for the market factor) exhibit greater differ-
ences between high and low levels of sentiment for small, volatile, unprofitable, low
dividend and low tangibility stocks, while translucent firms present little variation in
conditional alphas across all levels of sentiment. Regarding firm growth opportunity,
results reveal that investor sentiment imposes persistently significant influences across
all book-to-market and sales growth portfolios. However, the impact is greatest on
stocks that are extremely undervalued or overvalued. After controlling for additional
systematic risk factors including size, value and momentum, although the overall impact
of investor sentiment shrinks for all portfolios, I find that within my sample periods,
portfolios with high book-to-market ratios and low sales growth rates exhibit greater
negative exposures to investor sentiment. This pattern results in higher subsequent
returns of high book-to-market portfolios at lower sentiment levels but lower marginal
performance in high sentiment periods. This pattern is contrary to Baker and Wurgler
(2006) with respect to the role of value and sentiment but consistent with the value
factor premium (at low sentiment levels) suggested by Fama and French (1993).
Besides, I also investigate the return predictability of ex ante investment sentiment
on subsequent returns by constructing conditional long-short portfolios. This empirical
test also helps confirm whether investor sentiment is a systematic risk factor. The
portfolios are constructed based on certain firm characteristics that display opacity.
Not surprisingly, the results reveal a strong predictive power of sentiment on returns
of opaque stocks with small size, high volatility risk and low earnings and dividends.
Further, in terms of growth opportunity, I find that investor sentiment is the most
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heavily priced in portfolios with higher book-to-market ratios or lower growth rates
(i.e., undervalued stocks). All results remain robust after controlling for size, value and
momentum factors. In contrast, the weaker predictability of investor sentiment is found
for stocks with the lowest growth rates and highest book-to-market ratios in the sample.
This empirical chapter contributes to the extant literature in the following aspects.
First, the overall finding of the study complements existing work that shows investor
sentiment is a systematic, rather than idiosyncratic, risk factor (Antoniou et al., 2010;
Brown, 1999; Livnat and Petrovits, 2009; Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Yu and Yuan,
2011). There has been a long-running debate on whether investor sentiment is a
systematic risk factor in the asset-pricing process and my research offers novel evidence
that the exposure to investor sentiment is significantly priced even after controlling for
multiple systematic risk factors in a conditional setting. Second, this empirical chapter
suggests that stocks with a high degree of opacity are more susceptible to investor
sentiment relative to translucent stocks, indicating that returns of small, volatile,
unprofitable, low dividend paying and less tangible stocks are more susceptible to
sentiment risk. This finding offers a possible explanation to one of the historical finance
puzzles, the cross-sectional premium in equity returns. Last, this empirical chapter
demonstrates that investor sentiment has significant predictive power on subsequent
security returns, which also contributes to the existing prediction literature. Hence,
my research implies that considering investor sentiment is a systematic risk factor,
prediction of future stock returns should also account for the influence of investor
sentiment, especially for firms exhibiting high opacity characteristics, such as small
size, high volatility risk and low earnings and dividends.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 summarises the impor-
tant literature related to the study in this chapter. Section 3.3 describes the hypotheses
developed for the subsequent empirical tests. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the models
and data used in this chapter, respectively. Section 3.6 reports all empirical results as
well as the analyses, and Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
Cross-sectional premium in security returns has been one of the financial puzzles for
a long time. In particular, researchers found that holding everything else constant,
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securities with the same characteristics exhibit cross-sectional variations in their returns.
For example, an initial study by Banz (1981) argued that the traditional Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) fails to explain
the excessive returns on small firm securities. In addition, he found that small stocks
on the NYSE usually have higher stock returns relative to large firm stocks, and
concluded that ‘the market value of the equity of a firm’ should be a significant factor
in the asset-pricing process. This peculiar empirical finding prompted a number of
researchers to question whether the ‘size effect’ is associated with other anomalies in
financial markets. A few years later, this proposition was comprehensively confirmed
and further strengthened by Fama and French (1993). In particular, Fama and French
(1993) found that premiums on returns of small stocks over large ones prevail within
the whole security market, and thus, should be considered a systematic risk factor
in addition to the market risk. Besides the size effect, Fama and French (1993) also
suggested a systematic higher returns on stocks with higher book-to-market ratios
relative to low book-to-market stocks (value factor). Hence, with the addition of market
risk, Fama and French (1993) asserted that the size and value factors are another two
important risk actors in the asset-pricing process.7 More examples of market puzzles
are summarised as follows. Novy-Marx (2010) found that securities of firms with higher
profitability earn higher returns than unprofitable ones. Cooper et al. (2008) found
companies that grow more aggressively their total assets earn lower subsequent returns
on their stocks. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) introduced the momentum effect to
asset pricing, which hypothesises that higher past returns can typically forecast high
future returns. Campbell et al. (2008) argued that firms in financial distress, that is,
with high failure probability, have lower, not higher, subsequent returns. Therefore,
given the wide range of unexplained financial market anomalies, more effort is required
to find alternative approaches to figure out these market anomalies.
Over the past few decades, the general discussion on behavioural finance, in partic-
ular, regarding investor sentiment, has engrossed a great attention from researchers.
Researchers have found that certain psychological element presents strong explanatory
power on cross-sectional stock returns. In regards to the size effect, for example, Neal
and Wheatley (1998) examined the forecastability of three sentiment measures on
stock returns and found that discounts on closed-end funds, proxies for sentiment,
predict size premiums. Brown and Cliff (2005) considered the impact of sentiment
7This three-factor model has been further expanded to a four-factor model with the addition of
extra momentum factor by Carhart (1997) and to a five-factor model with the addition of a liquidity
factor by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003).
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on a set of size portfolios by regressing long-horizon returns on economic explanatory
variables as well as the lagged sentiment and found that returns of large stocks tend to
be more exposed to investor sentiment than small stock returns. In addition, referring
to the value effect, extant literature suggests mixed results on the impact of investor
sentiment on stocks with different book-to-market ratios. For example, Lakonishok
et al. (1994) argued that the high rates of return associated with securities with
high book-to-market ratios are associated with investors who misextrapolate the past
earnings growth rates of firms. Specifically, they asserted that for stocks with high
book-to-market ratios, investors are over-optimistic regarding firms with an excellent
last-year performance but over-pessimistic regarding firms that performed poorly in
the previous year. Furthermore, Lakonishok et al. (1994) argued that stocks with
low book-to-market ratios ‘charm’ investors, pushing prices far above fundamentals,
and consequently result in lower subsequent returns. Despite the broad spectrum of
results in existing studies, the vast majority draw a common conclusion that investor
sentiment predicts cross-sectional security returns.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) collected a wide range of firm characteristics and investi-
gated the underlying correlation between investor sentiment and subsequent returns of
stocks under each of these characteristics. The most outstanding contribution of this
paper is the instruction of a well constructed composite sentiment index. Specifically,
the authors selected six popular proxies for investor sentiment, including the discount
on closed-end funds, share turnover, first-day IPO returns, IPO volumes, equity share
in new issues and dividend premium, and stripped out the first principal component
from these proxies. They argued that the common component shared by these vari-
ables captures the nature of investor sentiment, and thus, should be considered as
an appropriate measurement for investor sentiment. By using this index, the authors
found small, young, high volatility, low profitability, non-dividend-paying, extreme
growth and distressed stocks are more exposed to investor sentiment.
A more recent paper by Berger and Turtle (2012) also found that the sensitivity of
a stock’s return to investor sentiment increases with multiple cross-sectional measures
of opacity. Also, the authors examined the extent to which sentiment sensitivities
are priced in a return generating context, and they found an inverse relation between
previous investor sentiment and the marginal performance of opaque stocks. These
general findings are consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006) concerning the role of
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investor sentiment in illustrating cross-sectional return premium.
As pointed out by Baker and Wurgler (2006), the mispricing of a stock is typically
caused by two channels including the uninformed investor demand and limits to arbi-
trage (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; De Long et al., 1990). Hence, companies that disclose
less information (low opacity), or that have higher level of firm-investor information
asymmetry, should be more vulnerable to the market sentiment and thus the stocks of
these companies are more likely to be misvalued. Ravi and Hong (2014) argued that
when the information asymmetry between investors and a particular firm is high, all
investors are largely uninformed. Empirical studies find that many accounting variables
display certain characteristics of information asymmetry and firm opacity. For example,
Chari et al. (1988) argued that firm size is a crucial proxy for information asymmetry
and found higher abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date for small
firms but no abnormal returns for large firms. Aboody and Lev (2000) found a close
relationship between the research and development costs (RD) and insider gains; in
particular, they found firms with intensive RD exhibit more substantial insider gains,
and thus, RD significantly predicts information asymmetry.8
Another essential ingredient for the misvaluation of security prices comes from the
short-sale impediment in financial markets. As argued by Stambaugh et al. (2012),
institutional constraints, arbitrage risk, behavioural biases of traders and trading costs
contribute to the huge short-sale impediments and thus limit the capacity for arbitrage.
Numerous studies have documented the relationship between limited arbitrage and
security mispricings. For example, Shleifer and Summers (1990) argued that it is, in
fact, risky, not riskless, to arbitrage against irrational investors in financial markets.
Both fundamental risk and risk from irrational investors increase the total risks for
arbitraging activities and thus limit the capacity for arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) indicated a similar risk that might limit financial market arbitrage: traders who
short security in the belief that the stock is currently overvalued and thus its price will
eventually fall in the future. However, if future prices increase further, traders, in fact,
suffer huge losses before liquidating. In addition, Baker and Wurgler (2006) concluded
8Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) indicated that the volatility of stock returns acts as a
good proxy for information asymmetry. Aboody and Lev (2000) suggested the relevance of property.
plant and equipment (PPE) in presenting firm opacity but indicated a weaker predict power relative
to RD. Earnings was also introduced as an indicator of information asymmetry by Collins et al.
(1997), Francis and Schipper (1999), and Ely and Waymire (1999); Venkatesh and Chiang (1986)
documented the effect of earnings and dividends, while Richardson (2000) suggested the relevance of
book-to-market ratios and sales growth rate.
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that mispricing results from the interaction of an uninformed demand shock and the
limits on arbitrage. Based on these two propositions, it may therefore be advantageous
to investigate the cross-sectional variations in stock returns from the perspective of
investor sentiment.
3.3 Hypotheses Development
To address the relationship between cross-sectional variation in stock returns and
investor sentiment, I formulate a fundamental hypothesis stating that firms with higher
opacity are more exposed to investor sentiment. I characterise firm opacity by a group
of firm characteristics including size, volatility, profitability, dividend policy, tangibility
and growth opportunity. All these variables are suggested as indicators of information
asymmetry and firm opacity between firms and investors in the existing literature.
As higher levels of opacity increase both the difficulty of valuation and the difficulty
of mispricing correction, I predict that opaque firms’ stock returns suffer more from
investor sentiment.
Hypothesis 1. Returns of stocks that display higher opacity are more susceptible to
investor sentiment.
Existing literature indicates a negative relationship between investor sentiment and
security returns (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Berger and Turtle, 2012; Ho and Hung,
2009; Lee et al., 1991). Following such an assumption, I hypothesise a consistent
negative relationship between investor sentiment and security returns. In addition, I
further predict that as firm opacity increases, the underperformance of such securities
becomes more severe at higher sentiment levels. Hence, on the basis of this fundamen-
tal hypothesis, I expect that the securities of firms with small capitalisations, high
volatility, low profitability, low dividend payment and low tangibility exhibit greater
exposure to investor sentiment.
Hypothesis 1a. Holding everything else constant, higher investor sentiment results
in lower subsequent returns.
Hypothesis 1b. All else constant, securities of firms with small capitalisations, high
volatility, low profitability, low dividend payment and low tangibility are more exposed
to investor sentiment.
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Concerning the book-to-market ratio, the current literature presents unclear results
on the relationship between book-to-market portfolio returns and investor sentiment.
For example, Baker and Wurgler (2006) found results were statistically significant for
stocks with high growth rates but no evidence of an impact of sentiment on book-to-
market portfolio returns. In addition, Berger and Turtle (2012) indicated a persistent
influence of investor sentiment on future portfolio returns across book-to-market port-
folios. In the context of my research, I hypothesise that the relationship between
sentiment and company growth opportunity follows a U-shape pattern. In particular,
sentiment sensitivity is higher for growth (i.e., stocks with low book-to-market ratios
or high growth rates) and value stocks (i.e., stocks with high book-to-market ratios or
low growth rates), but is lower for fairly priced stocks (i.e., stocks with book-to-market
ratios close to one or growth rates in-between). The intuition behind this hypothe-
sis is that book-to-market ratio represents a stock’s relative performance, and thus,
is more likely to capture the nature of misvaluation (Brown, 1999; De Long et al., 1990).
Furthermore, I also predict that high book-to-market portfolios outperform (un-
derperform) low book-to-market portfolios at lower (higher) sentiment levels. This
hypothesis predicts that high book-to-market portfolios exhibit higher portfolio returns
in low sentiment periods, which is consistent with the value factor premium suggested
by Fama and French (1993).The lower returns associated with high book-to-market
portfolios in the high sentiment periods indicate that portfolios with relatively higher
book-to-market ratios are more exposed to increases in investor sentiment. There
are two possible explanations for this hypothesis. First, in high sentiment periods,
investors overestimate the probability of ascending stock returns, especially for stocks
that are currently undervalued. Second, the mean-reverting property of the stock price
indicates that any mispricing opportunities will be ultimately corrected and stock prices
will move to the average price over time (De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Summers,
1990).910 However, when the market falls into recession, sentiment sensitivity turns
stronger for overvalued stocks, as investors extend the probability of the price of an
overvalued stock to fall to its fundamental value.
9De Long et al. (1990) argued that the unpredictability of future resale prices increases the risk for
arbitrageurs and consequently limits their ability to arbitrage.
10This relationship will be further illustrated and investigated in subsequent chapters.
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Hypothesis 1c. All else constant, stocks with the highest and lowest book-to-market
ratios are more prone to investor sentiment relative to stocks with moderate book-to-
market ratios.
Hypothesis 1d. High book-to-market portfolios outperform (underperform) low book-
to-market portfolios at lower (higher) sentiment levels.
3.4 Models
3.4.1 Rolling Regression Sentiment Sensitivities and Cross-
Sectional Firm Characteristics
To estimate the time-varying sentiment sensitivities of the return of each individual
stock to market sentiment, I first test the following simple regression across a 60-month
rolling window:
Rj,t = αj,0+βj,mRmt,j+βj,sent∆Sent⊥t + ej,t (3.1)
for j = 1,2, . . . ,N ; t= 1,2. . . ,T where: N is the number of stocks;
T is the number of time series observations available for each firm;
Rj,t represents the excess return of asset j during period t;
Rm,t represents the excess market return during period t;
∆Sent⊥t represents the change in the orthogonalised sentiment index of Baker and
Wurgler (2006) from the previous period.
In addition, to account for the effect of more risk factors, I incorporate three more
risk factors including size, value and momentum. Hence, the expanded factor model is
written as:
Rj,t=αj,0+βj,mtRm,j+βj,SMBRSMB,t+βj,HMLRHML,t+βj,UMDRUMD,t+βj,sent∆Sent⊥t +ej,t
(3.2)
where RSMB,t, RHML,t and RUMD,t refer to the size, value and momentum factor at
given month t, respectively. The coefficient estimate βj represents the sensitivity of
the stock’s return of each stock j to each individual variable.
For each stock/portfolio j, both regression equations give a parameter estimate of
βj,sent. The full sample of stocks is then assigned to ten sentiment sensitivity portfolios
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in accordance with each individual βj,sent from Eq.3.1 and Eq.3.2. In addition, consid-
ering the distribution of all βj,sents throughout my sample, it is worth noting that some
stocks may exhibit returns that vary inversely with investor sentiment. Stocks with a
negative βj,sent parameter estimates are all assigned to the first sentiment sensitivity
portfolio such that I can concentrate my analysis on stocks that vary positively with
investor sentiment to identify characteristics of sentiment prone stocks. The remaining
stocks are equally allocated into the rest nine portfolios, from Portfolio 2 to 10. For
each sentiment sensitivity portfolio, the average firm characteristic is calculated by
taking the average of all stocks within that portfolio for cross-sectional comparison
across portfolios.
3.4.2 Marginal Performance and Conditional Alpha
The purpose of this section of analysis is to examine the risk premium associated
with investor sentiment in the conditional performance at a given level of the ex ante
sentiment. Following the identification of Jha et al. (2009) and Berger and Turtle
(2012), I report the conditional alphas using the ex ante sentiment as an information
variable. As the information variable changes over time, the conditional mean returns
for all assets also changes accordingly. Hence, the resultant conditional alpha represents
merely a time-varying measure of the mispricing for any portfolio.
To measure the conditional alphas at each time t, the first step in this approach is
to rank all the stocks into ten identical portfolios according to each firm characteristic
at any given point in time. To be specific, to form a size portfolio at time t, all the
stocks are ranked from low to high according to the size of the company at time t.
Stocks with the smallest firm size are allocated to the first portfolio, Portfolio 1, and
stocks with the largest firm size are then assigned into the last portfolio, Portfolio 10.
The process of portfolio allocation is independent for each firm characteristic in order
to avoid the influence of its ranking on any other firm characteristic. Each accounting
variable is lagged to match the fiscal year end that falls within months t - 1 through t -
12 to ensure that the accounting information is available to investors. Starting from
the estimation of the unconditional alpha and sentiment sensitivity of each portfolio, I
specify an unconditional regression following Jha et al. (2009) and Berger and Turtle
(2012):
Rj,t = αj,0+αj,sentSent⊥j,t−1+βj,mRm,t+ ej,t (3.3)
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where the conditioning information instrument, Sent⊥j,t−1, is known at the beginning
of each investment interval and both the excess portfolio return, Rj,t, and the excess
market return, Rm,t, are contemporaneously measured over the subsequent period.
Hence, Eq.3.3 shows how the rate of return of each portfolio j reacts in response to
investor sentiment and the market risk.
Assuming that the ex ante sentiment is available to the market, after extracting
the unconditional alpha, αj,0, and the sensitivity to investor sentiment, αj,sent, from
Eq.3.3, the conditional alpha can be written as:
αj,t = αj,0+αj,sentSent⊥j,t−1 (3.4)
where the resultant conditional alpha, αj,t, can be considered as a measure for the
marginal performance of portfolio returns over certain risk factors. When there is no
conditioning information available in the market, the conditional alpha is equivalent to
the unconditional alpha, αj,0.
Similarly, to account for the effect from other systematic risk factors, I include the
size, value and momentum factor in the original unconditional regression. Hence, the
coefficient estimate for investor sentiment obtained from this model reflects the real
marginal performance at a given level sentiment index in a strict sense as it strips out
the influences from other systematic risk factors. So, Eq.3.3 is now specified as:
Rj,t=αj,0+βj,mRm,t+βj,SMBRSMB,t+βj,HMLRHML,t+βj,UMDRUMD,t+βj,sentSent⊥t−1+ej,t
(3.5)
where all variables are previously defined. Eq.3.4 remain unchanged.
Assuming investor sentiment is the only conditioning information variable in the
market, meaning that other risk factors such as market, size, value and momentum are
all zero, then the conditional alpha can be interpreted as the marginal risk premium
associated with any given level of market sentiment. More importantly, this risk
premium varies over time.
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3.4.3 Predictive Power of Sentiment in Long-Short Portfolios
An alternative way to explore the predictive power of investor sentiment on subsequent
returns across firm characteristics is to form a set of long-short portfolios. Specifically,
the formation of this portfolio involves longing stocks with high values of a characteristic
and shorting on stocks with low values. All the stocks are first ranked from lowest
to highest based on each specific characteristic at any given time t, and then split
into deciles according to their rankings. Any firm that falls into the top and bottom
decile are categorised as high and low respectively, while the fifth decile is denoted as
the medium portfolio. The formation of the long-short portfolio is on the basis of a
12-month rolling window; in other words, the portfolio rolls over every year. Moreover,
to match the fiscal year end, the monthly return of a long-short portfolio in year n
starts from July of that year and ends in June of year n + 1. For each given firm
characteristic, any firm with a fiscal year end that falls within months t - 12 through t
-1 is considered a component of that portfolio, to ensure that all accounting information
is available to investors. The monthly portfolio return at period t is calculated as the
equally weighted average monthly return of all stocks within that portfolio.
For each portfolio, I perform the following regressions:
Rp,t = αp,0+βp,sentSent⊥p,t+βp,1Rm,t+ ep,t (3.6)
and
Rp,t = αp,0+βp,sentSent⊥p,t+βp,1Rm,t+βp,2SMBt+βp,3HMLt+βp,4UMDt+ eP,t
(3.7)
where the dependent variable for both equations, Rp,t represents the return of a long-
short portfolio p. For example, for the portfolio ‘high minus low’, it indicates the
return difference between the top (first) and bottom (last) deciles.11 Eq.3.6 is a simple
regression on investor sentiment with only one control variable of market risk, while
Eq.3.7 is an expanded version of Eq.3.6 accounting for additional risk factors. Also,
as some of the variables are already defined and included in the dependent variables
for some firm characteristics (e.g., SMB for size), these variables are automatically
excluded from the pool of control variables for Eq.3.7.
11In following empirical tests, for some portfolios, I also construct ’high - medium’ and ’medium -
low’ where the ’medium’ portfolio is the fifth portfolio in the midst.
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3.5 Data and Summary Statistics
Data on firm-level characteristics and monthly individual stock returns were collected
from the CRSP/Compustat Merged database ranging from January 1987 to December
2010.12 In addition, all securities from NYSE and AMEX with at least a 72-month
return history are included in the sample.13 For the measure of investor sentiment,
I select the monthly market-based composite sentiment index constructed by Baker
and Wurgler (2006) in my subsequent analyses, which is considered the most popular
sentiment index at present. This index quantifies the latent sentiment variable by
taking out the principal component from six sentiment proxies suggested by previous
studies.14 Any period with a positive sentiment index is located in the high sentiment
regime, while the negative sentiment index indicates low sentiment periods. Risk
factors such as market, size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (UMD) are collected
from the Kenneth R. French’s Data Library.
Size is defined as the market value of equity (in million dollars), given by shares
outstanding multiplied by the closing price of each month. Total risk (σ) is calculated
as the annualised standard deviation of each year. Earnings (E) is defined as income
before extraordinary items plus income statement deferred tax minus preferred divi-
dends; the dividend variable (D) indicates dividends per share at the ex date times
total shares outstanding. Both earnings and dividends are scaled by the book value
of equity (BE). In addition, to account for the tangibility of a company, I choose the
property, plant and equipment (PPE) and the research & development cost R&D (RD)
as two representative tangibility characteristics, both of which are measured over a
scale of total assets. Last, the growth opportunity of a company is measured by two
indicators: the ratio of Book-to-market value (ME) and the sales growth rate (SG).
The sales growth rate refers to the percentage change in net sales over the previous
year. To consider the cross-sectional relationship between investor sentiment and firm
characteristics, Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of unconditional averaged firm
characteristics as well as investor sentiment. Table 3.1 displays the averaged statistics
12The reason that I only include data from the most recent 23 years is that there was an influx of
new investors, such as pension funds, into the market during the 1980s, and the increased demand
from investors is helpful in explaining the influence from investor sentiment (Katzenbach, 1987).
13Some of the empirical tests are conducted on the basis of a 60-month rolling regression; I also
allow a 12-month period for portfolio construction. Hence, only stocks with at least 72-month return
data are considered.
14The six proxies include closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the
average first-day return of IPOs, the equity share in new issues and the dividend premium.
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in subsample periods of high and low sentiment.15 Except for size and sentiment index,
all variables are presented as percentages.
From the mean, standard deviation and median in the overall sample period (see
Table 3.1), it can be seen that firm characteristic such as size, σ, earnings, dividends,
PPE and RD show high volatility and strong positive skewness. For example, the
average size for the pooled firms is $630.14 million with a standard deviation of 1019.76.
The median size is only $149.82 million, much lower than the average, indicating that
more than half of the companies are small to medium but large companies account for
a much more significant proportion of market value. Moreover, approximately more
than half of the observations are located in the high sentiment regime as the median
sentiment is positive. In regards to the summary statistics of firm characteristics in
subsample periods, only σ indicates an apparent difference between the averages in
high and low sentiment periods. In particular, the mean volatility in high sentiment
periods is 18.28% but drops to 12.40% in low sentiment periods.
15A period with positive sentiment index is defined as a high sentiment period, while a negative or
zero sentiment index represents low sentiment.
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3.6 Empirical Results
Three sets of empirical tests are conducted to investigate the impact of investor senti-
ment on firms with different levels of opacity in subsequent subsections. In particular,
Section 3.6.1 reports the empirical results from a rolling regression framework, which
compares a set of cross-sectional characteristics across constructed sentiment-based
portfolios. Section 3.6.2 measures the conditional alphas to demonstrate the marginal
performance of investor sentiment across different firm-characteristic-based portfolios.
Section 3.6.3 further explores the conditional impact from investor sentiment via a
series of long-short portfolios for each firm characteristic.
3.6.1 Measuring Attributes of Sentiment-Prone Stocks
The empirical work begins with the exploration of the cross-sectional impact of investor
sentiment on returns of sentiment-related portfolios. In the spirit of Berger and Turtle
(2012), the sentiment-related portfolios are created based on the time-varying sentiment
sensitivity of each stock; specifically, the return of each stock is regressed on the
sentiment index every five years to obtain the sensitivity to the market sentiment.
Table 3.2 reports the averaged firm characteristics of each sentiment-based portfolio.
The initial column presents the firm characteristics, columns (2) – (11) display the
averaged firm characteristics throughout Portfolios 1 to 10, where Portfolio 1 includes
all stocks with negative sentiment sensitivity, and Portfolios 2 – 10 include stocks with
positive sensitivity in ascending order. In addition, the last two columns provide the
F-statistics and t-statistics testing that the given average firm characteristic is equal
across all sentiment portfolios, and between the 2nd and the 10th sentiment portfolios,
respectively.1617
16When calculating the t-statistics, I test the difference between the 2nd, not the 1st, and the 10th
portfolio since the first portfolio includes only stocks with negative sentiment sensitivities.
17Aggregating stocks with negative sentiment sensitivity in one portfolio allows me to focus on
stocks that vary positively with the market. Unreported results without the negative sentiment
sensitivity adjustment show that in the context of a five-factor model, some opaque firms are more
inversely related to investor sentiment. However, it adds to robustness that investor-sentiment-prone
stocks show opaque firm characteristics.
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Table 3.2 provides supportive evidence to my core hypothesis that firms with higher
opacity are more prone to investment sentiment. In particular, characteristics such
as volatility, size, earnings, dividends, PPE and RD exhibit systematic variations
across sentiment-based portfolios. For example, the standard deviation of portfolios
with positive sentiment sensitivity, that is, Portfolios 2 to 10, increases monotonically
from 16.23% in the 2nd portfolio with the lowest sentiment exposure to 30.81% in
the portfolio with the highest sentiment sensitivity. This result implies that firms
with higher risk are more vulnerable to investor sentiment as one unit increase in
investor sentiment causes a larger variation in stock returns of risky firms. Besides,
the table confirms Baker and Wurgler (2006), in that smaller stocks are more prone
to investor sentiment. Further, it is shown that earnings and dividends, the two most
important indicators of a company’s profitability, have negative relationships with
investor sentiment; that is, firms with the lowest profitability are more sensitive to
investment sentiment.
In regards to tangibility, the relative PPE of the lowest sentiment portfolio is almost
double that of the highest, indicating that PPE also exhibits a strong relationship
with sentiment exposure. In contrast, stocks with the highest investment in RD are
allocated to the highly sentiment-sensitive portfolio, while firms with low RD costs have
the lowest sentiment sensitivity. The cross-sectional variations in relative PPE and RD
across portfolios indicate that investor sentiment exposure is strictly correlated with
tangibility, and more importantly, relatively intangible assets present higher exposure
to investor sentiment.
Using the book-to-market ratio and sales growth rate as indicators of firm maturity,
it is expected that mature companies are less sensitive to investment sentiment in
comparison with growth firms Baker and Wurgler (2006).18 However, Table 3.2 shows
that the pattern of the book-to-market ratios with respect to the sentiment sensitivity
follows a similar convex pattern. In particular, portfolios located at the two extremes
exhibit relatively lower book-to-market ratios in comparison with those in the middle.
For example, the book-to-market ratios for the 2nd and the 10th sentiment-based
portfolios are 81.34% and 64.32% respectively, while the average book-to-market ratio
for the middle three portfolios, Portfolios 4 to 6, is approximately 91%, much closer
to 1. By definition, a stock with a book-to-market ratio close to 1 suffers less from
18In the paper of Baker and Wurgler (2006), empirical results suggest that only growth rate shows
significant correlation with investor sentiment, while BE/ME does not.
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misvaluation of prices. In Chapter 4 and 5, I further show that the correlation between
sensitivity towards investment sentiment and firm maturity varies across sentiment
regimes. Finally, portfolios with the highest SG rate are most sensitive to invest-
ment sentiment. Overall, the results in Table 3.2 document strong cross-sectional
variations in multiple firm characteristics across different levels of sentiment sensitivities.
To account for more systematic risk factors, I expand the original model to a
five-factor model by including additional risk factors of size, value and momentum in
my estimation of sentiment sensitivities (e.g. Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 1993).
This test examines the robustness of the conclusion drawn in Table 3.2. In particular,
I attempt to investigate if the cross-sectional variation in firm characteristics with
regards to investor sentiment remains robust after controlling for more risk factors.
Results for these robustness tests, displayed in Table 3.3, indicate that the results of
Table 3.2 do remain robust after controlling for additional risk factors.
Similar to Table 3.2, the differences across all portfolios, and between the 2nd and
10th portfolios, are all statistically significant, with the hypothesised signs. However,
the differences in sample averages of firm characteristics across portfolios are less
evident after additional risk factors are incorporated in the process. For example,
the size of the company is approximately two times greater for the lowest sentiment
portfolio than for the highest sentiment portfolio. Other firm characteristics, such as
volatility, earnings, PPE, RD, book-to-market ratios and SG rate also exhibit a similar
pattern. Netting of additional risk factors narrows down the differences of certain firm
characteristics between high- and low-sentiment portfolios, but the overall pattern still
captures the significant impact of investor sentiment in explaining the cross-sectional
stock returns. Hence, the test results from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 offer substantial
evidence for the hypothesis that opacity-related firm characteristics exhibit significant
sentiment exposure.
3.6.2 Marginal Performance of Sentiment Portfolio
As an extension to the cross-sectional variation in firm characteristics across sentiment-
based portfolios, the analysis in this subsection shifts the focus of analysis from the
relationship between investor sentiment and firm opacity to the question of whether a
stock’s performance is predictable given that the ex ante sentiment is available at the
beginning of each period. Also, I investigate the expected marginal performance of each
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portfolio at any given level of the market index. As it is specified by previous studies
that higher sentiment results in lower subsequent returns, underperformance at higher
levels of market sentiment should be more severe for opaque stocks as these stocks
typically have higher sensitivities to investor sentiment, as concluded in subsection 3.6.1.
I consider the expected marginal performance of security returns during period t,
given investor sentiment as the only information available during period t - 1. I report
the conditional alphas using sentiment as a conditioning information variable, following
the conditional performance evaluation literature, including Ferson and Schadt (1996),
Christopherson et al. (1998), Jha et al. (2009) and Berger and Turtle (2012). Hence,
the conditional alphas αj,sent calculated from Eq.3.3 and Eq.3.4 indicate the marginal
performance at any given level of known sentiment measures.
Intuitively, the resultant conditional alpha based on the unconditional regression can
be interpreted as the excess return created by a given level of investor sentiment. When
all other risk factors are set to zero, the ex ante investor sentiment, which is known at
the beginning of each period becomes the only information variable in the equation, and
thus, the marginal performance at any given level of sentiment is merely the product of
the coefficient estimate and the sentiment index plus the unconditional alphas. When
comparing the cross-sectional performance of two portfolios, the portfolio with a rela-
tively higher conditional alpha indicates an outperformance of this portfolio at this level
of investor sentiment. This conditional alpha, unlike the unconditional measure of Jha
et al. (2009), allows variations in excess return across time as well as across sentiment
levels. Hence, the conditional specification has the potential to capture important the
cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in conditional performance that may be
obfuscated by averaging across firm characteristics, and over time. Table 3.4 reports
the coefficient estimates of investor sentiment as well as the unconditional alphas ob-
tained from Eq.3.3, and Table 3.5 displays all conditional alphas calculated from Eq.3.4
across multiple sentiment levels including the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles.
Table 3.4 suggests a significantly negative relationship between future returns and
investor sentiment for opaque portfolios, but an insignificant or positive relationship
for translucent portfolios. For example, the coefficient estimate of investor sentiment
becomes significantly negative from the 5th to the highest volatility portfolio. The
parameter estimates follow a steady and monotonic decreasing trend from the lowest
volatility portfolios to the highest. For the size portfolio, αj,sent of the bottom five
56
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Table 3.4 Regression Results for Unconditional Alphas and Sentiment Sensitivities
I estimate the following model across firm-characteristic deciles to obtain the unconditional alphas:
Rj,t = αj,0+αj,sentSent⊥j,t−1+βj,mRm,t+ej,t For each firm characteristic, I assign stocks to a decile
at month t based on accounting data for the fiscal year end that falls in month t - 12 through month
t - 1. I then estimate the above equation for the equally weighted excess returns across each firm
characteristic decile, and report parameter estimates of αj,0 and αj,sent, along with the associated
p-values. I also report F-statistics in the final two columns testing that the reported parameter is
equal between the 1st and 10th sentiment portfolios, F10−1, and across all 10 sentiment portfolios, Fi
= j. The sample is from January 1987 through December 2010. * and ** represent the 95% and 99%
level of significance, respectively.
Port1 Port2 Port3 Port4 Port5 Port6 Port7 Port8 Port9 Port10 F10−1 F
σ αj,0 0.62** 0.52** 0.50** 0.46** 0.48** 0.43* 0.41 0.33 0.32 0.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.13) (0.60) (0.79)
αj,sent 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.00 - 0.19 - 0.24** - 0.33** - 0.46** - 0.46** - 0.61** 9.48** 1.41
(0.38) (0.56) (0.42) (0.83) (0.21) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.20)
Size αj,0 1.40** 0.95** 0.74** 0.57** 0.42* 0.31 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.15) (0.25) (0.37) (0.24) (0.11)
αj,sent - 0.77** - 0.53* - 0.47* -0.34 - 0.40 - 0.31 - 0.28 - 0.21 - 0.16 - 0.10 13.26* 3.59**
(0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.25) (0.39) (0.37) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00)
E αj,0 0.66** 0.78** 0.61** 0.56** 0.49** 0.42** 0.46** 0.38** 0.29 0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.10)
αj,sent - 0.89** - 0.98** - 0.99** - 0.76 - 0.59 - 0.42 - 0.31 - 0.25 - 0.16 - 0.11 3.28* 1.40
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.23) (0.10) (0.14) (0.29) (0.17) (0.05) (0.20)
D αj,0 0.28** 0.36** 0.27** 0.26** 0.22** 0.28** 0.42** 0.53** 0.31** 0.29**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
αj,sent - 0.50* - 0.44 - 0.33 - 0.43 - 0.35 - 0.25 - 0.10 - 0.03 0.00 0.09 16.25** 1.95*
(0.04) (0.12) (0.15) (0.32) (0.51) (0.32) (0.43) (0.42) (0.80) (0.59) (0.00) (0.05)
PPE αj,0 0.08 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.39 0.58* 0.609** 0.62** 0.53** 0.66**
(0.87) (0.40) (0.15) (0.11) (0.08) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
αj,sent - 0.51* - 0.43* - 0.48* - 0.41* - 0.38* - 0.36* - 0.32* - 0.29* - 0.24 - 0.25 4.37* 3.99**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.03) (0.00)
RD αj,0 0.25 0.22 0.33* 0.33* 0.49** 0.52* 0.55* 0.67* 0.73 0.70
(0.41) (0.20) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
αj,sent - 0.42 - 0.33 - 0.51 - 0.32 - 0.25 - 0.31 - 0.41 - 0.20 - 0.52* - 0.60** 0.75 0.44
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12) (0.13) (0.31) (0.25) (0.01) (0.01) (0.52) (0.93)
BE/ME αj,0 - 0.49 - 0.33 - 0.23 - 0.11 0.02 0.19* 0.25* 0.36** 0.69** 0.79**
(0.10) (0.31) (0.78) (0.29) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
αj,sent - 0.43* - 0.32* - 0.23* - 0.25* - 0.21* - 0.26 - 0.30 - 0.31* - 0.34 - 0.46* 0.02 2.46**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.21) (0.12) (0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.92) (0.01)
SG αj,0 0.83** 0.72** 0.77** 0.69** 0.53** 0.42** 0.48** 0.37* 0.12* 0.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08)
αj,sent - 0.59* - 0.48* - 0.32 - 0.23 - 0.16 - 0.12 - 0.34 - 0.23* - 0.40* - 0.61** 0.52 3.98**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.10) (0.29) (0.38) (0.09) (0.05) (0.02) (0.00) (0.46) (0.00)
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portfolios are all negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, while investor
sentiment is not significantly priced for large firms. For example, the parameter es-
timate αj,sent is -0.77 with a p-value less than 5% for the smallest size portfolio. In
regards to the profitability-related portfolios, it can be observed that portfolios with low
profitability, such as poor earnings and low dividend payments, exhibit strong negative
sentiment impacts on their subsequent returns. This impact becomes insignificant and
positive as the profitability improves. Moreover, in terms of measures for tangibility,
portfolios with low PPE receive significant negative prices for investor sentiment but
this becomes insignificant as the relative level of a company’s PPE increases. RD cost
has an insignificant relationship to investor sentiment in this case.
However, characteristics such as the book-to-market ratio do not share the same
monotonic trend as displayed by portfolios above. Instead, the parameter estimates of
the book-to-market portfolio indicate that the sentiment effect is relatively stronger for
portfolios located at two sides compared with portfolios in the middle. For example,
the coefficient estimates αj,sents for the 1st and 10th BE/ME portfolio are -0.425
and -0.459 respectively, while the average parameter estimate for the middle three
portfolios (i.e., Portfolios 4 to 6) is only approximately -0.23. The strong negative
correlation between investor sentiment and subsequent excess returns confirms the
empirical suggestion that higher sentiment results in lower subsequent returns, and
more importantly, this relationship is more prominent for opaque stocks.
Consistent with Table 3.4, Table 3.5 indicates more substantial variations in excess
returns across sentiment percentiles for opaque portfolios relative to translucent port-
folios. Specifically, the alpha difference between low and high sentiment levels becomes
wider in portfolios with higher opacity. For example, the conditional alpha for the
highest volatility portfolio is 0.6100% at the 5th sentiment percentile and -0.4324%
at 95th sentiment percentile, and thus, the difference D95−5 in the highest volatility
portfolio equals 1.0424%. However, this difference shrinks to only 0.1626% for the
lowest volatility portfolio. This large alpha differential between extreme high and
low sentiment percentiles also exists for portfolios with small size, low earnings, low
dividend payment, low PPE and high RD costs. However, in regards to the book-to-
market ratio portfolios, the marginal performance difference between extreme sentiment
percentiles is the greatest for the first and last portfolios, and decreases as the portfolio
moves from the extremes to the middle. For instance, the low book-to-market portfolio
exhibits a performance differential of 0.7275% across the 5th and 95th percentiles
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Table 3.5 Conditional Alphas at Given Levels of Investor Sentiment
This table reports the parameter estimates for conditional alphas with associated p-values, for
various percentiles of sentiment portfolios ranging from the 5th to the 95th across firm-characteristic
portfolios. Rj,t = αj,0 + αj,sentSent⊥j,t−1 + βj,mRm,t + ej,t where the conditioning information
instrument, Sent⊥j,t−1, is known at the beginning of each investment interval and both the excess
portfolio return, Rj,t, and the market excess return, Rm,t,are contemporaneously measured over
the subsequent period. Hence, assuming that the past sentiment is available to the market, the
resultant conditional alpha is computed as αj,t = αj,0 + αj,sentSent⊥j,t−1. D95−5 indicating
the alpha differential between the 95th and 5th percentile of sentiment. * and **
indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 95% and 99% level, respectively.
Percentile Port1 Port2 Port3 Port4 Port5 Port6 Port7 Port8 Port9 Port10
σ 5 0.5665 0.4917 0.4878 0.4565 0.5874 0.5607* 0.5848* 0.5523* 0.5662* 0.6100*
25 0.5968 0.5095 0.4967 0.4568 0.5272 0.4833* 0.4797* 0.4170* 0.4203* 0.4161*
50 0.6169 0.5214 0.5027 0.4570 0.4871 0.4317* 0.4097* 0.3267* 0.3231* 0.2867*
75 0.6374 0.5334 0.5087 0.4572 0.4465 0.3795* 0.3388* 0.2354* 0.2247* 0.1559*
95 0.7291 0.6331 0.5358 0.4582 0.2639 0.1447* 0.0200* -0.1752* -0.2178* -0.4324*
D95−5 0.1626 0.1415 0.0479 0.0017 -0.3235 -0.4159 -0.5649 -0.7275 -0.7839 -1.0424
Size 5 2.3122* 1.2397 0.9945* 0.7497 0.6353 0.4756 0.2829 0.3168 0.2002 0.1283
25 2.0676* 1.0712 0.8461* 0.6418 0.5076 0.3759 0.1925 0.2499 0.1495 0.0958
50 1.9045* 0.9589 0.7472* 0.5698 0.4224 0.3095 0.1321 0.2053 0.1158 0.0741
75 1.7395* 0.8452 0.6471* 0.4969 0.3363 0.2422 0.0711 0.1602 0.0816 0.0522
95 0.9976* 0.3342 0.1969* 0.1694 -0.0511 -0.0601 -0.2032 -0.0427 -0.0720 -0.0463
D95−5 -1.3146 -0.9055 -0.7976 -0.5803 -0.6864 -0.5358 -0.4861 -0.3595 -0.2722 -0.1746
E 5 1.1382* 1.3141** 1.1501* 0.9725 0.8128 0.1924 0.6281 0.5158 0.3804 0.2712
25 0.8554* 1.0014** 0.8339* 0.7295 0.6243 0.3261 0.5287 0.4372 0.3279 0.2358
50 0.6668* 0.7929** 0.6230* 0.5675 0.4986 0.4153 0.4625 0.3847 0.2928 0.2122
75 0.4761* 0.5819** 0.4097* 0.4035 0.3714 0.5056 0.3954 0.3317 0.2574 0.1884
95 -0.3818* -0.3667** -0.5496* -0.3335 -0.2005 0.9113 0.0940 0.0931 0.0980 0.0812
D95−5 -1.5200 -1.6809 -1.6997 -1.3060 -1.0133 0.7189 -0.5340 -0.4228 -0.2824 -0.1900
D 5 -0.0101* 0.6015 0.4493 0.4965 0.4057 0.4115 0.4753 0.5437 0.3089 0.2401
25 -0.1687* 0.4608 0.3445 0.3599 0.2937 0.3319 0.4428 0.5345 0.3096 0.2694
50 -0.2745* 0.3669 0.2746 0.2688 0.2189 0.2788 0.4211 0.5283 0.3100 0.2890
75 -0.3815* 0.2719 0.2040 0.1766 0.1433 0.2251 0.3992 0.5221 0.3104 0.3087
95 -0.8625* -0.1550 -0.1139 -0.2378 -0.1968 -0.0164 0.3007 0.4941 0.3123 0.3976
D95−5 -0.8524 -0.7566 -0.5631 -0.7343 -0.6025 -0.4279 -0.1746 -0.0496 0.0034 0.1575
PPE 5 0.3584* 0.3525* 0.4507* 0.4433* 0.5959* 0.7729* 0.7819* 0.7775* 0.6580 0.7958
25 0.1960* 0.2159* 0.2969* 0.3121* 0.4749* 0.6596* 0.6803* 0.6861* 0.5822 0.7177
50 0.0877* 0.1248* 0.1944* 0.2246* 0.3942* 0.5839* 0.6125* 0.6252* 0.5316 0.6657
75 -0.0219* 0.0326* 0.0906* 0.1361* 0.3126* 0.5075* 0.5440* 0.5635* 0.4805 0.6131
95 -0.5146* -0.3818* -0.3760* -0.2619* -0.0545* 0.1636* 0.2358* 0.2863* 0.2506 0.3764
D95−5 -0.8730 -0.7343 -0.8267 -0.7052 -0.6504 -0.6094 -0.5460 -0.4913 -0.4074 -0.4194
RD 5 0.4781 0.3983 0.6064 0.4110 0.6272 0.6864 0.7763 0.7760 1.0103* 1.0231**
25 0.3441 0.2935 0.4440 0.3087 0.5460 0.5881 0.6451 0.7114 0.8444* 0.8320**
50 0.2547 0.2236 0.3357 0.2406 0.4918 0.5224 0.5576 0.6682 0.7338* 0.7046**
75 0.1642 0.1530 0.2261 0.1716 0.4370 0.4560 0.4691 0.6246 0.6218* 0.5758*
95 -0.2425 -0.1649 -0.2666 -0.1385 0.1907 0.1575 0.0711 0.4285 0.1185* -0.0039**
D95−5 -0.7206 -0.5631 -0.8730 -0.5494 -0.4365 -0.5289 -0.7052 -0.3475 -0.8918 -1.0270
BE/ME 5 -0.2607* -0.1556* -0.0909* 0.0246* 0.1379* 0.3293 0.4104 0.5266* 0.8742 1.0407*
25 -0.3960* -0.2575* -0.1638* -0.0557* 0.0704* 0.2474 0.3161 0.4269* 0.7660 0.8946*
50 -0.4863* -0.3255* -0.2125* -0.1092* 0.0253* 0.1928 0.2533 0.3605* 0.6938 0.7971*
75 -0.5776* -0.3942* -0.2617* -0.1633* -0.0202* 0.1376 0.1897 0.2932* 0.6207 0.6985*
95 -0.9882* -0.7033* -0.4829* -0.4068* -0.2250* -0.1106 -0.0963 -0.0091* 0.2923 0.2551*
D95−5 0.7275 0.5477 0.3920 0.4313 0.3629 0.4399 0.5067 0.5358 0.5820 0.7857
SG 5 1.1517* 0.9842* 0.9459 0.8166 0.6142 0.4877 0.6602 0.4958* 0.3398* 0.4386**
25 0.9638* 0.8307* 0.8443 0.7434 0.5635 0.4485 0.5520 0.4213* 0.2124* 0.2438**
50 0.8385* 0.7283* 0.7765 0.6945 0.5298 0.4224 0.4798 0.3716* 0.1274* 0.1139**
75 0.7118* 0.6248* 0.7080 0.6451 0.4956 0.3959 0.4067 0.3213* 0.0415* -0.0177**
95 0.1418* 0.1592* 0.3998 0.4230 0.3420 0.2771 0.0783 0.0953* -0.3449* -0.6089**
D95−5 -1.0099 -0.8250 -0.5460 -0.3937 -0.2722 -0.2105 -0.5820 -0.4005 -0.6847 -1.0475
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of sentiment, and the performance differential is a comparable 0.7857% for the high
book-to-market portfolio across the same range of sentiment. Besides, this performance
differential gradually reduces as the portfolio moves from two sides to the middle.
Moreover, the cross-sectional marginal performance of the book-to-market portfolio
shows that the cross-sectional effect from investor sentiment is relatively persistent
across all sentiment percentiles. For example, the performance differential at the 75th
percentile is approximately 1.28% (-0.5776 and 0.6985) between the lowest and highest
deciles of book-to-market firms. Similarly, when the sentiment level is at the 20th
percentile, the performance difference remains 1.29% (-0.3960 to 0.8946). The result is
consistent with Berger and Turtle (2015) but conflicts with other findings which show
that growth stocks are more prone to investor sentiment. In the subsequent chapters, I
show that that the performance of the book-to-market portfolio strongly depends on
current sentiment regimes.
Further, to account for the effect of other systematic risks, I expand the model by
including the size, value and momentum factors to obtain a new set of conditional
alphas. Table 3.6 reports the unconditional alphas as well as the coefficient estimates
for investor sentiment obtained from an expanded risk factor model, Eq.3.5, and Ta-
ble 3.7 reports the new conditional alphas across the same level of sentiment percentiles.
Estimate results in Table 3.6 demonstrate that the coefficient estimates of investor
sentiment in most opaque portfolios remain significant after controlling for additional
risk factors. Specifically, portfolios with high volatility, small size, low earnings, low
dividends and low PPE still exhibit significantly negative exposures to investor senti-
ment although both magnitude and significance are reduced relative to the coefficient
estimates displayed in Table 3.4. For example, the sentiment sensitivity for the highest
volatility portfolio is -0.48 with a p-value of 0.04, a decrease from -0.61 (the magnitude)
with a p-value of 0.01 obtained from the original two-factor model. Apparently, after
stripping out the effect from other risk factors, the predictive power of sentiment
significantly reduces, implying that the cross-sectional premium in portfolio returns
is partly explained by risk factors such as size, value and momentum. However, the
finding that investor sentiment still explains a proportion of the cross-sectional variation
confirms my hypothesis that investor sentiment is a systematically priced risk factor.
In addition, I find that after controlling for more systematic risk factors, investor
sentiment imposes different impacts on book-to-market and sales growth portfolios. In
particular, my previous results suggest similar sentiment exposures to the two sides
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Table 3.6 Regression Results for Unconditional Alphas and Sentiment Sensitivities in an
Expanded Risk Factor Model
I estimate the following model across firm-characteristic deciles to obtain the unconditional alphas:
Rj,t = αj,0+βj,mRm,t+βj,SMBRSMB,t+βj,HMLRHML,t+βj,UMDRUMD,t+βj,sentSent⊥t−1+ej,t
For each firm characteristic, I assign stocks to a decile at month t based on accounting data from the
fiscal year end that falls in month t - 12 through month t - 1. I then estimate the above equation for
equal weighted excess returns across each firm-characteristic decile, and report parameter estimates of
αj,0 and αj,sent, along with the associated p-values. I report F-statistics in the final two columns
testing that the reported parameter is equal between the 1st and 10th sentiment portfolios, F10−1,
and across all 10 sentiment portfolios, Fi = j. The sample is monthly from January 1987 through
December 2010. * and ** represent the 95% and 99% level of significance, respectively.
Port1 Port2 Port3 Port4 Port5 Port6 Port7 Port8 Port9 Port10 F10−1 F
σ αj,0 0.39* 0.41** 0.42* 0.42* 0.38* 0.35* 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.35
(0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.11) (0.20) (0.38)
αj,sent 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.14 - 0.20 - 0.35* - 0.48* 6.70* 1.30*
(0.68) (0.79) (0.67) (0.60) (0.50) (0.54) (0.83) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Size αj,0 0.33* 0.28* 0.26* 0.21* 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.35) (0.48) (0.40) (0.12) (0.19)
αj,sent - 0.32* - 0.29* - 0.31* -0.28 - 0.22 - 0.16 - 0.12 - 0.08 - 0.06 - 0.03 9.78 2.74
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.25) (0.39) (0.37) (0.21) (0.40) (0.52)
E αj,0 0.33 0.48 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.31
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20)
αj,sent - 0.44* - 0.41* - 0.37 - 0.35* - 0.28 - 0.27 - 0.26 - 0.20 - 0.15 - 0.09 4.16** 1.56
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.18) (0.39) (0.45) (0.42) (0.39) (0.36) (0.00) (0.16)
D αj,0 0.38* 0.46 0.39 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.33
(0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.15) (0.08)
αj,sent - 0.21* - 0.24* - 0.20* - 0.19 - 0.18 - 0.15 - 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 7.25** 0.78
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.17) (0.31) (0.32) (0.43) (0.42) (0.80) (0.59) (0.01) (0.61)
PPE αj,0 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.16* 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.29
(0.43) (0.36) (0.49) (0.60) (0.30) (0.48) (0.29) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12)
αj,sent - 0.37** - 0.27* - 0.28* - 0.30 - 0.25 - 0.23 - 0.18 - 0.16 - 0.13 - 0.10 4.33* 1.59
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.12) (0.16) (0.25) (0.20) (0.34) (0.42) (0.54) (0.04) (0.12)
RD αj,0 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.42*
(0.29) (0.20) (0.18) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05)
αj,sent - 0.21 - 0.26 - 0.28 - 0.23 - 0.21 - 0.29 - 0.39 - 0.35 - 0.39 - 0.32 0.42 0.98
(0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.38) (0.29) (0.36) (0.60) (0.31) (0.25) (0.86) (0.63)
BE/ME αj,0 - 0.26 - 0.21 - 0.29 - 0.22 -0.29 -0.31 -0.28 -0.38 -0.57 -0.49
(0.60) (0.77) (0.89) (0.57) (0.38) (0.29) (0.35) (0.20) (0.09) (0.07)
αj,sent - 0.22 - 0.18* - 0.14 - 0.11 - 0.10 - 0.13 - 0.26 - 0.26 - 0.29 - 0.32* 1.58* 2.67**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.35) (0.24) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00)
SG αj,0 0.42* 0.34 0.28* 0.41* 0.32* 0.30 0.60 0.32 0.35 0.43*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
αj,sent - 0.32* - 0.24* - 0.17 - 0.08 - 0.11 - 0.09 - 0.18 - 0.20* - 0.25* - 0.21 0.86 1.98*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.25) (0.45) (0.31) (0.23) (0.13) (0.08) (0.36) (0.04)
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of the book-to-market; however, after including three additional risk factors in the
model, the sentiment impact becomes increasingly significant on portfolios with the
highest book-to-market ratios and with the lowest sales growth rates. For example,
the sentiment sensitivities for the highest and lowest book-to-market ratio portfolio
are -0.32 and -0.22, respectively. Such differential indicates that one unit increase in
investor sentiment reduces the future return of a high book-to-market portfolio by
approximately 3.2% but only decreases 2.2% of subsequent returns in the lowest book-
to-market portfolio. In contrast, the effect of investor sentiment on low-sales growth
portfolios becomes more pronounced after controlling for other risk factors, whereas
the results in the single-factor model (the model that only contains the market risk and
investor sentiment) show that investor sentiment affects portfolios with high and low-
sales growth in a similar way. This finding offers insightful inference on the relationship
between cross-sectional returns of book-to-market and sales growth portfolios that
both undervalued and overvalued portfolios are significantly susceptible to sentiment
risk, however, undervalued, not overvalued, portfolios have higher sentiment exposure.
This finding provides contrary evidence to Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Berger and
Turtle (2012) with respect to the role of investor sentiment in book-to-market portfolios.
Table 3.7 reports the resultant conditional alphas obtained from the expanded risk
factor model. Aligned with previous results, the conditional alphas exhibit strong
sentiment exposure on opaque portfolios such as portfolios with high volatility, small
capitalisations, low earnings, low dividend and low PPE. Moreover, I find that the
conditional alphas are lower in high sentiment percentiles because of the negative
sensitivities to investor sentiment. For example, the conditional alphas at the 5th and
95th percentiles of sentiment for the high volatility portfolio are 0.6082 and -0.1521,
respectively, implying a 0.7603 differential between extreme sentiment percentiles.
Further, the book-to-market portfolio indicates larger conditional alpha differentials
in the high-end portfolios relative to the low-end portfolios. In particular, the alpha
differences between the 95th and 5th percentile sentiment in the highest and lowest
portfolios are -0.7635 and -0.4137, respectively, indicating a stronger sentiment impact
on higher book-to-market portfolios.
3.6.3 Predictive Regression for Long-Short Portfolios
An alternative way to examine the conditional characteristic effects is to form equally
weighted long-short portfolios on the basis of firm characteristics. Besides, this ap-
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Table 3.7 Conditional Alphas at Given Levels of Investor Sentiment from an Expanded
Risk Factor Model
This table reports the parameter estimates for conditional alphas with associated p-values, for various
percentiles of sentiment portfolios ranging from the 5th to the 95th across firm-characteristic portfolios:
Rj,t = αj,0+βj,mRm,t+βj,SMBRSMB,t+βj,HMLRHML,t+βj,UMDRUMD,t+βj,sentSent⊥t−1+ej,t;
where the conditioning information instrument, Sent⊥j,t−1,is known at the beginning of each
investment interval and both the portfolio excess return, Rj,t, and the market excess return, Rm,t, are
contemporaneously measured over the subsequent period. Hence, assuming that the past sentiment is
available to the market, the resultant conditional alpha is computed as αj,t = αj,0+αj,sentSent⊥j,t−1.
D95−5 indicating the alpha differential between the 95th and 5th percentile of
sentiment. * and ** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 95% and
99% level, respectively.
Percentile Port1 Port2 Port3 Port4 Port5 Port6 Port7 Port8 Port9 Port10
σ 5 0.3557 0.3755 0.3886 0.3980 0.3658 0.3507 0.4247 0.4201* 0.5185* 0.6082*
25 0.3766 0.3936 0.4060 0.4116 0.3724 0.3491 0.3817 0.3555* 0.4087* 0.4554*
50 0.3938 0.4085 0.4204 0.4229 0.3779 0.3478 0.3461 0.3022* 0.3180* 0.3292*
75 0.4148 0.4266 0.4378 0.4365 0.3846 0.3462 0.3030 0.2374* 0.2079* 0.1759*
95 0.4596 0.4653 0.4752 0.4657 0.3988 0.3428 0.2106 0.0989* -0.0277* -0.1521*
D95−5 0.1039 0.0897 0.0866 0.0677 0.0331 -0.0079 -0.2141 -0.3211* -0.5462* -0.7603*
Size 5 0.4990* 0.4314* 0.4181* 0.3596 0.2995 0.2240 0.1502 0.0984 0.0619 0.0244
25 0.3984* 0.3406* 0.3216* 0.2722 0.2306 0.1737 0.1122 0.0721 0.0442 0.0165
50 0.3153* 0.2656* 0.2419* 0.2001 0.1736 0.1321 0.0808 0.0504 0.0296 0.0099
75 0.2143* 0.1745* 0.1450* 0.1125 0.1044 0.0817 0.0427 0.0241 0.0118 0.0020
95 -0.0016* -0.0203* -0.0621* -0.0749 -0.0436 -0.0263 -0.0387 -0.0323 -0.0262 -0.0150
D95−5 -0.5006* -0.4518* -0.4801* -0.4345 -0.3432 -0.2503 -0.1889 -0.1307 -0.0882 -0.0394
E 5 0.5597* 0.6931* 0.4988 0.5746* 0.4372 0.4735 0.3999 0.4114 0.3113 0.3594
25 0.4208* 0.5640* 0.3817 0.4642* 0.3483 0.3868 0.3189 0.3484 0.2632 0.3325
50 0.3061* 0.4574* 0.2851 0.3730* 0.2749 0.3152 0.2520 0.2964 0.2235 0.3103
75 0.1667* 0.3279* 0.1676 0.2622* 0.1857 0.2282 0.1707 0.2333 0.1752 0.2834
95 -0.1314* 0.0509* -0.0836 0.0252* -0.0051 0.0422 -0.0031 0.0981 0.0720 0.2256
D95−5 -0.6910* -0.6422* -0.5824 -0.5494* -0.4423 -0.4313 -0.4030 -0.3133 -0.2393 -0.1338
D 5 0.4894* 0.5908* 0.4965* 0.4100 0.5141 0.3923 0.4229 0.4044 0.3608 0.3200
25 0.4217* 0.5152* 0.4329* 0.3508 0.4584 0.3442 0.4052 0.4053 0.3674 0.3247
50 0.3658* 0.4527* 0.3803* 0.3019 0.4124 0.3045 0.3906 0.4061 0.3729 0.3286
75 0.2978* 0.3768* 0.3165* 0.2426 0.3565 0.2562 0.3728 0.4071 0.3796 0.3334
95 0.1525* 0.2146* 0.1801* 0.1156 0.2370 0.1530 0.3348 0.4091 0.3938 0.3436
D95−5 -0.3369* -0.3762* -0.3164* -0.2944 -0.2770 -0.2393 -0.0882 0.0047 0.0331 0.0236
PPE 5 0.2532* 0.1902* 0.2332* 0.2629 0.2737 0.2810 0.2672 0.2880 0.2290 0.3466
25 0.1371* 0.1060* 0.1443* 0.1677 0.1940 0.2082 0.2108 0.2377 0.1876 0.3137
50 0.0412* 0.0365* 0.0709* 0.0890 0.1281 0.1481 0.1643 0.1961 0.1534 0.2865
75 -0.0753* -0.0479* -0.0183* -0.0065 0.0481 0.0751 0.1078 0.1457 0.1118 0.2535
95 -0.3245* -0.2285* -0.2091* -0.2109 -0.1230 -0.0811 -0.0130 0.0377 0.0228 0.1829
D95−5 -0.5777* -0.4187* -0.4423* -0.4738 -0.3967 -0.3621 -0.2802 -0.2503 -0.2062 -0.1637
RD 5 0.2267 0.2389 0.2882 0.2215 0.2096 0.2490 0.5396 0.4642 0.6054 0.5902
25 0.1606 0.1579 0.1999 0.1484 0.1447 0.1573 0.4155 0.3523 0.4832 0.4877
50 0.1060 0.0910 0.1270 0.0880 0.0912 0.0815 0.3131 0.2597 0.3824 0.4030
75 0.0396 0.0097 0.0384 0.0147 0.0261 -0.0106 0.1887 0.1474 0.2598 0.3002
95 -0.1023 -0.1641 -0.1510 -0.1421 -0.1131 -0.2075 -0.0775 -0.0930 -0.0023 0.0802
D95−5 -0.3290 -0.4030 -0.4392 -0.3636 -0.3227 -0.4565 -0.6171 -0.5572 -0.6076 -0.5100
BE/ME 5 -0.0759 -0.0697* 0.0119 0.0067 0.0575 0.0323 -0.1100 -0.0568 0.0163 -0.0520*
25 -0.2166 -0.1703* -0.2552 -0.1976 -0.2678 -0.2818 -0.2189 -0.3250 -0.5097 -0.4233*
50 -0.2733 -0.2178* -0.2921 -0.2268 -0.2932 -0.3168 -0.2861 -0.3932 -0.5855 -0.5056*
75 -0.3422 -0.2756* -0.3368 -0.2624 -0.3240 -0.3593 -0.3677 -0.4761 -0.6776 -0.6056*
95 -0.4896 -0.3992* -0.4326 -0.3384 -0.3898 -0.4503 -0.5422 -0.6533 -0.8745 -0.8195*
D95−5 -0.4137 -0.3295* -0.4445 -0.3451 -0.4473 -0.4826 -0.4322 -0.5965 -0.8908 -0.7675*
SG 5 -0.5431* -0.4192* -0.3198 -0.2992 -0.2781 -0.2468 -0.3135 -0.3699 -0.4336 -0.4423
25 0.4904* 0.3892* 0.3189 0.4275 0.3434 0.3162 0.2972 0.3599 0.4047 0.4737
50 0.4073* 0.3267* 0.2747 0.4066 0.3154 0.2932 0.2515 0.3073 0.3404 0.4178
75 0.3063* 0.2508* 0.2211 0.3812 0.2814 0.2653 0.1959 0.2435 0.2623 0.3498
95 0.0904* 0.0886* 0.1063 0.3268 0.2088 0.2055 0.0771 0.1071 0.0953 0.2045
D95−5 0.6335* 0.5077* 0.4261 0.6260 0.4868 0.4523 0.3905 0.4770 0.5289 0.6468
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proach also helps re-investigate whether investor sentiment is systematically priced
in portfolio returns. Similar to what has been done by Baker and Wurgler (2006), to
form a long-short portfolio, I long stocks with high values and then short on stocks
with low values.
Table 3.8 reports the empirical results of long-short regressions on investor senti-
ment. The results show that the coefficient estimates of investor sentiment for size,
risk, earnings and dividends are statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover,
the signs for the parameter estimates of these portfolios strictly follow the hypothesis
that the relationship is negative for size and risk, while positive for earnings and divi-
dends. The magnitudes of the coefficient for predicting returns of volatility portfolio,
for example, demonstrates that one unit increase in sentiment results in a -0.8295%
(unorthogonalised) lower monthly return on the high minus low volatility portfolio. In
terms of tangibility, the portfolio for PPE shows significant parameter estimates (at
the 10% significance level) with expected signs; but either regression does not support
the impact of investor sentiment on returns for the RD portfolio. In addition to the
findings described above, the most important finding from Table 3.6 is the predictive
power of investor sentiment on book-to-market and sales growth portfolios. Specifi-
cally, the results from Panel D, E and F suggest three distinct impacts of sentiment
on subsequent portfolio returns. First, investor sentiment barely has any predictive
power on returns of high minus low portfolios for the book-to-market portfolio. For
instance, the parameter estimate βj,sentSentt−1 for the high minus low book-to-market
portfolio is 0.0032 (with a p-value of 0.82), indicating that neither is statistically
significant at any acceptable significance level. This pattern is strongly consistent
across all parameter estimates in Panel D. Second, Panel E and F display the sentiment
performance on the relative overvalued and undervalued portfolios, respectively.19
Taking the book-to-market portfolio as an example, the coefficient estimates for the
medium minus low book-to-market portfolio is positive but turns negative for the high
minus medium portfolio. Additionally, the corresponding p-values indicate that the
impact is only statistically significant for undervalued portfolios. For example, the
average p-value for the parameter estimates of the medium minus low book-to-market
portfolio is 0.16, while for the high minus low portfolio, this is approximately 0.07.
The absolute magnitudes of coefficient estimates are also larger for the undervalued
19As revealed by results in Section 3.6.2, for both book-to-market and sales growth portfolios,
portfolios in the middle are less affected by investor sentiment than portfolios at the extremes. Hence,
the construction in Panels E and F helps identify the predictive power of investor sentiment on each
extreme of the portfolio.
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group of portfolios. The coefficient estimates for the sales growth portfolio suggest a
similar pattern. Hence, the test results from Panels D, E and F indicate that within
the sample period, investor sentiment has a comparatively strong predictive power
on subsequent returns of undervalued portfolios relative to overvalued stocks. This
outcome suggests that stocks with high book-to-market ratios or low growth rates
tend to be more sensitive to investor sentiment. In contrast to Baker and Wurgler’s
(2006) argument that growth stocks are more prone to investor sentiment, my findings
indicate an opposite direction of the impact.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the coherent relationship between cross-sectional variations in
stock returns and investor sentiment. Following the proposition that higher sentiment
causes lower subsequent stock returns, I find this relationship to be more severe for
opaque stocks relative to translucent stocks.
My empirical results reveal that securities with higher opacity, such as high volatil-
ity, small capitalisations, low profitability, low dividend and low intangibility, exhibit
lower subsequent returns. Also, portfolios with opaque characteristics offer the greatest
marginal performance when previous sentiment levels are low. However, this type
of stock also exhibits much poorer marginal performance at higher sentiment levels
relative to translucent portfolios because of the significant negative correlation between
investor sentiment and opaque firm returns. Concerning the book-to-market portfolios,
marginal performance is more substantial for both high- and low-end portfolios. After
controlling for additional systematic risk factors, in contrast to the mixed evidence in
the extant literature, the sentiment impact becomes more significant on portfolios with
higher, not lower, book-to-market ratios.
Empirical results from the long-short portfolio analyses complement both my
preceding analyses and extant studies by showing that opaque portfolios exhibit a
significantly negative exposure to investor sentiment. Moreover, my results also confirm
that investor sentiment is a systematic, rather than idiosyncratic, risk.
This empirical chapter contributes to the extant literature in the following as-
pects. First, my results offer a novel explanation for the famous finance puzzle of
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Table 3.8 Time Series Regressions of Long-Short Portfolio Returns, January 1987 to
December 2010
I report the parameter estimates from two regressions of long-short portfolio returns on lagged
SENTIMENT or SENTIMENT⊥. The first equation includes only the market risk premium (RM)
while the second regression incorporates three more factors including two Fama and French factors
(HML and SMB), and a momentum factor (UMD).
Rp,t = αj,0+βj,mRm,t+βj,sentSENTIMENTt−1+ej,t (3.6)
Rp,t = αj,0 + βj,mRm,t + βj,SMBRSMB,t + βj,HMLRHML,t + βj,UMDRUMD,t +
βj,sentSENTIMENTt−1+ej,t (3.7)
The long-short portfolios are constructed based on firm characteristics of firm size (ME), total risk
(σt), earnings (E), dividends (D), property, plant and equipment (PPE scaled by assets), research and
development (RD scaled by assets), and book-to-market ratios (BE/ME), sales growth rate (SG). The
construction of the long-short portfolio is on the basis of a 12-month rolling window. The monthly
portfolio return in month t is calculated as the equally-weighted average return of all stocks within
that portfolio at time t. Columns (3) and (4) indicate coefficient estimates of unorthogonalised
sentiment from Eq.3.6 and Eq.3.7 respectively with their p-values underneath. Similarly, columns
(5) and (6) refer to the coefficient estimates for the orthogonalised sentiment variable from Eq.3.6
and Eq.3.7 respectively with their p-values underneath. * and ** present the 95% and 99% level of
significance, respectively.
SENTIMENTt−1 SENTIMENTt−1 SENTIMENT⊥t−1 SENTIMENT⊥t−1
After Controlling After Controlling
for additional Risk Factors for additional Risk Factors
βj,sent βj,sent βj,sent βj,sent
Panel A: Size, and Risk
ME SMB -0.5123* -0.4827** -0.4920** -0.4602**
p (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
σ High-Low -0.8295** -0.7726** -0.7909** -0.7521**
p (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: Profitability and Dividend Policy
E >0 - <0 0.9736* 0.7382* 0.9564** 0.7102**
p (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01)
D >0 -=0 0.7628* 0.5391** 0.7412** 0.5031**
p (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Panel C: Tangibility
PPE/A High-Low 0.2481 0.1025 0.2138 0.0942
p (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
RD/A High-Low -0.1814 -0.1099 -0.1527 -0.0892
p (0.35) (0.48) (0.50) (0.42)
Panel D: Growth Opportunities and Distress
BE/ME HML 0.0032 0.0012 0.0001 0.0011
p (0.82) (0.73) (0.91) (0.85)
SG High-Low -0.0091 -0.0034 -0.0005 0.0003
p (0.77) (0.63) (0.81) (0.68)
Panel E: Overvaluation and Growth Opportunity
BE/ME Medium-Low 0.2267 0.1629 0.1918 0.1436
p (0.15) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18)
SG High-Medium -0.0138 -0.0125 -0.0116 -0.0105
p (0.17) (0.19) (0.25) (0.28)
Panel F: Undervaluation and Distress
BE/ME High-Medium -0.3402 -0.3015 -0.3177 -0.2741
p (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
SG Medium-Low 0.2025 0.1859 0.1791 0.1626
p (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13)
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cross-sectional variations in security returns in asset pricing. In particular, given the
content of investor sentiment, my results indicate that the cross-sectional variations
in equity returns closely relate to firm opacity. Second, this empirical chapter further
complements the asset-pricing literature by confirming the market-wide component of
investor sentiment in the return-generating process. Third, consistent with previous
sentiment-related studies, I find a significantly negative relationship between stock
returns and market sentiment. Last, on the basis of the marginal performance analysis,
I find that opaque stocks exhibit higher returns at lower sentiment levels but generate
lower returns in a bullish market. Connecting my research to existing literature with
respect to cross-sectional premiums in security returns, I show that the premium only
exists in a bearish market but is completely eliminated by sentiment traders in a bullish
market.
My results also provide important implications and directions for future research.
First, my results confirm that investor sentiment is a systematic rather than idiosyn-
cratic risk factor, and thus, has to be treated appropriately by future asset-pricing
literature. Second, on the basis of the marginal performance analysis, I show that
opaque stocks exhibit higher returns at lower sentiment levels but lower subsequent
returns at higher levels of sentiment. This finding may predict the potential failure
of some well-documented risk factors such as size and value under certain market
conditions. Therefore, future research could focus on testing the efficiency of these
risk factors in the context of investor sentiment. Last, many of the firm characteristics
employed in this empirical chapter are considered related to existing asset-pricing
anomalies. My results, which detail systematic relations between sentiment and firm
characteristics, may lead to additional research in asset mispricing.
Chapter 4
Skewness Preference,
Mean-Variance Relation and
Investor Sentiment
Abstract
Extant studies indicate that investors sometimes have strong preferences for skewness. In
particular, researchers find that some investors intentionally undiversify their portfolios by
including extra (positive) skewness (Mitton and Vorkink, 2007). This empirical chapter
examines whether such skewness preference explains variations in security returns given the
presence of investor sentiment. My research is conducted at both the market and portfolio
levels. After partitioning the sample period into high- and low-sentiment regimes, I find
that the traditional mean-variance proposition only holds in the low-sentiment regime but
breaks down in the high-sentiment regime. Specifically, I find that in the high-sentiment
regime, the trade-off between the subsequent return and variance is significantly negative
for the market portfolio but insignificant for size, book-to-market and sentiment-based
portfolios. In addition, my results further indicate that skewness (and co-skewness at the
portfolio level) is significantly priced with positive premiums in the low-sentiment regime but
negative discounts in high-sentiment periods. These findings are explained by the alteration
of investors’ risk tolerance across time, in that investors are relatively risk-averse in the
low-sentiment regime but more risk-seeking in high-sentiment periods. Last, I also find that
both variance and skewness (co-variance and co-skewness at the portfolio level) are most
heavily priced in portfolios with small capitalisations, high book-to-market ratios and high
sensitivity to investor sentiment. This finding offers additional evidence on the relationship
between cross-sectional variations in security returns and investor sentiment, as discussed
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in the previous chapter. More importantly, it provides possible explanations as to how,
specifically, investor sentiment contributes to such imbalances.
4.1 Introduction
In the modern portfolio theory, the mean-variance model initially introduced by Markowitz
(1952) has gained widespread acceptance as a useful and practical tool for the portfolio optimi-
sation. However, over the past few years, an increasing number of researchers have found that
the traditional positive trade-off between mean and variance does not adequately explain real
stock market performance. For example, Campbell (1987), Nelson (1991), Whitelaw (1994)
and Brandt and Kang (2004) indicated a negative, not positive, relationship between risk and
subsequent returns. Meanwhile, researchers such as Turner et al. (1989) and Harvey (2001)
suggested a mixture of results, both positive and negative, to the relationship. Hence, many
researchers such as Arditti (1971), Samuelson (1975), Rubinstein (1973), Konno and Suzuki
(1995) and Jean (1971) indicated that a higher moment framework might be more appro-
priate when depicting stock returns as investor’s utility functions are not constantly quadratic.
Existing literature has already documented the importance of the higher moments of
stock returns in the asset pricing process. For example, Kraus and Litzenberger (1976)
argued that apart from the variance, skewness which measures the third moment of a return
distribution is also a significant pricing factor in security returns. Harvey and Siddique (2000)
found that systematic skewness significantly explains much of the cross-sectional variations
in stock returns, even after controlling for the risk factors of size and value. Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) found that some investors would rather sacrifice part of their utilities to
include more positively skewed stocks in their portfolios and these portfolios exhibit lower
subsequent returns. Konno and Suzuki (1995) revealed that the skewness of the rate of return
of assets and the third order derivative of a utility function play critical roles when optimising
portfolios.1
In recent years, the introduction of behavioural finance has altered the way that people
think regarding financial markets. As evidenced by the previous chapter that investor senti-
ment contributes a great proportion to the cross-sectional return premium, this empirical
chapter intends to plumb the relationship between investor sentiment and time-series stock
returns. In particular, I attempt to address two important issues. First, I re-examine the
traditional mean-variance relationship of security returns in the context of investor sentiment,
1 Jean (1971) and Lai et al. (2006) further expanded the model by including the fourth moment of
stock returns, that is the kurtosis, and found that the four-dimensional framework was surprisingly
useful in solving conflicting portfolio optimisation objectives. In my research, the only interest is the
third moment, skewness, of stock returns.
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and second, I further explore the role of systematic skewness in the asset-pricing process
after controlling for the effect of investor sentiment.
The general motivation of this empirical chapter comes from the idea that sentiment
investors usually misestimate risks. Previous studies found that sentiment-driven investors
tend to be young, naive, and inexperienced, and thus it is highly likely that these investors do
not have a profound understanding of investment risk (Brennan, 2004; Chevalier and Ellison,
1999; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003). Hence, it is highly likely that sentiment traders misestimate
the risk. When sentiment traders under-estimate the risk, they may choose to invest more
aggressively resulting in overinvestment; however, when they over-estimate the risk, it is
very likely that they invest more conservatively giving rise to underinvestment. In addition,
skewness may further exacerbate sentiment investors’ misestimation of investment risk. By
definition, a stock with a positively skewed return distribution gives investors little chance to
gain extreme positive returns, but it also gives investors a greater chance to get a cluster
of small negative returns. When sentiment investors underestimate (overestimate) the risk
associated with negative returns, they are more (less) likely to purchase the positively-skewed
stocks, and thus exhibit strong (weak) preference for positive skewness.2
This empirical chapter begins with the examination of the first research question that
whether investor sentiment plays a role in the traditional mean-variance relation of stock
returns. A recent paper by Yu and Yuan (2011) found that the coherent relationship between
mean and variance in security returns varies depending on market sentiment. Besides, the
authors pointed out that the expected rate of return in the market is positively correlated
with the realised conditional variance in the period of low market sentiment, but not in the
period of high market sentiment. On the basis of this study, this empirical chapter attempts
to investigate the influence of investor sentiment in the return-risk trade-off at both market
and portfolio level.
Despite heated debate on the overall importance of investor sentiment in financial markets,
the relationship between mean and variance can be separately analysed under three scenarios.
First, the traditional mean-variance framework is preserved in the low-sentiment regime
because investors are relatively risk-averse in this regime. Specifically, investors become
more risk-averse when they perceive the market to be bearish. This scenario is consistent
with investors’ tendency to avoid potential losses when they observe recent unfavourable
outcomes (loss aversion). Wolff et al. (2014) found supportive evidence for the relationship
between investor risk aversion and sentiment; in particular, they asserted that high sentiment
indicates low risk aversion while low sentiment indicates high risk aversion. Hence, this
2Extant literature has well documented the strong preference to positively skewed stocks of investors
(Arditti, 1967; Kapadia, 2006; Scott and Horvath, 1980).
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behaviour of investors follows rational expectations, and thus, a positive relationship between
mean and variance is predicted. However, in high-sentiment periods, this trade-off shifts
to be either negative or insignificant, for two reasons. First, the empirical results from
existing literature and my previous chapter indicate that securities with higher volatility
exhibit higher exposure to investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Berger and
Turtle, 2012). Moreover, higher investor sentiment results in lower subsequent returns for
this type of stocks. Hence, the mean-variance relationship under this scenario is expected
to be negative in the high-sentiment regime. Second, this trade-off can be insignificant be-
cause of the incorporation of skewness in the process, which elicits my second research question.
The second research question that I intend to address is how investor skewness preference
affects asset prices in the context of investor sentiment. Although the importance of skewness
in asset valuation has been well documented in the historical literature, some recent literature
offered more intuitive implications. For example, Kapadia (2006) and Mitton and Vorkink
(2007) found that investors sometimes intentionally hold undiversified portfolios to increase
the likelihood of extreme positive returns, or in other words, to capture higher levels of
skewness in their portfolios. This finding offers contrary evidence on the assumption of
the mean-variance framework that all investors will hold a well-diversified portfolio. This
phenomenon reflects risk-seeking rather than the risk-averse behaviour of investors. Intu-
itively, in the high-sentiment regime, investors with this risk-seeking property tend to include
more positively skewed stocks in their portfolios by sacrificing part of the benefits from
diversification. In addition, investors demand lower risk premiums in the period of low risk
aversion; that is, the high sentiment regime (Wolff et al., 2014). Hence, strong preferences
for skewness may consequently result in higher prices and lower subsequent returns for this
type of stock, especially in the high-sentiment regime. Moreover, skewness in bullish markets
‘charms’ risk-seeking investors relative to the variance, as higher positive skewness increases
the likelihood of extreme positive gains. Therefore, incorporating skewness in high-sentiment
regimes may mitigate the effect of variance in explaining stock returns. However, this trade-off
is expected to be valid only in the high-sentiment period (low risk aversion) as investor risk
aversion augments when market sentiment is low. In low-sentiment periods, when investors
are relatively risk-averse rather than risk-seeking, they value the benefit of diversification
more highly than that of including extra skewness in their portfolios. Hence, when the
skewness is considered in the asset-pricing process in low-sentiment periods, investors require
higher risk premiums for including additional units of skewness in their portfolios. Bams et al.
(2017) indicated similar patterns to this prediction that the skewness-risk premium-return
relationship only holds when risk aversion is high. In periods of low risk aversion, investors
demand lower risk compensation for including extra skewness in portfolios, thus substantially
weakening the skewness-risk premium-return trade-off.
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To address my research questions, I construct the following hypotheses. First, the mean-
variance relationship is positive and significant in the low-sentiment regime. The intuition
behind this hypothesis is that investors are relatively risk-averse in low-sentiment periods,
consistent with the assumption of the conventional mean-variance proposition, but more
risk-seeking in high-sentiment periods. Hence, risk-averse investors who bear additional risks
require higher compensation in return. In the high-sentiment regime, however, investors
become relatively risk-seeking rather than risk-averse, and thus, intend to take excessive risk
without requiring excess compensation.
Second, similar to the mean-variance trade-off, the relationship between investors’ skew-
ness preference and subsequent returns is also positive in the low-sentiment period but
negative in higher-sentiment periods. This trade-off is determined by investors’ relative
valuation of the benefits of skewness and diversification. Specifically, when market sentiment
is low, the higher risk aversion encourages investors to value more highly the benefits of
diversification, as undiversified portfolios convey excessive risk. Hence, including additional
(positive) skewness in portfolios imposes an unfavoured risk on investors in the low-sentiment
regime and thus has to be rewarded by an extra positive premium. Alternatively, the (positive)
premium for investing in positively skewed stocks in low-sentiment periods should, at least,
reflect the opportunity cost of diversification.
In contrast, during higher-sentiment periods, diversification becomes less valuable to
investors, as investors focus on enhancing their chances of higher returns. Hence, the strong
propensity for excessive risk speculation attributed to investors’ risk-seeking behaviour results
in overinvestment in positively skewed stocks and lower subsequent returns. In general,
risk-seeking investors choose to sacrifice part of the benefits of diversification by intentionally
holding extra positive skewness in their portfolios to increase the likelihood of achieving ex-
treme positive returns, as argued by Mitton and Vorkink (2007). Interestingly, the behaviour
of risk-seeking investors in high-sentiment regimes is somewhat parallel to the opportunistic
practice of gamblers. For example, Golec and Tamarkin (1998) found that economic agents
sometimes accept gambles with high variance but low expected returns. They also pointed
out that this behaviour is driven by skewness, not variance.
Last, securities of firms with small capitalisations and low book-to-market ratios (growth
stock) are more exposed to skewness in high-sentiment regimes, as these stocks typically
exhibit higher positive skewness. Extant literature suggests that stocks with exceptionally
high volatility are likely to have positive skewness, given the limited liability nature of equity
(Conine and Tamarkin, 1981; Kapadia, 2006). Hence, small growth stocks usually have the
most skewed returns. Kapadia (2006) also found that low returns to small growth stocks can
72 Skewness Preference, Mean-Variance Relation and Investor Sentiment
be partly explained by cross-sectional skewness.
My data covers a sample period ranging from January 1987 to December 2010, including
all common securities with at least a 72-month return history in the NYSE and AMEX stock
exchange.3 The daily and monthly return of both the equally and value-weighted market
index is collected from the CRSP/Compustat merged database. For the measurement of
investor sentiment, Baker and Wurgler’s (BW) composite sentiment index is selected to
calculate individual sentiment sensitivity and identifying sentiment regimes. Besides, the
daily and monthly return data for the size and value portfolios are collected from Kenneth
R. French’s Data Library to capture the impact of both variance and skewness across portfolios.
My empirical results provide substantial evidence on and implications for extant asset-
pricing literature. From the market perspective, first, my results indicate the conventional
mean-variance framework does not hold in the one-regime framework. In particular, I find
that the variance (or co-variance for portfolios) risk is not significantly priced in cases without
controlling for the sentiment effect. Second, once the whole sample period is partitioned into
two sentiment regimes, a positive mean-variance trade-off is significantly observed in the
low-sentiment regime for the equally-weighted market index but this trade-off breaks down
in high-sentiment periods. Notably, for the equally-weighted market index, the variance risk
is negatively priced with larger magnitude than that in low-sentiment periods, resulting in
overall negative returns in the high-sentiment regime. This result is consistent with Yu and
Yuan (2011). In addition, I find that skewness complements variance in the asset-pricing
process. My empirical results reveal that skewness also explains a proportion of market
returns in both regimes, with a positive premium rewarded in the low-sentiment regime but
negative discount in the high-sentiment regime. These findings offer supportive evidence
for my predictions on the mean-variance-skewness trade-off. Further, this finding laterally
indicates that the market is not always mean-variance efficient, given the influence of strong
preferences for skewness and the change in risk aversion in different sentiment regimes.
Further, the empirical results at the portfolio level imply the following patterns. First,
both co-skewness and co-variance are most heavily priced in portfolios with the largest
absolute sentiment betas. In particular, I find the risk premium embedded in co-skewness
in the low-sentiment regime is the greatest for portfolios with both the highest and lowest
sentiment sensitivities. The co-variance exhibits a similar pattern but with smaller variations
across sentiment-based portfolios. This finding offers additional evidence on existing studies
illustrating that the risk premium associated with systematic variance and skewness can be
partly explained by investor sentiment. Second, concerning size portfolios, the co-variance
3The sample period selected in this chapter is consistent with the sample period of my previous
chapter, to ensure any inconsistency in results is not caused by a different sample period.
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risk is only priced in the low-sentiment regime with expected positive signs. This relation-
ship remains persistent across all portfolios. Furthermore, my results illustrate that the
premium rewarded on co-variance risk is larger in middle-size portfolios than small-size ones.
These findings together indicate that the variance risk does not contribute much to the
cross-sectional underperformance of size portfolios in the high-sentiment regime. However,
after controlling for the effect of skewness, skewness is exceptionally priced in nine out of 10
portfolios. Moreover, my results also suggest that the skewness is the most heavily priced
in the portfolio with the smallest market capitalisations in both high- and low-sentiment
periods, but with opposite signs. This finding is consistent with my hypothesis that investors
require higher compensation for bearing additional skewness in low-sentiment regimes, and
further, the underperformance of small stocks in bullish markets is mainly attributable to
skewness, not variance risk. In regards to book-to-market portfolios, the co-variance exhibits
a similar pattern as the size portfolio in that the variance risk is only priced in portfolios with
middle book-to-market ratios in the low regime but not priced in bullish market conditions.
Conversely, skewness is a vital pricing factor across the majority of portfolios. In particular,
I find skewness is not literally priced in portfolios with extreme high and low book-to-market
ratios in the low-sentiment regime, indicating that when investors are relatively risk-averse,
they have less tendency to excessive skewness. Additionally, when the market switches to
a bullish market, excessive skewness results in lower subsequent returns in all portfolios
and this impact is stronger in high-end portfolios, not low book-to-market ratio portfolios.
This finding reverses the inferential results in Baker and Wurgler (2006) regarding a lack of
significance for all growth opportunity and distress proxies. A possible explanation for such a
pattern is that investors are more likely to expect a recent mean-reverting process in returns
of a stock with a divergence between its current price and book value in high-sentiment periods.
This empirical chapter contributes to the extant literature in the following ways. First,
my results not only complement existing studies on the mean-variance relation but specify
the conditions under which the framework holds at both the market and portfolio levels
after accounting for the effect of investor sentiment. In fact, the failure of the traditional
mean-variance model is mainly caused by assuming a simple time-invariant attitude to risk
among investors. My findings indicate the traditional mean-variance trade-off holds in periods
when investors are relatively risk-averse (low-sentiment regime) but breaks down in regimes
when investors are more risk-seeking (high-sentiment regime). Second, this chapter also
contributes to skewness-related asset-pricing studies. In particular, my research specifies
the role of skewness in the return-generating process and finds that including skewness in
asset pricing mitigates the effect of variance, especially in the high-sentiment regime. In
addition, my empirical results further demonstrate that the underperformance of stocks in
high-sentiment periods is attributable to skewness rather than variance risk. This finding,
to my best knowledge, has not been formally proposed in existing studies. Third, this
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chapter establishes a close connection between cross-sectional variations in security returns
and skewness in the context of investor sentiment. My previous chapter provides supportive
evidence on the relationship between cross-sectional differentials in stock returns and investor
sentiment, indicating that securities with small capitalisations and high book-to-market ratios
are more susceptible to investor sentiment. My results in this chapter offer more intuitive
inferences on such cross-sectional anomalies in stock returns, and further, explains why this
type of security might be more exposed to investor sentiment.
In sum, the empirical results in this chapter offer important implications for researchers,
investors and anyone who is concerned about this topic. This research chapter indicates that
investors have stronger preferences for skewness relative to variance in high-sentiment periods,
consistent with their risk-seeking behaviour in such periods. During high-sentiment periods, in-
vestors who prefer positive skewness assign more weight to upside potential; and the reduction
in downside risk associated with holding the market portfolio does not sufficiently compensate
them for the reduction in upside potential. Hence, rather than holding a relatively ‘safe’ port-
folio, such investors intentionally choose to undiversify their portfolios by including greater
skewness when they are overoptimistic about the market. The strong preference for skewness
in high-sentiment periods from sentiment investors leads to lower subsequent returns to stocks.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 summarises the important
literature related to the study in this chapter. Section 4.3 describes the hypotheses developed
for the subsequent empirical tests. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 present the models and data used in
this chapter, respectively. Section 4.6 reports all empirical results combined with associated
analyses, and Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Literature Review
The traditional asset-pricing theory proposes a positive trade-off between risk and expected
return; that is, investors who bear higher risk should be compensated by higher expected
returns (Merton, 1980). The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965) on the basis of Markowitz’s (1952) mean-variance framework has,
since its introduction, been widely accepted as the most popular asset-pricing model in
finance but has come under scrutiny over the past few decades. A growing number of studies
have found this relationship does not always explain security returns. For example, Fama and
MacBeth (1973) and Miller et al. (1972) found an inconsistent relationship between mean
and variance in contrast to the mean-variance relation implied by CAPM. Brandt and Kang
(2004) employed a latent VAR process to investigate contemporaneous and intertemporal
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relationships between mean and conditional variance, and found a strong negative, not
positive, mean-variance relationship. Earlier research also found a similar negative correlation
in mean-variance trade-off of stock returns (Campbell, 1987; Nelson, 1991; Whitelaw, 1994).
In addition, other researchers have indicated an otherwise double-sided correlation between
expected security returns and variances. For example, Harvey (2001) found that the mean-
variance trade-off is strongly sensitive to the specification of conditional models, and thus,
can be either positive or negative. Roll and Ross (1994) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1995)
found little connection between the sample mean returns and estimated betas, because of the
failure of the efficient market hypothesis. Hence, the failure of the traditional mean-variance
proposition has induced researchers to further investigate the impact of the higher moment,
that is the skewness, in stock returns.
Extant literature emphasises the importance of higher-moment risk in asset pricing. For
example, Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) argued that the efficiency of the traditional CAPM in
explaining security market returns is subject to multiple applications, such as the performance
measurement and market efficiency. Also, they found that skewness is a significant pricing
factor, in addition to the variance in security returns. Dittmar (2002) suggested a similar
result, indicating the importance of skewness in determining future stock returns. Harvey and
Siddique (2000) also found that conditional skewness explains the cross-sectional variation in
security returns even after controlling for the size and book-to-market effects.
In recent years, behavioural finance research has further explored the role of skewness in
asset pricing given the presence of irrationals in the market. Theoretically, the maximum
utility theory states that everyone in the market should hold the same portfolio, that is, the
market portfolio (Lintner, 1965; Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). However, recent research
has found that some investors would rather sacrifice part of their utility by including more
positively skewed stocks in their portfolios (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). This strong
preference for skewness among investors has been well documented in existing literature. For
example, Mitton and Vorkink (2007) found that investors with heterogeneous preferences
for skewness choose to undiversify their portfolios to achieve (extreme) prospective positive
returns. Also, they found that the violation of the conventional mean-variance framework
can be largely explained by investors’ strong preferences for skewness, both systematic
co-skewness and idiosyncratic skewness. Arditti (1967), Simkowitz and Beedles (1978), Scott
and Horvath (1980) and Conine and Tamarkin (1981) found similar results, indicating that
investors intentionally hold undiversified portfolios when skewness is taken into consideration.
While the above studies provide valuable information regarding the role of skewness in the
asset-pricing process in the presence of investor sentiment, researchers have not reached
consensus on how such risk factors need to be priced.
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Existing literature indicates mixed results regarding the risk premium associated with
the skewness. For example, Kapadia (2006) found that cross-sectional skewness explains a
considerable proportion of the common time variation and the premium associated with the
high idiosyncratic volatility. Kapadia also indicated that the sensitivity to cross-sectional
skewness also relates to the underperformance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and small
growth stocks, because of investors’ strong preference for the skewness of this type of stocks.
However, the existing literature has not yet reached an agreement on the pricing of skewness.
For example, Kapadia (2006) showed that the market skewness is negatively priced in the
asset-pricing process; while other researchers such as Adrian and Rosenberg (2008) and
Harvey and Siddique (2000) predicted a positive premium for the market skewness. Therefore,
there still exists large gaps in this area for researchers to further investigate the role of
skewness in asset pricing.
As the majority of previous literature on this topic is constructed on the basis of rational
models, introducing the role of the irrational component in the asset-pricing model might
completely reverse previous findings. Some recent literature has already made bold attempts
and proved that using investor sentiment to explain investors’ preferences for skewness works
exceptionally well. For example, Mitton and Vorkink (2007) argued that both co-skewness
and idiosyncratic skewness can affect equilibrium prices in the context of heterogeneous pref-
erences. However, this result significantly contrasts with the predictions made by traditional
asset-pricing models, which assume full diversification for all investors. Therefore, it is of
interest to reconsider the impact of skewness in asset pricing by simultaneously accounting
for the influence of irrational investors.
4.3 Hypotheses Development
The empirical tests in this chapter are constructed on the basis of two fundamental assump-
tions. First, sentiment traders whose trading behaviour is primarily driven by their sentiment,
do exist in the market. This point has already been well discussed in existing literature and
earlier parts of this thesis. Second, sentiment traders always misestimate risk. In particular,
they overestimate risks in periods of low sentiment but underestimate risks in high sentiment
periods. Hence, sentiment traders are more likely to present strong risk-seeking behaviour
in the high sentiment regime but behave more risk-averse in periods of low sentiment. This
assumption is closely aligned with Mitton and Vorkink’s (2007) proposition that investors
intentionally hold undiversified portfolios to increase the likelihood of extreme positive returns.
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Moreover, these two assumptions lead to further inferences. First, sentiment investors
have stronger preferences for (positive) skewness, especially during high-sentiment periods
relative to the low-sentiment periods since sentiment investors underestimate the risk as-
sociated with the left-hand side of positive skewness. Second, irrationals have stronger
preferences for skewness relative to variance in the high-sentiment regime. This behaviour
indicates that irrationals tend to overestimate the probability of extreme positive gains during
high-sentiment periods. Interestingly, this implication is parallel to the literature on gambling,
where economic agents sometimes accept unfavourable gambles with high variance and low
expected returns because of the nature of the positive skewness associated with the gamble
(Golec and Tamarkin, 1998). Putting all these assumptions together leads to the following
three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. The conventional positive trade-off between mean and variance in security
returns significantly holds in the low-sentiment regime.
It is commonly believed that a normal risk-averse investor would require higher expected
returns for taking on more risk. Hence, a positive trade-off between the mean and variance is
predictable. However, some investors are not entirely risk-averse; instead, these investors
are willing to sacrifice part of their profits to take on more risk. We call them risk-loving.
When the market sentiment is low, the investment behaviour of investors become relatively
conservative in order to avoid risk; but in high sentiment periods, some investors turn to be
more risk-loving rather than risk-averse, thereby willing to take on more risk.
I predicts that the traditional mean-variance relationship only holds in the low-sentiment
regime but breaks down in high-sentiment periods for two reasons. First, in low sentiment
periods, investors put more weight on the risk and thus require a positive premium for taking
an additional unit of risk. Second, in periods of high sentiment, investors become more likely
to be attracted to returns than to risk, so their requirement for the compensation of risk will
be reduced accordingly. Hence, I expect the relationship between variance and return to be
positive in the low-sentiment regime but negative in the high-sentiment regime.
Alternatively, the mean-variance trade-off in the high-sentiment regime can also be
insignificant after accounting for the effect of skewness. Intuitive, since sentiment-driven
investors become increasingly risk-loving in the high-sentiment regime, these investors may be
more interested in skewness than in variance, because a positive skewness gives them the op-
portunity to earn an extremely high rate of return. Therefore, based on these assumptions, the
mean-variance relationship between mean and variance can be either positive or insignificant;
but as high sentiment typically encourages excessive risk-taking and speculative activities,
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an insignificant relationship has a better chance of being observed in the high-sentiment regime.
Hypothesis 2. The positive trade-off between mean and skewness is significantly positive in
low-sentiment periods, but negative in high-sentiment periods.
Theoretically, the positive skewness of returns consists of frequent small negative losses
and a few extreme gains. When the market is believed to be bearish, investing in more
skewed stocks requires investors to bear additional risks as people perceive this information
as ‘less likely to obtain extreme returns but more likely to incur small losses’. Hence, investors
require higher compensation for bearing excessive skewness in low-sentiment periods. In
the low-sentiment regime, investors become relatively risk-averse and thus value more the
benefits of diversification relative to the small likelihood of extreme positive returns of
positive skewness. However, when investors predict a bullish market, higher market sentiment
strengthens investors’ preference for positively skewness, and thus, future returns are expected
to be lower because of the overinvestment from sentiment traders. The intuition behind
this hypothesis is that during high-sentiment periods, investors overweight the probability of
observing favourable outcomes and thus exaggerate their propensity to speculate and gamble.
The overpursuit of extreme positive profits from positively skewed stocks erodes the returns
in the following period.
Hypothesis 3. Both (co-)variance and (co-)skewness are most heavily priced in portfolios
with small capitalisations and low book-to-market ratios.
Harvey and Siddique (2000) suggested that specific groups of securities, such as the ones
with the smallest market capitalisations or lowest book-to-market ratios are more likely to be
affected by (co-)skewness as these assets typically have the most skewed returns. Besides,
other studies have indicated that small or growth stocks are more susceptible to investor
sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Berger and Turtle, 2012).4 Following these studies,
I predict that both co-variance and co-skewness are most heavily priced in portfolios with
small capitalisations and low book-to-market ratios.
4.4 Models
4.4.1 Conditional (co-)Variance and (co-)Skewness
The model setting in the empirical analysis aims at capturing the nature of the time-varying
dependence of security returns on variance and skewness. In particular, this model uses the
4(Baker and Wurgler, 2006) argued that growth stocks are more exposed to investor sentiment but
their results reveal low significance for book-to-market ratio portfolios.
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realised variance and skewness of the previous months as conditioning information variables
for the current month’s return. For the market portfolio, the return of month t is conditioned
on the realised variance computed based on the daily return of the the previous month t - 1,
which is measured as:
V art = σ2t =
22
Nt
Nt∑
t=1
r2t−d (4.1)
where V art is the realised variance of month t and rt−d is the demeaned daily return in
month t. The corresponding subscript t−d indicates the date t minus d days and Nt is the
total number of trading days in month t. The variance is standardised by a consistent 22
trading days for each month.
Similarly, the realised monthly skewness for the market index is calculated as:
Skewt = θ3t =
22
Nt
Nt∑
t=1
( rt−d√∑Nt
t=1 r
2
t−d
)3 (4.2)
where all variables are as previously defined.
To capture the time-dependence of market returns on the realised variance and skewness,
the basic model follows the specification of the two-regime conditional mean-variance model
of Yu and Yuan (2011), that is,
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1V art−1+ ϵt (4.3)
where Rm,t is the market excess return of month t. Dt−1 is a dummy variable constructed
to identify the independent sentiment regimes. Specifically, Dt−1 takes the value of 1 if the
previous month t - 1 has a positive sentiment index, indicating a high-sentiment regime, and
0 otherwise. Hence, the interaction term between the dummy sentiment variable and realised
variance presents the performance of variances on subsequent returns in the high-sentiment
regime. In addition, for the market portfolio, the coefficient estimate for the conditional
variance, βV ar, in fact, represents investors’ risk aversion in the low-sentiment regime. In
particular, it measures the additional expected return an investor might require to accept
additional risk. Based on the specification of my model, I also predict a time-varying risk
tolerance which is measured by βV ar+β1Dt−1. When Dt−1 takes the value of 1, it indicates
that the previous period is bullish; as such, the risk tolerance in the high-sentiment regime is
transformed to βV ar+β1. In low-sentiment periods, the risk tolerance is simply the βV ar as
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Dt−1 equals to zero for the low sentiment regime. If β1 is significantly different from 0 for
the market portfolio, my empirical test proves that investor risk tolerance truly varies across
time with investor sentiment, and thus, my predictions are logical.
Moreover, to estimate the relationship at the portfolio level, I compute the systematic
co-variance and co-skewness of each portfolio in the market. The realised co-variance, COVt,
and co-skewness, COSt, with the market portfolio at month t are measured as:
COVt = σ2pm,t =
22
Nt
Nt∑
t=1
(rp,t−d)(rm,t−d) (4.4)
COSt = θ3pm,t =
22
Nt
Nt∑
t=1
(rp,t−d)(rm,t−d)2 (4.5)
where rp,t−d is the demeaned daily return in month t for portfolio p and rm,t−d is the de-
meaned daily return in month t for the market index. All other variables are as previously
defined.
4.4.2 Portfolio Construction
The subsequent empirical tests consider three sets of portfolios: sentiment-related, size and
value. The size and value portfolios are the conditional equally-weighted portfolios based on
the market capitalisation and book-to-market ratios, respectively.
For the sentiment-based portfolio, the portfolios are constructed following a rolling window
model. In particular, the essence of this model seeks to capture the potential time-varying
sensitivity of portfolio returns to market sentiment. Additionally, this model allows a re-
balancing of portfolios after each rolling window ensuring that all stocks in each portfolio
exhibit similar sentiment sensitivities across time.5
To construct the sentiment-based portfolio, I select a standard 60-month rolling window
to calculate the conditional sensitivity of a stock’s monthly returns to investor sentiment.
For each rolling window, the monthly returns of each stock, Rj,t, during the period t are
regressed on the monthly sentiment index in the previous month, Sentt−1. Besides, I also
5This rolling window method mitigates the potential possibility of large jumps in the sensitivity of
a company stock return to investor sentiment throughout the life of a company. For example, existing
literature indicates young and growth stocks are more susceptible to investor sentiment than old and
value stocks (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Berger and Turtle, 2012). Hence, an unconditional
sensitivity to sentiment may lead to misleading results.
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include a market risk factor, measured as the equally-weighted excess market return, Rm,t,
over the risk-free rate, Rf,t to control for the effect of the market. The model is specified as
below,
Rj,t = α0+βSent,jSentt−1+βm(Rm,t−Rf,t)+ ϵt (4.6)
where βSent,j represents the sentiment sensitivity of a given stock j. For any given rolling
window, all securities within the window are assigned to ten identical portfolios based on the
ranking of individual sentiment betas βSent,j . Securities with the lowest betas are assigned to
the first portfolio, while the highest sentiment beta stocks are assigned to the last portfolio.
The monthly portfolio return at month t in the year after each rolling window is calculated
as the equally-weighted average of all stock returns in that month. Further, the portfolio
rebalances every year.
4.4.3 Regression Specification
To test the mean-variance-skewness relation in the context of investor sentiment, I employ
a conditional two-regime model following Yu and Yuan (2011) (Eq.4.3 ). Besides, I further
expand this framework to two sets of equations in order to plumb the comprehensive relation-
ship between investor sentiment and subsequent returns at both the market and portfolio level.
Market
Eq.4.7 to Eq.4.12 measure the performance of variance and skewness in the market return
generating process. Each equation is performed using both equally- and value-weighted
market index. Also, equations with odd numbers, that is Eq.4.7, Eq.4.9 and Eq.4.11, are
one-regime equations which do not take into account the influence of investor sentiment. In
contrast, equations with even numbers, that is Eq.4.8, Eq.4.10 and Eq.4.12, partition the
whole sample period into two regimes, high and low, on the basis of investor sentiment and
examine the significance of variance and skewness under each regime. Eq.4.7 and Eq.4.8 only
consider the effect of variance, Eq.4.9 and Eq.4.10 examine the skewness impact alone while
Eq.4.11 and Eq.4.12 incorporate both variance and skewness. All equations from Eq.4.7 to
Eq.4.12 are specified as:
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+ ϵt (4.7)
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Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1V art−1+ ϵt (4.8)
Rm,t = α0+βSkewSkewt−1+ ϵt (4.9)
Rm,t = α0+βSkewSkewt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1Skewt−1+ ϵt (4.10)
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+βSkewSkewt−1+ ϵt (4.11)
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+βSkewSkewt−1+a1Dt−1+
β1Dt−1V art−1+β2Dt−1Skewt−1+ ϵt
(4.12)
where Rm,t is monthly excess market return during period t. V art−1 and Skewt−1
represent the realised variance and skewness of the market, computed based on the daily
returns from the previous period, respectively. Dt−1 is the dummy variable for the high-
sentiment regime, which takes the value 1 if the current period t has a positive sentiment index.
Portfolio
I also test the significance of variance and skewness in portfolio’s return generating process. I
consider three groups of portfolios including sentiment sensitivity, size and book-to-market
ratio and the setting of regressions at the portfolio level follows the regressions performed
at the market level. However, in order to capture the systematic impact of variance and
skewness at the portfolio level, I replace V art−1 and Skewt−1 of the market index with
the realised co-variance, COVp,t−1, and co-skewness, COSp,t−1, of each portfolio to market,
respectively. Eq.4.13 to Eq.4.16 represent the models for the portfolio-level regressions.6
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+ ϵt (4.13)
6The reason that I exclude Eq.4.9 and Eq.4.10 from portfolios, equations which only consider
the impact of skewness, is that I assume a trade-off between the benefits of diversification and co-
skewness for investors when holding portfolios. Investors may not consider skewness alone, especially
in the period of high risk aversion, as it would be very costly for them to sacrifice the benefits from
diversification in this period. Hence, at the portfolio level, I assume that investors care about the
skewness only if it provides extra benefits over diversification.
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Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+ ϵt (4.14)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+ ϵt (4.15)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+a1Dt−1+
β1Dt−1COVt−1+β2Dt−1COSt−1+ ϵt
(4.16)
where Rp,t is the equally-weighted excess return for each portfolio p in month t. COVp,t−1
and COSp,t−1 represent the realised co-variance and co-skewness of the portfolio return to
market in the previous period, respectively.
4.5 Data
Stock return data are collected from the CRSP/Compustat Merged database, including both
the daily and monthly return ranging from the 1st January 1987 to 31st December 2010.
All common securities from the NYSE and AMEX stock exchange with at least 72 months’
return history are included in my sample. The measure for investor sentiment employed
in this chapter is the monthly BW sentiment index.7 Based on BW’s sentiment index, the
sample period of my data is split into two mutually exclusive regimes, high and low, based
on the sentiment index. I use a dummy variable, Dt, to indicate investor sentiment at each
month t, and then, to identify the sentiment regimes. In particular, Dt takes the value of
1 for any periods with positive sentiment index, indicating a high sentiment period, and 0
otherwise. Excess returns for the size and book-to-market portfolios are obtained from the
Kenneth R. French’s Data Library.8
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for excess return and realised variance for both
the equally- and value-weighted market index (displayed in Panels A and B, respectively).
Also, Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the sentiment index in Panel C. Taking the
equally-weighted index as an example, the average market excess return is much lower in the
high-sentiment regime relative to in the low-sentiment period for both indexes. In particular,
7As a reminder, the BW sentiment index refers to the composite sentiment index constructed by
Baker and Wurgler (2006) consisting of the principal component of six sentiment proxies.
8My empirical analyses cover the results for both equally- and value-weighted portfolio returns,
but since the results of the value-weighted are not statistically significant, I only include the results
of equally-weighted in the main part of my report. For anyone who might concern regarding the
value-weighted results, please refer to Appendix A.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics for Equally-Weighted and Value-Weighted Market indexes
and the Investor Sentiment Index in Different Sentiment Regimes
This table reports the summary statistics for the equally-weighted and value-weighted market indexes
and the investor sentiment index, displayed in Panels A, B and C, respectively. The excess market
return is computed as the raw monthly market return minus the risk-free rate. The realised variance
is the monthly variance computed from the within-month daily return.
Excess Return Realised Variance
Period Mean (%) Variance (%) Skewness Kurtosis Mean (%) Variance (%) Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: Equally-weighted Index
Whole Sample 0.6544 0.2418 -0.9786 8.7388 0.1876 0.0028 6.6818 52.3318
High Sentiment 0.0135 0.2639 -1.9939 10.4499 0.1952 0.0035 6.9236 52.3046
Low Sentiment 1.2141 0.2174 0.2418 5.3525 0.1810 0.0022 5.8552 43.0603
Panel B: Value-weighted Index
Whole Sample 0.4804 0.1881 -1.1013 6.7037 0.2655 0.0034 6.7720 55.6501
High Sentiment -0.0984 0.2240 -1.4785 7.5182 0.3115 0.0048 6.4071 51.1143
Low Sentiment 0.9858 0.1525 -0.3603 3.6296 0.2252 0.0021 6.2069 46.6559
Panel C: Investor Sentiment
Period Investor Sentiment Investor Sentiment (Orthogonalised)
Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Whole Sample 0.1263 0.2812 1.5962 6.7610 0.0650 0.2664 1.9571 8.2323
High Sentiment 0.4316 0.2446 2.0840 7.1237 0.4095 0.2865 2.0186 6.4337
Low Sentiment -0.2833 0.0375 -0.4787 2.4400 -0.2519 0.0387 -0.9700 3.5125
the mean excess return is just 0.0135% when market sentiment is high. In contrast, this
return increases to 1.2141% in the low-sentiment regime. This pattern follows economic
intuition in that high-sentiment periods generally produce negative subsequent returns; this
has been documented in the literature and shown in the empirical results in the previous
chapter. In addition, the realised variance is relatively high in the high-sentiment regime. For
example, the realised variance in high- and low-sentiment periods are 0.1952% and 0.1810%,
respectively, indicating that returns in high-sentiment periods are comparatively more volatile
than low-sentiment period returns.
Another important finding from Table 4.1 is that investor sentiment and excess returns
are oppositely distributed in both the high- and low- sentiment regime. In particular, the
skewness of market return is negative in high-sentiment periods but turns to be positive in
the low-sentiment regime. For example, skewness of the equally-weighted index is -1.9939 in
the high-sentiment regime but increases to 0.2418 as the market sentiment regime switches.
The skewness of investor sentiment, however, shows an opposite distribution. To be specific,
the skewness of investor sentiment in the high-sentiment regime is 2.0840, indicating an
extremely long tail on the right, but this value reduces to -0.4787 in the low sentiment regime.
The sentiment distribution with a positive skewness in the high-sentiment regime indicating
a potentially high propensity for speculation from sentiment investors. By relating it with
the distribution of market returns in the high sentiment regime, I can possibly guess that
the positive distribution of investor sentiment may be one of the reasons for the negative
distribution of market returns.
4.6 Empirical Results 85
Table 4.2 Regression Results for Variance and Skewness in the Two Sentiment Regimes -
the Market Portfolio
This table reports the coefficient estimates for both value- and equally-weighted market portfolios in
the context of two sentiment regimes. The estimated equations include all equations from Eq.(4.7) to
Eq.(4.12):
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+ ϵt (4.7)
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1V art−1+ ϵt (4.8)
Rm,t = α0+βSkewSkewt−1+ ϵt (4.9)
Rm,t = α0+βSkewSkewt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1Skewt−1+ ϵt (4.10)
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+βSkewSkewt−1+ ϵt (4.11)
Rm,t = α0+βV arV art−1+βSkewSkewt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1V art−1+β2Dt−1Skewt−1+ ϵt (4.12)
To control for the effect of both variance and skewness in the high-sentiment regime, I construct
the interaction term by multiplying each variable by the dummy sentiment indicator, Dt−1. The
dependent variable is the monthly excess return of the market portfolio. βV ar and βSkew represent the
coefficient estimates for the variance and skewness, respectively. β1 and β2 are coefficient estimates of
the interaction term for variance and skewness, respectively. a1 is the parameter estimate for the
dummy sentiment variable alone. In addition, Alow and Ahigh reveal the time-varying risk aversion
in the low- and high-sentiment regimes, respectively. For each coefficient estimate, the correspond-
ing t-statistic is also reported, and * and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Equation α0 t-stat βV ar t-stat βSkew t-stat a1 t-stat β1 t-stat β2 t-stat Alow Ahigh Adj. R2 (%)
Panel A: Value-weighted Index
(4.7) 0.0073* 2.52 -0.7220 -1.42 -0.7220 0.40
(4.8) 0.0080* 2.05 0.3682 0.50 -0.0020 -0.35 -2.0257 0.05 0.3682 -1.6575 1.93
(4.9) 0.0045 1.74 -0.0090 -0.49 -0.27
(4.10) 0.0085* 2.36 0.0008 0.03 -0.0083 -1.59 -0.0155 -0.42 -0.06
(4.11) 0.0073* 2.50 -0.7219 -1.41 -0.0000 -0.00 -0.7219 -0.00
(4.12) 0.0083* 2.10 0.3606 0.49 0.0159 0.54 -0.0024 -0.42 -2.0076* -1.97 -0.0247 -0.63 0.3606 -1.6470 1.30
Panel B: Equally-weighted Index
(4.7) 0.0107** 3.40 0.1343 0.21 0.1343 -0.38
(4.8) 0.0128** 3.08 2.2636** 2.85 -0.0045 -0.74 -5.0873** -4.19 2.2636 -2.8237 7.46
(4.9) 0.0065* 2.10 -0.0001 -0.01 -0.36
(4.10) 0.0083* 2.13 -0.0023 -0.09 -0.0088 -1.60 -0.0215 -0.63 0.25
(4.11) 0.0106** 3.20 0.1400 0.22 -0.0023 -0.12 0.1400 -0.78
(4.12) 0.0154** 3.36 2.1923** 2.76 0.0411* 1.96 -0.0077 -1.21 -4.9498** -4.06 -0.0590* -1.99 2.1923 -2.7575 9.60
4.6 Empirical Results
4.6.1 Market Level
My empirical test begins with an examination of whether variance and skewness are significant
pricing factors of market portfolio returns in different sentiment regimes. I estimate all equa-
tions from Eq.4.7 to 4.12 for both the equally- and value-weighted market indexes. Besides, I
also calculate the time-varying market risk tolerance in both high- and low-sentiment regimes.
Table 4.2 reports the parameter estimates with corresponding t-statistics from tests of market
portfolios and Panels A and B present the results for value- and equally-weighted market
indexes, respectively.
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Table 4.2 indicates apparent differences between the results of value- and equally-weighted
market indexes with respect to the mean-variance-skewness relation. First, the results of the
value-weighted market index shows that variance and skewness perform poorly in explaining
market returns in both one- and two-regime models. For example, βV ar and βSkew from
Eq.4.12 in Panel A take the value of 0.3606 and 0.0159, respectively. The t-statistics of
these two parameters indicate that neither of them is statistically significant at the 5% level.
In contrast to the value-weighted index, the results for the equally-weighted index indicate
strong effects for both variance and skewness in predicting future market returns. Specifically,
the coefficient estimates from Eq.4.8 indicate that the mean-variance relationship holds
in the two-sentiment regime model. In particular, the variance is positively priced in the
low-sentiment regime but negatively priced in the high-sentiment regime. The parameter
estimates of variance in both regimes, βV ar and β1, are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the magnitude for the parameter estimate in the high-sentiment regime is higher
than that in the low-sentiment regime, revealing an overall negative effect on subsequent
returns from the variance risk. For example, βV ar and β1 from Eq.4.8 equal 2.2636 (with a
t-statistic of 2.85) and -5.0873 (with a t-statistic of -4.19), respectively, resulting in a net
effect of approximate -2.82 on subsequent future returns from the market variance. Besides,
introducing the skewness slightly reduces the impact from variance but significantly improves
the performance of the model. Skewness is significantly priced at the 5% level, with similar
patterns of variance risk in both high- and low-sentiment regimes. In particular, the skewness
is significantly priced with positive premiums (negative discount) in the low (high) sentiment
regime. Taking results from Eq.4.12 as examples, skewness is priced with coefficient estimates
of 0.0411 and -0.0590 in the low- and high-sentiment regimes, respectively, and both are
statistically significant at the 5% level according to their t-statistics. Moreover, the adjusted
R-square increases from 7.46% (Eq.4.8 ) to 9.60% (Eq.4.12 ). A possible explanation for such a
huge difference between value- and equally-weighted market index is that the equally-weighted
market index, by definition, magnifies the importance of stocks with small capitalisations
which have proved susceptible to investor sentiment by extant literature, as discussed earlier.
Besides, Table 4.2 provides strong evidence for my prediction of the time-varying risk
tolerance, especially for the equally-weighted market index. In particular, when Dt−1 equals
zero, the risk aversion in the low-sentiment period is merely the coefficient estimate of the vari-
ance, βV ar. From the results in Eq.4.12 for the equally-weighted portfolio, the low-sentiment
risk aversion is significantly positive, with a value of 2.1923, indicating that investors require
approximate 2.2% additional risk premium for bearing an extra unit increase in market
variance in the low-sentiment regime. However, risk aversion in bullish markets, measured
by the summation of βV ar and β1, indicates that investors are incredibly risk-seeking when
market sentiment is high. Specifically, Ahigh estimated from Eq.4.12 for the equally-weighted
index is no longer positive, but negative, with a value of -2.7575. The negative risk aversion
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implies that investors would rather accept lower future returns than take excessive risks. My
results are consistent with Wolff et al. (2014), which shows that investors’ risk tolerance
varies across time depending on the level of investor sentiment and higher investor sentiment
leads to lower risk aversion.
The assumptions on which the conventional mean-variance proposition is established
include that all investors are constantly risk-averse and thus should maximise their expected
returns at any given level of risk (Markowitz, 1952). My results indicate that the violation of
this assumption leads to the failure of traditional mean-variance framework in explaining
equity returns. Intuitively, when investors are less risk-averse (optimistic), they ask for
less compensation for additional risk. Hence, my results further demonstrate that investor
sentiment can be treated as a good indicator of investor relative risk aversion where low
sentiment predicts higher risk aversion and high sentiment presents lower risk aversion.
Further, by definition, the market portfolio is a completely diversified portfolio with every
asset weighted in proportion to its total presence in the market; that is, the value-weighted
market portfolio. My results suggest that neither variance nor skewness is significant in
explaining future returns in both regimes. This finding indicates that the value-weighted
market index suffers less from the sentiment exposure. In contrast, the equally-weighted
market index assigns identical weight to each asset within the portfolio, which exaggerates the
importance of small security returns. As shown in Panel B in Table 4.2, both variance and
skewness significantly predict future market returns, revealing that small securities exhibit
momentous sensitivities to investor sentiment. Two possible conclusions can be drawn from
this indication. First, the overweighted returns from small stocks contribute to both the
positive premium associated with variance and skewness in low-sentiment periods as well as
the underperformance of the equally-weighted index in the high-sentiment regime. Second,
although the market portfolio is well diversified, returns of the equally-weighted market index
still display a significant correlation with pricing factors other than market risk, which shows
that the equally-weighted market index does not necessarily capture the nature of an efficient
stock market.
Second, this mean-variance trade-off might be attenuated after controlling for the skewness
in the high-sentiment regime. As revealed by Table 4.2, investors’ risk aversion changes
with investment sentiment over time. Hence, given the proposition that higher sentiment
encourages investors to take excessive risk and to speculate, investors should have a stronger
preference for positive skewness relative to high variance in the high-sentiment regime, as
positively skewed stocks offer investors great upside potential for extreme future returns.
This behaviour, to a certain extent, is parallel to the gambling literature in which a gam-
bler sometimes accepts gambles with high variance and low expected returns because of
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their strong preferences for skewness, not variance (Golec and Tamarkin, 1998; Kapadia,
2006). Consequently, after considering investors’ preference for skewness in the high-sentiment
regime, the relationship between variance and future returns can be ambiguous in this scenario.
4.6.2 Portfolio Level
The subsequent analyses address the mean-variance-skewness relation at the portfolio level. I
estimate three sets of portfolios: sentiment-based, size and book-to-market ratios and for
each set of portfolios, I test all regression equations from Eq.4.13 to 4.16.
Sentiment-Based Portfolio
Table 4.3 presents the test result for the sentiment-based portfolios, including the coefficient
estimates and the t-statistics. As described previously, the sentiment-based portfolio is
constructed on the basis of the rolling sensitivity of individual security returns to investor
sentiment, where Portfolio 1 consists of stocks with the lowest sensitivity to sentiment expo-
sure and Portfolio 10 includes the highest sentiment-sensitive stocks.
Table 4.3 shows a weak and ambiguous relationship between co-variance and subsequent
returns in all one-regime equations. For example, in the one-regime model (Eq.4.13 ), the
coefficient estimate of the co-variance in the portfolio with the highest sentiment sensitivity
is 0.79 with a t-statistic of 1.02. However, when it comes to the two-regime model (Eq.4.14 ),
co-variance is significantly priced in both high- and low-sentiment regimes with opposite signs
in all two-regime equations (except for Portfolio 5).9 In particular, the coefficient estimates
of co-variance for bearish markets (βCOV ) are positive but negative in bullish markets (β1),
consistent with the market portfolio. This finding indicates that without considering the
higher moment of stock returns, co-variance is a significant pricing factor in returns of all
sentiment-based portfolios.
Furthermore, including co-skewness in the two-regime equation significantly improves the
predictive power of these models. In detail, the adjusted R-square of the two-regime model
that includes co-variance as the only explanatory variable (Eq.4.14 ) in the portfolio with
the lowest sentiment sensitivity is only 5.96%, showing that only approximately 5.96% of
the total variation in security returns can be explained by the co-variance in both regimes.
9A possible explanation for the insignificant coefficient estimates of both co-variance and co-
skewness in Portfolio 5 is this portfolio includes stocks with sentiment sensitivity closest to zero, and
thus, returns have little sentiment exposure. Hence, I skip this portfolio for the following analysis
with respect to sentiment-based portfolios.
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However, adding co-skewness to the model significantly increases the adjusted R-square to
15.16%, almost three times larger than the adjusted R-square from a single co-variance factor
model. Moreover, consistent with co-variance, co-skewness is also positively priced in the
low-sentiment regime. For example, the coefficient estimates of co-variance and co-skewness
in low-sentiment periods for the highest sentiment-based portfolio are 1.87 and 202.23, re-
spectively, and both are statistically significant at the 5% level. This pattern is persistent
across almost all sentiment-based portfolios, which shows that when market sentiment is
low and consensus risk aversion is high, an asset with higher co-variance or co-skewness to
market returns results in higher future asset returns. Hence, this finding is closely aligned
with the pattern observed in the market portfolio.
When the market is bullish, the premium associated with co-variance and co-skewness
are completely eliminated. In particular, the coefficient estimates β1,p and β2,p demonstrate
significant negative pricing, rather than positive pricing for co-variance and co-skewness in
the high-sentiment regime across all portfolios. For example, the coefficient estimates β1,p and
β2,p obtained from Eq.4.16 equal -5.48 and -243.77 in the first portfolio, respectively. Hence,
my results complement existing literature, which argues that higher investor sentiment gives
rise to lower future returns by showing that for any portfolio with an associated sentiment
sensitivity far from zero, returns are negatively correlated with co-variance and co-skewness
in high-sentiment periods (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Pontiff, 1997). In addition, for the
mean-variance-skewness framework in the low-sentiment regime (from Eq.4.16 ), a significant
positive premium for co-skewness prevails in all portfolios except for Portfolio 5, while the
co-variance risk is only statistically significant in highly sentiment-sensitive portfolios. For
example, the t-statistics of βCOV,p show that only Portfolios 1, 2, 9 and 10 exhibit significant
betas for co-variance in the low-sentiment period (at the 5% level). This finding reveals that
investors commonly neglect the risk associated with co-variance for portfolios that are less
susceptible to investor sentiment in low-sentiment periods but are incredibly sensitive to
risk relevant to additional (positive) co-skewness. Hence, for portfolios with less sentiment
sensitivity, investors require significantly higher positive premiums for extra co-skewness but
insignificant premiums for co-variance in bearish markets.
Furthermore, I calculate the overall impact of co-variance in the high-sentiment regime,
that is, the high sentiment exposure of co-variance, by simply adding up the coefficient
estimates βCOV and β1 for each portfolio. Similarly, the high-sentiment betas for co-skewness
are computed as the summation of βCOS and β2 for each portfolio.10 Table 4.4 reports the
10I examined the significance of both co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime by
replacing the sentiment dummy variable, Dt−1, with 1−Dt−1. The new coefficient estimates βCOV and
βCOS exhibit similar significance to the interaction terms of co-variance and co-skewness, respectively,
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Table 4.3 Significance of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in Different Sentiment Regimes -
Sentiment-Based Portfolios
This table reports the coefficient estimates of both co-variance and co-skewness forsentiment-based
portfolios in high- and low-sentiment regimes. The baseline models are from Eq.4.13 to Eq.4.16 :
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+ ϵt (4.13)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+ ϵt (4.14)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+ ϵt (4.15)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+β2Dt−1COSt−1+ ϵt (4.16)
To control for the effect of both co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime, interaction
terms for each variable with the dummy sentiment indicator are constructed. The dependent variable
is the monthly excess return for each sentiment-based portfolio. βCOV and βCOS represent the
coefficient estimates of co-variance and co-skewness for each portfolio’s return to the equally-weighted
market return, respectively. β1 and β2 are coefficient estimates for the interaction term of co-variance
and co-skewness, respectively. a1 is the parameter estimate for the dummy sentiment variable alone.
* and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Equations α0 t-stat βCOV t-stat βCOS t-stat a1 t-stat β1 t-stat β2 t-stat Adj. R2 (%)
Low βSent Portfolio
(4.13) 0.01** 3.13 0.25 0.51 -0.28
(4.14) 0.01* 2.43 1.77** 2.96 0.00 0.32 -4.15** -4.20 5.96
(4.15) 0.01** 3.72 -0.57 -1.08 137.39** 3.69 4.20
(4.16) 0.01** 2.91 1.09 1.86 225.46** 4.36 0.01 0.82 -5.48** -4.93 -243.77** -3.28 15.16
Portfolio 2
(4.13) 0.01* 2.43 0.52 1.05 0.04
(4.14) 0.01* 2.04 2.32** 3.80 -0.00 -0.03 -4.52** -4.68 8.36
(4.15) 0.01** 2.71 0.08 0.15 58.79 1.94 1.07
(4.16) 0.01* 2.31 2.02** 3.40 150.86** 3.56 0.00 0.56 -6.36** -5.39 -155.72* -2.25 14.67
Portfolio 3
(4.13) 0.01** 3.02 -0.17 -0.34 -0.33
(4.14) 0.01 1.70 1.67** 2.63 0.01 1.07 -4.42** -4.50 6.23
(4.15) 0.01** 3.33 -0.77 -1.25 46.32 1.67 0.33
(4.16) 0.01* 2.21 0.72 1.06 133.10** 3.36 0.01 1.29 -5.22** -3.96 -149.72 -1.87 10.70
Portfolio 4
(4.13) 0.01* 2.25 0.95* 2.14 1.30
(4.14) 0.01* 1.96 1.37* 2.45 -0.00 -0.33 -1.14 -1.25 1.43
(4.15) 0.01** 2.72 0.28 0.55 79.09** 2.77 3.67
(4.16) 0.01* 2.35 0.81 1.44 168.79** 3.66 -0.00 -0.10 -1.93 -1.65 -191.27* -2.45 6.53
Portfolio 5
(4.13) 0.10 1.07 0.14 0.05 -0.38
(4.14) 0.18 1.39 0.03 0.01 -0.17 -0.82 -2.57 -0.10 -0.83
(4.15) 0.10 1.07 0.17 0.06 -101.97 -0.12 -0.75
(4.16) 0.18 1.39 0.05 0.02 -211.74 -0.14 -0.16 -0.77 -4.70 -0.13 331.08 0.16 -1.59
Portfolio 6
(4.13) 0.01 2.15* 0.01 0.01 -0.38
(4.14) 0.01 1.38 1.45* 2.12 0.00 0.45 -3.44** -3.26 3.11
(4.15) 0.01* 2.34 -0.36 -0.59 35.06 1.23 -0.18
(4.16) 0.01 1.60 1.19 1.77 139.55** 2.82 0.01 1.04 -5.65** -3.98 -139.38* -2.45 7.47
Portfolio 7
(4.13) 0.01** 3.34 -0.09 -0.15 -0.36
(4.14) 0.01* 2.38 1.76* 2.44 0.00 0.38 -4.58** -4.05 5.31
(4.15) 0.01** 3.54 -0.57 -0.83 48.04 2.27 2.14
(4.16) 0.01** 2.78 0.91 1.17 157.21** 2.67 0.00 0.58 -5.37** -3.67 -160.63** -2.77 8.19
Portfolio 8
(4.13) 0.01** 3.45 0.25 0.46 -0.29
(4.14) 0.01** 2.79 1.24 1.64 -0.00 -0.41 -2.07 -1.89 0.85
(4.15) 0.01** 3.88 -0.57 -0.88 76.08* 2.33 1.33
(4.16) 0.01** 3.15 0.55 0.68 113.42** 2.55 -0.00 -0.23 -2.83* -2.05 -121.45 -0.31 3.61
Portfolio 9
(4.13) 0.01** 3.08 0.10 0.19 -0.35
(4.14) 0.01* 2.38 1.42* 2.06 0.00 0.04 -3.36** -3.06 2.87
(4.15) 0.01** 3.06 0.05 0.09 5.14 1.04 -0.32
(4.16) 0.01* 2.33 1.39* 2.02 4.92 1.00 0.00 0.51 -4.85** -3.40 80.67 1.56 3.50
High βsent Portfolio
(4.13) 0.02** 3.01 0.79 1.02 0.01
(4.14) 0.02** 3.43 2.58** 2.70 -0.01 -0.52 -4.89** -3.11 4.18
(4.15) 0.02** 3.66 0.96 1.06 -14.24 -0.37 -0.30
(4.16) 0.02** 3.69 1.87 1.89 202.23* 2.51 -0.01 -0.49 -4.94* -2.27 -174.23 -1.79 5.76
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Table 4.4Overall Impact of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in Different Sentiment Regimes
- Sentiment-Based Portfolios
This table displays the overall impact of co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment
regime for sentiment-based portfolios. The reported coefficient estimates are extractions from the
results in Table 4.3. In particular, the coefficient estimates for co-variance (βCOV ), co-skewness
βCOS , the interaction term of co-variance and sentiment dummy (β1), as well as the interaction
term of co-skewness and sentiment dummy (β2) from Eq.4.14, and 4.16 are presented. The
last two columns report the overall impact of co-variance (βCOV and β1) and co-skewness
(βCOS and β2 for co-skewness) in the high sentiment regime, respectively. * and ** indicate
that the coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Portfolio Equation βCOV βCOS β1 β2
Overall Impact of Co-Variance Overall Impact of Co-Skewness
in High-Sentiment Regime, βCOV + β1 in High-Sentiment Regime, βCOS + β2
Portfolio 1
(4.14) 1.77** -4.15** -2.38 0
(4.16) 1.09* 225.46** -5.48** -243.77** -4.39 -18.31
Portfolio 2
(4.14) 2.32** -4.15** -1.83 0
(4.16) 2.02** 150.86** -6.37** -155.72** -4.35 -4.86
Portfolio 3
(4.14) 1.67** -4.42** -2.75 0
(4.16) 0.72 133.10** -5.22** -149.72* -4.50 -16.62
Portfolio 4
(4.14) 1.37** -1.14 0.23 0
(4.16) 0.81 168.79** -1.93* -191.27 -1.11 -22.48
Portfolio 5
(4.14) 0.03 -2.57 -2.54 0
(4.16) 0.05 -211.74 -4.70 331.08 -4.65 119.34
Portfolio 6
(4.14) 1.45** -3.44** -1.99 0
(4.16) 1.19* 139.55** -5.65** -139.38** -4.46 0.18
Portfolio 7
(4.14) 1.76** -4.58** -2.82 0
(4.16) 0.91* 157.21** -5.37** -160.63** -4.45 -3.42
Portfolio 8
(4.14) 1.24* -2.07** -0.83 N/A
(4.16) 0.54 113.42** -2.83** -121.48 -2.83 -8.06
Portfolio 9
(4.14) 1.42** -3.36** -1.94 0
(4.16) 1.39** 4.92 -4.85** 80.67 -3.46 N/A
Portfolio 10
(4.14) 2.58** -4.89** -2.31 0
(4.16) 1.87* 202.23** -4.94** -174.23* -3.07 27.99
overall impact of co-variance and co-skewness in both high- and low-sentiment regimes.
Table 4.4 indicates that for most portfolios, co-variance imposes persistent negative effects
on subsequent returns in all conditions. For example, the net return of the first portfolio
generated from a one-unit increase in co-variance is -2.3370% in the high-sentiment regime
without considering the skewness, and this differential for co-variance remains relatively
constant across all portfolios. Besides, it can be observed that this minor differential between
the first and last portfolios is attributed to a positive premium in the low-sentiment regime,
βCOV,1, but a much lower discount, β1, in the last portfolio. Specifically, the portfolio with
the lowest sentiment sensitivity has a parameter estimate βCOV of 1.7684 and a β1 of -4.1454
resulting in an overall reduction in subsequent returns of -2.3770 in the high-sentiment regime.
In contrast, the premium rewarded for co-variance in the low-sentiment regime increases
to 2.5755, but the co-variance is more heavily discounted to -4.8872 in the high-sentiment
regime. Hence, co-variance presents relatively minor influences on subsequent returns in the
displayed in Table 4.3. Therefore, I use the significance of β1 and β2 to indicate corresponding
significance level of co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime, respectively.
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high-sentiment regime across almost all portfolios but exhibits much higher premiums in the
highly sentiment-sensitive portfolio.
In addition, including co-skewness in the model causes two visible changes to the mean-
variance relation. First, including co-skewness reduces the risk premium of co-variance in the
low-sentiment regime. For example, the coefficient estimate of co-variance, βCOV , decreases
from 2.5755 (Eq.4.14 ) to 1.8680 (Eq.4.16 ) in the low-sentiment regime after including co-
skewness. This reduction of low-sentiment co-variance risk premium spreads to all portfolios.
Second, co-skewness strengthens the underperformance of future returns caused by co-variance
in high-sentiment periods. Taking the 10th portfolio as an example, the coefficient estimate
of co-variance β1 reduces from -2.3117 (Eq.4.14 ) to -3.0728 (Eq.4.16 ) in bullish markets.
This pattern is persistently observed for all portfolios.
Regarding the impact from co-skewness, the overall impact of co-skewness in high-
sentiment periods is negative for most portfolios, resulting from positive premiums in the
low-sentiment regime but larger discounts in the high-sentiment regime. For example, βCOS
and β2 in the lowest sentiment-based portfolio from Eq.4.16 are 225.4602 and -243.7675,
respectively, indicating an approximate 18.31 net reduction in subsequent returns from a
one-unit increase in the co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime.
The results in both Tables 4.3 and 4.4 can be summarised to the following aspects. First,
consistent with the market portfolio, the positive mean-variance relation for sentiment-based
portfolios hold in low-sentiment periods with positive premiums rewarded for co-variance.
Second, the premium rises as portfolio sensitivity to investor sentiment increases, indicating
that investors require higher compensation for co-variance when holding a portfolio that
is more exposed to investor sentiment. According to the finding in the previous chapter
that opaque stocks exhibit higher sentiment sensitivity, it can be argued that the higher
return premium associated with opaque stocks in low-sentiment periods is attributable to
the co-variance. Second, the net negative impact of co-variance in the high-sentiment regime
shows that the risk premium in low-sentiment periods is not sufficient to cover the return
reductions resulting from co-variance in the high-sentiment regime. These two patterns also
apply to the co-skewness in both low- and high-sentiment periods. Therefore, it is reasonably
to argue that the underperformance of securities with higher sentiment exposure results from
both co-variance and co-skewness. Moreover, including co-skewness in the mean-(co-)variance
framework reduces the premium rewarded for co-variance in the low-sentiment regime, which
suggests that after taking (co-)skewness into consideration, investors give up some of the
benefits generated from co-variance and require higher compensation for including additional
positively skewed stocks in their portfolios.
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Table 4.5 Significance of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in Different Sentiment Regimes -
Size Portfolios
This table reports the coefficient estimates of both co-variance and co-skewness for size port-
folios in high- and low-sentiment regimes. The baseline models are from Eq.4.13 to Eq.4.16 :
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+ ϵt (4.13)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+ ϵt (4.14)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+ ϵt (4.15)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+β2Dt−1COSt−1+ ϵt (4.16)
To control for the effect of both co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime, interaction
terms of each variable with the dummy sentiment indicator are constructed. The dependent variable
is the monthly excess return for each size portfolio. βCOV and βCOS represent the coefficient
estimates of co-variance and co-skewness for each portfolio’s return to the equally-weighted market
return, respectively. β1 and β2 are coefficient estimates for the interaction term of co-variance and
co-skewness, respectively. a1 is the parameter estimate for the dummy sentiment variable alone. *
and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Portfolio Equation α0,p t-stat βCOV,p t-stat βCOS,p t-stat a1 t-stat β1,p t-stat β2,p t-stat Adjusted R2
Portfolio 1
(4.13) 0.03** 6.46 15.02 1.56 0.01
(4.14) 0.04** 6.74 10.30 1.06 -0.02** -3.03 55.47 1.15 0.03
(4.15) 0.03** 6.52 10.79 1.08 -85.45 -1.54 0.01
(4.16) 0.04** 6.75 16.92* 2.19 432.88** 3.78 -0.02** -2.98 51.34 1.01 -496.77** -3.80 0.03
Portfolio 2
(4.13) 0.01* 2.15 -1.09 -0.21 -0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 2.80 -2.98 -0.58 -0.02 -2.16 56.37 1.57 0.01
(4.15) 0.01* 2.11 -0.02 -0.00 18.39 0.45 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.42 15.29* 2.07 316.96** 3.40 -0.02 -1.86 34.14 0.95 -363.60** -3.51 0.05
Portfolio 3
(4.13) 0.01* 2.07 0.39 0.08 -0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 2.78 -1.61 -0.31 -0.02* -2.20 47.80 1.56 0.01
(4.15) 0.01* 2.04 0.97 0.17 9.41 0.22 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.35 20.78** 2.58 368.65** 3.57 -0.01 -1.86 21.50 0.70 -422.47** -3.76 0.05
Portfolio 4
(4.13) 0.01 1.72 0.08 0.02 -0.00
(4.14) 0.01* 2.41 -1.99 -0.37 -0.02* -2.09 51.55 1.58 0.01
(4.15) 0.01 1.68 1.10 0.19 17.50 0.46 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.04 15.63* 1.99 309.42** 3.07 -0.01 -1.82 31.73 0.97 -334.98** -3.09 0.03
Portfolio 5
(4.13) 0.01 1.81 2.46 0.48 -0.00
(4.14) 0.01* 2.54 0.43 0.08 -0.02* -2.13 43.69 1.53 0.01
(4.15) 0.01 1.81 2.28 0.41 -3.04 -0.08 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.13 24.53** 2.86 407.83** 3.49 -0.01 -1.81 16.36 0.56 -450.04** -3.67 0.05
Portfolio 6
(4.13) 0.01* 1.98 2.57 0.49 -0.00
(4.14) 0.01* 2.42 0.73 0.14 -0.01 -1.71 33.25 1.24 0.00
(4.15) 0.01* 1.96 2.98 0.54 6.88 0.23 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.05 20.68* 2.43 347.71** 3.00 -0.01 -1.45 11.84 0.43 -361.12** -3.01 0.03
Portfolio 7
(4.13) 0.01* 2.07 3.53 0.70 -0.00
(4.14) 0.01** 2.59 1.96 0.38 -0.01 -1.82 32.03 1.11 0.00
(4.15) 0.01* 2.08 3.02 0.58 -8.69 -0.35 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.28 17.37* 2.25 276.05** 2.64 -0.01 -1.57 13.38 0.45 -298.75** -2.77 0.02
Portfolio 8
(4.13) 0.01 1.91 2.53 0.51 -0.00
(4.14) 0.01* 2.49 0.89 0.18 -0.01 -1.86 32.29 1.19 0.00
(4.15) 0.01 1.90 2.66 0.52 2.14 0.09 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.17 14.99* 2.00 256.78* 2.51 -0.01 -1.64 16.78 0.60 -264.94* -2.53 0.02
Portfolio 9
(4.13) 0.01* 2.17 2.55 0.55 -0.00
(4.14) 0.01** 2.60 1.60 0.34 -0.01 -1.54 14.16 0.54 -0.00
(4.15) 0.00* 2.16 2.93 0.61 6.30 0.31 -0.01
(4.16) 0.01* 2.24 16.49* 2.31 274.80** 2.77 -0.01 -1.31 -1.62 -0.06 -278.74** -2.75 0.02
Portfolio 10
(4.13) 0.01* 2.01 -1.04 -0.22 -0.00
(4.14) 0.01* 2.48 -1.69 -0.36 -0.01 -1.45 4.33 0.19 -0.00
(4.15) 0.01* 1.98 -0.06 -0.01 16.46 0.95 -0.00
(4.16) 0.01* 2.24 9.11 1.23 201.53 1.89 -0.01 -1.33 -4.16 -0.18 -189.70 -1.76 0.00
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Size Portfolio
In extension to the sentiment-based portfolio, I also examine the efficiency of the mean-
variance-skewness relationship in a set of size portfolios with the influence of investor sentiment.
Harvey (2001) found that co-skewness complements co-variance in explaining cross-
sectional variations in returns for portfolios including size. Hence, my empirical tests aim to
re-examine the role of co-skewness in explaining cross-sectional variations in size portfolio
returns in the context of investor sentiment. In addition, earlier asset-pricing literature
argued that small stocks exhibit relatively higher returns over large stocks (Fama and French,
1993), while recent sentiment-related literature finds that small stocks actually underperform
in higher-sentiment periods. Such conflict between conventional asset pricing and recent
sentiment-related studies also motivates the following tests.
Therefore, with these two purposes, I re-estimate all regression equations (Eq.4.13 to
Eq.4.16 ) on each equally-weighted size portfolio and report the coefficient estimates in Table
4.5. Table 4.5 suggests that both co-variance and co-skewness are significant pricing factors
of subsequent returns in the low-sentiment regime. In particular, both of these variables are
positively priced at the 5% significance level in the low-sentiment regime across all portfolios
except for the last portfolio, the portfolio with the largest capitalisations. For example, the
coefficient estimates for co-variance and co-skewness in the low-sentiment regime of Portfolio
3 are 20.78 and 368.65, respectively, and both are significant at the 1% level. Second, the
premium associated with co-variance shows no clear monotonic patterns across all portfolios;
instead, there is a visible descending trend of co-skewness premium from the first portfolio to
the last. In particular, the estimate parameter βCOS,1 from Eq.4.16 in the first portfolio is
432.88 with a t-statistic of 3.78 but drops to only 201.53 (with a t-statistic of 1.89) in the
portfolio with the largest capitalisations. This pattern indicates that the co-skewness premium
in the smallest portfolio is twice as large as the premium in the largest portfolio, implying that
in low-sentiment periods (high risk aversion), investors require relatively constant premiums
of co-variance across all size portfolios but demand much higher co-skewness premiums for
smaller stocks. Further, the results also reveal that only co-skewness is significantly priced in
bullish markets while co-variance predicts little variation in subsequent portfolio returns. For
example, consider the coefficient estimates of co-variance and co-skewness in the portfolio
with the smallest capitalisations. Eq.4.16 indicates an insignificant β1 of co-variance equaling
to 51.34 but a significant β2 of co-skewness of -496.77. Consistent with my prediction, this
finding illustrates that in high-sentiment periods, investors have stronger preferences for
higher (positive) co-skewness rather than co-variance since higher skewness increases the
likelihood of extreme positive gains.
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Furthermore, Table 4.6 measures of the net impact of both co-variance and co-skewness
in the high-sentiment regime, similar to Table 4.4, for sentiment-based portfolios. Table
4.6 demonstrates a clear monotonic descending trend in the magnitude of co-skewness in
high-sentiment periods. For example, starting from the first portfolio, the overall impact of
co-skewness in bullish markets obtained from Eq.4.16 is -63.8919, indicating that a one-unit
increase in co-skewness decreases future returns by 63.89%. However, this effect significantly
shrinks to only -3.9369 in the second last portfolio and ultimately loses its significance in the
last portfolio, indicating that the underperformance of future portfolio returns alleviates as
the size of portfolios increases.
In sum, my empirical results concerning the size portfolio indicate that in low-sentiment
periods, the positive premium associated with co-skewness depresses as portfolio size increases
but the co-variance premium remains relatively constant across all size portfolios. In periods
of higher sentiment, however, co-variance is no longer significant in explaining future portfolio
returns. Unlike co-variance, co-skewness predicts the largest variation in returns between high-
and low-sentiment regimes in the portfolio with the smallest capitalisations. These patterns
indicate that co-skewness, not co-variance, contributes to both the cross-sectional return
premium in low-sentiment periods and the severe underperformance in portfolio returns in
high-sentiment periods. This finding also offers a possible solution to the conflict between
existing asset-pricing and sentiment-related studies.
Book-to-Market Ratio Portfolio
The last part of my empirical tests in this chapter focuses on the mean-variance-skewness
relationship in value portfolios. Although research is investigating the relationship between
investor sentiment and security returns of book-to-market portfolios, few have reached the
final destiny. For example, without considering the effect of investor sentiment, Fama and
French (1993) argued that value stocks exhibit a positive premium in returns over growth
stocks. However, the recent sentiment-related literature indicates more complex results. For
example, Baker and Wurgler (2006) argued that growth or distressed stocks are more exposed
to investor sentiment risk, but found insignificant evidence with respect to the book-to-market
portfolio. Berger and Turtle (2012) found that investor sentiment imposes persistent impacts
on stock returns across all book-to-market ratio portfolios. The following empirical tests
concentrate on addressing the issue of whether co-variance and co-skewness help explain
the puzzle associated with the cross-sectional variations in book-to-market ratio portfolio
returns. I report the coefficient estimates obtained from Eq.4.13 to 4.16 for each individual
equally-weighted book-to-market portfolio in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.6Overall Impact of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in the High-Sentiment Regimes
- Size Portfolios
This table displays the overall impact of co-variance and co-skewness in the high sentiment regime for
size portfolios. The reported coefficient estimates are extractions from the results in Table 4.5. In
particular, the coefficient estimates for co-variance (βCOV ), co-skewness βCOS , the interaction term of
co-variance and sentiment dummy (β1), as well as the interaction term of co-skewness and sentiment
dummy (β2) from Eq.4.14, and 4.16 are presented. The last two columns report the overall impact of
co-variance (βCOV and β1) and co-skewness (βCOS and β2 for co-skewness) in the high sentiment
regime, respectively. * and ** indicate that the coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the
95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Portfolio Equation βCOV βCOS β1 β2
Overall Impact of Co-Variance Overall Impact of Co-Skewness
in High-Sentiment Regime, βCOV + β1 in High-Sentiment Regime, βCOS + β2
Portfolio 1
(4.14) 10.30 55.47 65.76 0
(4.16) 16.92** 432.88** 51.34 -496.77** 68.26 -63.89
Portfolio 2
(4.14) -2.98 56.37 53.39 0
(4.16) 15.29** 316.96** 34.14 -363.60** 49.43 -46.64
Portfolio 3
(4.14) -1.61 47.80 46.19 0
(4.16) 20.78** 368.65** 21.50 -422.47** 42.28 -53.81
Portfolio 4
(4.14) -1.99 51.55 49.55 0
(4.16) 15.63** 309.42** 31.73 -334.98** 47.36 -25.57
Portfolio 5
(4.14) 0.43 43.69 44.12 0
(4.16) 24.53** 407.83** 16.36 -450.04** 40.89 -42.21
Portfolio 6
(4.14) 0.73 33.25 33.99 0
(4.16) 20.68** 347.71** 11.84 -361.12** 32.53 -13.41
Portfolio 7
(4.14) 1.96 32.03 33.99 0
(4.16) 17.37** 276.05** 13.38 -298.75** 30.75 -22.70
Portfolio 8
(4.14) 0.89 32.29 33.17 0
(4.16) 14.99** 256.78** 16.78 -264.94** 31.77 -8.17
Portfolio 9
(4.14) 1.60 14.15 15.76 0
(4.16) 16.49** 274.80** -1.62 -278.74** 14.88 -3.94
Portfolio 10
(4.14) -1.69 4.34 2.64 0
(4.16) 9.11 201.54* -4.16 -189.70* 4.96 11.84
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Table 4.7 reveals that both co-variance and co-skewness have weak predictive powers
on low sentiment returns in portfolios with the lowest book-to-market ratios. For example,
the coefficient estimates of co-variance in the first and second portfolios from Eq.4.16 are
22.45 (with a t-statistic of 1.82) and 18.49 (with a t-statistic of 1.83), respectively. The
t-statistics indicate that the co-variance is not statistically significant at the 5% level in either
of these portfolios. Co-skewness also displays similar t-statistics for low-sentiment parameter
estimates in portfolios 1 and 2. Moreover, co-variance significantly matters in low-sentiment
future returns only in portfolios with book-to-market ratios close to 1. In particular, only
Portfolios 4, 5 and 6 present significant (at the 5% significance level) coefficient estimates
βCOV for co-variance. In contrast, co-skewness is consistently significantly priced in all
portfolios from Portfolio 3 to 10. For instance, the parameter estimate, βCOS , of co-skewness
in the second last portfolio obtained from Eq.4.16 equals 431.46 with a t-statistic of 2.36,
while the low sentiment co-variance is not statistically significant at the 5% level in the same
equation. This pattern explains that in bearish markets, co-variance is efficient in describing
future stock returns only for stocks that are fairly priced.
In the high-sentiment regime, co-variance completely loses its predictive power for future
portfolio returns as none of the portfolios exhibits significant high sentiment coefficient
estimates for co-variance. In contrast, co-skewness is constantly significantly priced in nine
out of 10 portfolios with negative coefficient estimates in bullish markets. For example, the
parameter estimates of co-skewness in the first and last portfolio reported from Eq.4.16 are
priced at values of -347.91 and -394.67, respectively, and both are statistically significant
at the 5% level. Hence, any increases in co-variance of book-to-market portfolios do not
necessarily cause significant variations in future returns, while co-skewness does. Additionally,
co-skewness, not co-variance, contributes to the persistent underperformance across all book-
to-market portfolios in high-sentiment periods, resulting in lower future returns to investors.
Table 4.8 reports the net effect of co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime
on subsequent returns for book-to-market portfolios. Specifically, Table 4.8 shows insignificant
high sentiment effects for co-variance and persistently negative effects for co-skewness in nine
out of 10 portfolios. Further, the impact of co-skewness is relatively greater on portfolios
at the sides, which represents higher differentials between book and market values of port-
folios, and more importantly, the high-end portfolio achieves the most significant impact
from co-skewness. For example, the net effect of co-skewness in the high sentiment regime
obtained from Eq.4.16 in the first portfolio, -40.3938, reduces to only -15.8306 in the second
portfolio. This effect, however, monotonically grows to -92.1652 in the last book-to-market
portfolio. Following an analogous U-shaped pattern across all portfolios, the overall impact
of co-skewness in high-sentiment periods exhibits an initial decrease from the first portfolio
to the second, but presents a monotonically ascending trend for the rest of portfolios, with
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Table 4.7 Significance of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in Different Sentiment Regimes -
Book-to-Market Portfolios
This table reports the coefficient estimates of both co-variance and co-skewness for book-to-market
portfolios in high and low sentiment regimes. The baseline models are from Eq.4.13 to Eq.4.16
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+ ϵt (4.13)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+ ϵt (4.14)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+ ϵt (4.15)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+β2Dt−1COSt−1+ ϵt (4.16)
To control for the effect of both co-variance and co-skewness in the high sentiment regime,
interaction terms of each variable with the dummy sentiment indicator are constructed. The
dependent variable is the monthly excess return for each book-to-market portfolio. βCOV and
βCOS represent the coefficient estimates of co-variance and co-skewness for each portfolio’s return
to the equally-weighted market return, respectively. β1 and β2 are coefficient estimates for the
interaction term of co-variance and co-skewness, respectively. a1 is the parameter estimate for
the dummy sentiment variable alone. * and ** present the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Portfolio Equation α0,p t-stat βCOV,p t-stat βCOS,p t-stat a1 t-stat β1,p t-stat β2,p t-stat Adjusted R2
Portfolio 1
(4.13) 0.01 1.73 8.42 1.15 0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 3.00 4.62 0.63 -0.03 -2.89 64.60 1.77 0.03
(4.15) 0.01 1.75 7.13 0.91 -21.85 -0.48 -0.00
(4.16) 0.02** 2.77 22.45 1.82 307.51 1.80 -0.03* -2.70 43.48 1.14 -347.91* -1.96 0.03
Portfolio 2
(4.13) 0.01** 2.69 7.68 1.22 0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 3.44 4.57 0.72 -0.02* -2.56 62.94 1.84 0.02
(4.15) 0.01* 2.69 7.37 1.11 -5.66 -0.15 -0.01
(4.16) 0.02** 3.25 18.49 1.83 263.35 1.76 -0.02* -2.41 47.18 1.34 -279.18 -1.81 0.03
Portfolio 3
(4.13) 0.01** 3.57 5.67 0.94 -0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 3.82 3.38 0.55 -0.02* -2.06 45.76 1.36 0.01
(4.15) 0.01** 3.57 5.24 0.82 -7.01 -0.22 -0.00
(4.16) 0.02** 3.52 22.54* 2.30 338.72* 2.49 -0.01 -1.83 22.95 0.66 -360.88** -2.58 0.03
Portfolio 4
(4.13) 0.01** 3.77 8.41 1.35 0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 4.23 6.08 0.96 -0.02* -2.36 40.63 1.14 0.02
(4.15) 0.01** 3.78 7.54 1.16 -15.87 -0.49 0.00
(4.16) 0.02** 4.01 24.74** 2.59 363.91** 2.58 -0.02* -2.14 17.51 0.48 -395.92** -2.74 0.04
Portfolio 5
(4.13) 0.01** 4.26 4.48 0.83 -0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 4.57 2.71 0.50 -0.02* -2.27 31.34 0.94 0.01
(4.15) 0.01** 4.27 3.66 0.63 -14.36 -0.41 -0.00
(4.16) 0.02** 4.22 25.85** 2.74 417.14** 2.98 -0.01* -1.98 3.45 0.10 -455.96** -3.16 0.04
Portfolio 6
(4.13) 0.01** 4.35 4.51 0.80 -0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 4.36 2.57 0.45 -0.01 -1.92 33.11 1.08 0.01
(4.15) 0.01** 4.37 3.28 0.55 -23.34 -0.68 -0.00
(4.16) 0.02** 4.14 17.86* 2.07 298.94* 2.36 -0.01 -1.72 13.50 0.43 -344.61** -2.62 0.02
Portfolio 7
(4.13) 0.02** 5.22 -0.75 -0.15 -0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 5.10 -2.41 -0.46 -0.01* -2.05 32.38 1.00 0.00
(4.15) 0.02** 5.24 -2.05 -0.37 -22.28 -0.67 -0.01
(4.16) 0.02** 4.85 16.05 1.75 327.05* 2.44 -0.01 -1.83 8.78 0.26 -369.01** -2.67 0.02
Portfolio 8
(4.13) 0.02** 5.63 -0.77 -0.13 -0.00
(4.14) 0.02** 5.44 -2.36 -0.41 -0.01* -2.04 28.77 0.75 0.00
(4.15) 0.02** 5.62 -1.18 -0.20 -7.74 -0.21 -0.01
(4.16) 0.02** 5.16 15.19 1.80 332.53** 2.82 -0.01 -1.82 6.98 0.18 -373.47** -3.02 0.03
Portfolio 9
(4.13) 0.02** 6.13 4.57 0.63 -0.00
(4.14) 0.03** 6.27 1.13 0.15 -0.02** -2.72 39.34 1.14 0.02
(4.15) 0.02** 6.16 2.44 0.32 -46.93 -1.02 -0.00
(4.16) 0.03** 6.14 20.18 1.85 431.46* 2.36 -0.02** -2.59 14.80 0.42 -507.29** -2.69 0.04
Portfolio 10
(4.13) 0.03** 7.53 10.56 1.58 0.01
(4.14) 0.04** 7.37 8.38 1.24 -0.02** -2.70 22.44 0.46 0.02
(4.15) 0.03** 7.57 7.44 1.02 -60.60 -1.10 0.01
(4.16) 0.04** 7.25 23.97* 2.02 302.51 1.69 -0.02** -2.58 2.84 0.06 -394.67* -1.99 0.04
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Table 4.8Overall Impact of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in the High-Sentiment Regimes
- Book-to-Market Portfolios
This table displays the overall impact of co-variance and co-skewness in the high sentiment
regime for book-to-market portfolios. The reported coefficient estimates are extractions from the
results in Table 4.7. In particular, the coefficient estimates for co-variance (βCOV ), co-skewness
βCOS , the interaction term of co-variance and sentiment dummy (β1), as well as the interaction
term of co-skewness and sentiment dummy (β2) from Eq.4.14, and 4.16 are presented. The
last two columns report the overall impact of co-variance (βCOV and β1) and co-skewness
(βCOS and β2 for co-skewness) in the high sentiment regime, respectively. * and ** indicate
that the coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Portfolio Equation βCOV βCOS β1 β2
Overall Impact of Co-Variance Overall Impact of Co-Skewness
in High-Sentiment Regime, βCOV + β1 in High-Sentiment Regime, βCOS + β2
Portfolio 1
(4.14) 4.62 64.64* 69.26 0
(4.16) 22.45* 307.51** 43.48 -347.91** 65.93 -40.39
Portfolio 2
(4.14) 4.57 62.94* 67.51 0
(4.16) 18.49* 263.35* 47.18 -279.18* 65.67 -15.83
Portfolio 3
(4.14) 3.38 45.76 49.15 0
(4.16) 22.54** 338.72** 22.95 -360.88** 45.49 -22.16
Portfolio 4
(4.14) 6.08 40.63 46.71 0
(4.16) 24.74** 363.91** 17.51 -395.92** 42.26 -32.02
Portfolio 5
(4.14) 2.72 31.34 34.05 0
(4.16) 25.85** 417.14** 3.44 -455.96** 29.29 -38.83
Portfolio 6
(4.14) 2.57 33.11 35.68 0
(4.16) 17.86** 298.94** 13.50 -344.61** 31.36 -45.67
Portfolio 7
(4.14) -2.41 32.38 29.98 0
(4.16) 16.05* 327.05** 8.77 -369.01** 24.82 -41.96
Portfolio 8
(4.14) -2.36 28.77 26.41 0
(4.16) 15.19* 332.53** 6.98 -373.47** 22.17 -40.94
Portfolio 9
(4.14) 1.13 39.34 40.47 0
(4.16) 20.18* 431.46** 14.80 -507.29** 34.98 -75.83
Portfolio 10
(4.14) 8.37 22.44 30.82 0
(4.16) 23.97** 302.51** 2.84* -394.67** 26.81 -92.16
little fluctuation. Therefore, my results indicate that co-skewness exerts greater influence on
portfolios with more substantial differentials between book and market values of equities, and
this influence reaches its maximum in the portfolio with the highest book-to-market portfolios.
In sum, my empirical results from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 offer new insights into the relation-
ship between investor sentiment and book-to-market portfolio returns. First, the positive
premium for co-variance in the low-sentiment regime follows the rational expectation theory
for risk-averse investors, which argues that risk-averse investors require higher compensation
of bearing additional variance risk.11 Second, co-skewness preference is consistently positively
priced across all book-to-market portfolios in low-sentiment periods, reflecting that investors
11Although the results from Table 4.7 indicate that the co-variance risk (in the low-sentiment
regime) is not significantly priced at the 5% significance level in portfolios with extremely low and
high book-to-market ratios, the coefficient estimates of co-variance remain significant at the 10% level
for portfolios with positive signs.
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are averse to accepting extra (positive) co-skewness in their portfolios only if they can be
compensated by sufficiently high premiums. Third, similar to size portfolios, co-variance
risk exhibits poor predictive power for future returns in the high-sentiment regime, while co-
skewness imposes significantly persistent and negative effects on subsequent returns across all
portfolios. This finding shows that when co-skewness is taken into consideration, co-variance
becomes less important to investors in bullish markets, because of their strong tendency
for risk-seeking behaviour. Last, the magnitudes of the overall impacts from co-skewness
in the high-sentiment regime follow an analogous U-shaped pattern, presenting an initial
decrease in the first two portfolios, followed by monotonic growth for the rest of portfolios.
This pattern indicates that the portfolio with the highest book-to-market ratio suffers more
losses from co-skewness. In general, a stock with the highest book-to-market ratio means
that the stock is currently traded relatively undervalued as the book value of the stock is
higher than its market price. Hence, my empirical results indicate a stronger underper-
formance of value stocks relative to growth stocks (i.e., stocks with lower book-to-market
ratios) in the high-sentiment regime. This finding is contrary to previous literature with
respect to the relationship between investor sentiment and book-to-market portfolios, which
argues that growth stocks are more exposed to investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler,
2006; Berger and Turtle, 2012). The mean-reverting property of stock returns can possibly
explain my findings. In particular, when investors observe a bullish market, they expect a
higher probability of the mispricing correction for undervalued stocks rather than a persistent
price increase for overvalued securities because of the mean-reverting property of stock returns.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines a vital topic in conventional asset-pricing theories. In particular,
the mean-variance relationship in security returns has been a long-term dispute in finance.
This chapter re-tests this controversial topic, aiming to figure out the efficiency of this
proposition in explaining stock market performance. In addition, my research also considers
the role of investor sentiment in the mean-variance relation. Last, extending the conventional
mean-variance relationship, this chapter also illustrates the impact of investors’ preference
on the higher moment of security returns, skewness, in the asset-pricing process, given the
content of investor sentiment.
By employing a conditional variance approach, I find that the classical one-regime mean-
variance framework fails to explain the relationship between stock returns and variance in any
case. In particular, the realised variances in the previous period have little predictive power
for subsequent returns. In contrast, I find a superior performance of my two-regime framework
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in describing the mean-variance relationship in security returns. In particular, on the basis
of my preliminary finding that investors’ risk aversion changes with investor sentiment, I find
that the positive trade-off between variance and returns only holds in low-sentiment (high
risk aversion) periods but breaks down in the high-sentiment (low risk aversion) periods. The
intuition behind my two-regime model with respect to investor sentiment is that investors’
risk aversion is not constant over time but varies with investor sentiment. My framework
formalises this intuition by partitioning the sample period into two sentiment-based regimes.
I estimate the mean-variance relation at both market and portfolio levels and find consis-
tent results that (co-)variance is positively priced in low-sentiment periods but insignificantly
or negatively priced in high-sentiment periods. This empirical chapter complements both
earlier asset-pricing literature and recent sentiment-related studies and creates insightful
connections between these two areas.
Besides, I further show that investors’ preference for (co-)skewness complements (co-
)variance in explaining stock market returns. In particular, I find the systematic co-skewness
(at the portfolio level) or skewness (at the market level) are important pricing factors in the
return-generating process of an asset. Moreover, I also find (co-)skewness is significantly
positively priced in the low-sentiment period but negatively priced in high-sentiment pe-
riods. The positive premium of (co-)skewness in fact reflects investors’ strong aversion to
(co-)skewness in low-sentiment periods. Another important finding of these empirical results
is that the underperformance of stocks in the high-sentiment periods is mainly attributable
to skewness rather than variance risk.
Finally, my empirical analyses in this chapter with respect to (co-)skewness provide
insight into why variables such as size and book-to-market value are important in explaining
the cross-sectional variation of asset returns. Extending my previous empirical chapter, I
find co-skewness exhibits strongest exposures to investor sentiment in both high- (negative)
and low- (positive) sentiment regimes in small and high book-to-market portfolios. This
finding indicates that (co-)skewness contributes to both the positive cross-sectional premium
associated with small and value stocks in the low-sentiment periods as well as the severe
underperformance of small and value stocks in the high-sentiment regime. Hence, my research
in this empirical chapter not only sheds new light on the puzzle related to the cross-sectional
variations in stock returns, but offers intuitive insights into the extant sentiment-related
literature with respect to the underperformance of certain stocks in high-sentiment periods
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Berger and Turtle, 2012).

Chapter 5
Investment Sentiment and Market
Instability: An Investigation into
Financial Bubbles and Crises
Abstract
Extant literature has well documented the role of irrational components in the formation of
financial bubbles and crises. This empirical chapter examines the role of investor sentiment in
the return-generating process during financial bubbles and crises by linking investor sentiment
to multiple bubble models. By applying a dynamic path-dependent model, I first examine how
sensitive the market return is to cumulative changes in investor sentiment and find that initial
increases in investor sentiment produce positive returns, but a continuous accumulation of
positive sentiment changes slows down the growth rate and leads to ultimate negative returns.
This finding can be explained by extended periods of increasing overvaluation, followed by
price corrections. In addition, I show that initial consecutive sentiment drops predict lower
subsequent returns but long-term consecutive sentiment decreases generate positive future
returns. My results indicate that certain path-dependent dynamics can appropriately explain
the underlying relationship between investor sentiment and market returns. Moreover, I
find that these results only hold for opaque portfolios (such as small, risky and unprofitable
portfolios). This finding offers complementary evidence to my previous chapter concerning
firm opacity. Besides, I show that the relationship between investor sentiment and future
returns for book-to-market portfolios varies across market conditions; in particular, high
book-to-market portfolios exhibit significant relations in bubbles while low book-to-market
portfolios show significant relations in crises. I also investigate the relationship between
investor sentiment and future returns in two real cases of financial bubbles and crises, the
1999 High-Tech Bubble and the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, by employing a three-stage
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Markov-regime switching model as well as a structural autoregression, and find that future
market returns are positively correlated with investor sentiment during stable periods but
negatively correlated in periods of extreme volatility. Besides, this empirical chapter indicates
market returns predict contemporaneous investor sentiment in both the High-Tech Bub-
ble and the Global Financial Crisis and such predictive power is stronger in an episode of crisis.
5.1 Introduction
As mentioned earlier, the trust in the theory of the efficient market hypothesis has been
severely eroded by recent empirical investigations as well as factual developments which
indicate significant deviations of stock prices from their fundamental values. In the history of
financial markets, a bubble or a crisis would be a excellent example of the greatest deviations
of stock prices from the fundamentals.
According to Kindleberger (1991, page 20), a financial market bubble and ensuing crisis
are defined as ‘a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process,
with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers –
generally speculators interested in profits from trading in the asset rather than its use of
earning capacity and the rise is usually followed by a reversal of expectations and a sharp
decline in price often leads to financial crisis’. Historically, the impact of financial bubbles
and ensuing crises are so tremendous that many researchers have tried to figure out what
truly causes these events in order to better prevent them.
Among the mainstream literature on financial market bubbles and crises, a collection
of studies portrayed the importance of irrational factors in explaining such events. For
example, Baker and Wurgler (2006) found that the well-structured composite sentiment index
covariates with most of the prominent US stock market bubbles between 1961 and 2002. Lux
(1995) and Devenow and Welch (1996) showed that the herding activity, which represents a
certain degree of the irraitonal behaviour, among irrationals causes and exaggerates deviations
in stock prices. In particular, Lux (1995) argued that irrationals typically choose to ‘follow
the market’ when they have limited access to other sources of information, as they believe
that other investors may have better information than themselves. Chiang and Zheng (2010)
also found strong herding behaviour in the United States and Latin American markets during
crisis periods. Besides, other researchers indicated that trading activities from young and
inexperienced investors account for a considerable proportion of stock price bubbles. For
example, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) found that young investors have more incentives to
herd. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) showed that young and inexperienced investors are normally
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more risk-seeking and have higher expectations about future returns, such that they typically
trade more aggressively relative to older investors.1
The goal of this empirical chapter is to shed light on the role of investor sentiment in the
return-generating process during extreme financial market conditions, in particular, financial
bubbles and crises. There are two general motivations for this. First, the importance of
investor sentiment has been well documented as demonstrated by extant relevant studies but
it still remains puzzled as to why rational arbitrageurs fail to use such information to correct
market misvaluations. As a general rule of thumb, if rational investors know that irrational
behaviour of sentiment traders can predict future stock returns, then why don’t rational
investors use this as a signal to make higher profits? The reason for asking this question is that
if the market mispricing can be always corrected in time, the market bubble will never occur.
Second, previous literature has mainly used theoretical and qualitative approaches to study
the impact of investor sentiment in the financial market bubbles and crises, because of their
strong instability. This empirical chapter attempts to specify the role of investor sentiment in
predicting stock market returns during bubbles and crises, both empirically and quantitatively.
An earlier study by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) proposed a possible pattern for stock
prices in bubbles. Specifically, the authors indicated that stock prices should follow certain
dynamics rather than a constant movement pattern. In particular, they argued that stock
prices should rise initially with high buying pressure, but eventually drop because of high
selling pressure, from both rational and irrational investors, in later periods of bubbles. This
price dynamic is supported by empirical evidence. For example, De Long et al. (1990) argued
that in bubbles, rational investors act in advance of irrationals and their investment provides
a buying signal to irrationals. Hence, the buying pressure from both groups exacerbates stock
price deviations. In addition, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) argued that rational
speculators initially ride the bubble to achieve higher returns caused by the increasing buying
pressure from irrationals, resulting in significant deviations in stock prices. Also, the lack of
immediate synchronisation makes it difficult for rational arbitrageurs to correct misvaluations,
prolonging the bubble. Consequently, prices increase substantially above fundamentals, before
the ultimate correction. However, as the bubble persists, an increasing number of rational
arbitrageurs liquidate their stocks and close off their positions against the bubble. The
decreasing asset returns also create a sell signal for irrationals, which further exaggerates the
1There are also some studies revealing that not only irrational investors, but rational investors
are also involved in the process of inflating bubbles. For example, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004)
found that sophisticated investors such as hedge fund managers intentionally ride the bubble instead
of attacking it, to make profits from irrationals. In this empirical chapter, since I am not interested in
examining which group of investors causes the bubble, I simply combine these two groups of investors
and define them as sentiment-driven investors.
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selling pressures in the market.
Moreover, when the bubble bursts and the market falls into recessions, the high selling
pressure, which is mainly from irrationals because of their herding behaviour and strong loss
aversion, significantly reduces stock prices and consequently erodes future returns and wipes
out market liquidity (Kabir and Shakur, 2018; Lai and Lau, 2004; Philippas et al., 2013).
For example, a most recent paper by Bekiros et al. (2017) found herding behaviour tends
to be intense under extreme market conditions, such as bubbles and crises. Moreover, they
found that herding is only observed at the beginning of the crisis, and becomes insignificant
towards the end. As recessions persist, rational arbitrageurs are inclined to make profits from
irrational activities by ‘fishing the bottom’, and consequently, the higher buying pressure
raises stock prices and increases future returns.
The fundamental research question in this empirical chapter is how investor sentiment
affects stock returns during bubbles and crises. In addition, I am also interested in whether
the reverse relationship holds, that is whether market returns can also predict investor
sentiment. I construct the following hypotheses to address my research questions. First,
following Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), I hypothesise that initial increases in investor
sentiment produce positive returns because of high buying pressure. However, in later periods
of the bubble, returns should decrease in response to the increasing selling pressure. Second,
in an episode of crisis, initial drops in sentiment create a selling signal to investors and
the rising selling pressure reduces subsequent returns. As the recession following the crisis
persists, stock returns should start to increase as rational arbitrageurs tend to make profits
by ‘fishing the bottom’. Hence, the movement of stock prices should follow distinct dynamics
in bubbles and crises.
Second, I predict that investor sentiment imposes more significant impact during ex-
tremely volatile periods in bubbles and crises. Empirical studies suggested that financial
bubbles and crises lead to excessive market volatility, especially at the end of a bubble and at
the beginning of a crisis.2 The intuition behind is that excessive volatility is always associated
with active investment and a surge in the number of active investments will often lead to the
subsequent growth of stock price fluctuations. Hence, during periods of excessive volatility,
investor sentiment should play a significant role in the formation process of market returns.
Moreover, this relationship should be negative rather than positive because the aggregated
market should be more sensitive to selling pressure than buying pressure, resulting from
2Flood and Hodrick (1986, 1990) and Wu (1997) found excessive volatility during bubbles while
researchers such as Black (1976), Whaley (2000), Schwert (1989, 1990), and Schwert and Seguin (1990)
indicated that stock price volatility significantly increases during crises and recessions.
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people’s strong sense of loss aversion.
Besides, I further hypothesise that market returns can also predict investor sentiment,
to a certain extent. This hypothesis is easy to understand, because market returns, as a
critical component of market information, are bound to have, more or less, an impact on
investors’ expectations for the future. This effect should be positive since higher market
returns would help build investors’ confidence in the market, leading to higher investor
sentiment. Low levels of market returns, however, can give rise to greater losses of investor
sentiment because of investors’ strong aversion to potential losses. Hence, this effect should be
more prominent in an episode of market crises. Moreover, unlike the lagging effect of investor
sentiment on market returns, the effect of market returns imposed on investor sentiment
should be contemporaneous since investors usually respond rapidly to changes in market
information. Therefore, the predicted effect of market return on investor sentiment should be
contemporaneously positive.
The data used in the empirical tests of this empirical chapter cover the sample period
between January 1987 and December 2010, consistent with the data range in the preceding
chapters. The market return data are collected from the CRSP database for both the NYSE
and AMEX stock exchanges. The monthly returns for portfolios varying by variance, size,
book-to-market ratio and operating profits are downloaded from the Kenneth R. French’s
Data Library. I select the BW sentiment index as my measurement for investor sentiment,
which is consistent with preceding chapters.
The empirical analysis of this chapter begins with an investigation of the relationship
between stock prices and investor sentiment in both bubbles and crises based on a path-
dependent dynamic model developed by Berger and Turtle (2015). By constructing sentiment
dynamics, I find that initial consecutive sentiment increases produce positive returns. How-
ever, persistent accumulation of positive sentiment changes leads to lower and negative future
returns. This pattern is consistent with Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and Berger and
Turtle (2015) with respect to the proposition of building overvaluation in the early stage of
the bubble, followed by an ultimate correction at a later stage. Besides, I find that in an
episode of crisis, initial drops in investor sentiment result in lower excess returns. In contrast,
large consecutive sentiment decreases result in ultimate positive stock returns.
Furthermore, to account for the length of positive (negative) sentiment episodes, I con-
dition the subsequent returns on the number of months that sentiment has consecutively
increased (decreased). I find that future excess returns are positively correlated with medium-
term (three-to-five months) consecutive sentiment increases but negatively correlated with
long-term (six months or more) consecutive sentiment increases. Conversely, I also show
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that future excess returns are only exposed to short-term (one-to-two months) consecutive
sentiment drops when returns are conditioned on the length of a negative sentiment episode.
This pattern is consistent with Bekiros et al. (2017) with respect to the herding behaviour in
the crisis, in that the herding is only observed at the beginning of the crisis and becomes
insignificant towards the end. The intuition behind these findings is that investors underreact
to good news but overreact to bad news in the first place because of risk aversion; in particular,
investors require an extended period to confirm that the current boom is not temporary and
will start to trade aggressively unless they believe their investment is ‘safe’. In the market
downturn, when investors observe a sell signal, they choose to liquidate their assets as soon
as possible to avoid further future losses. My results indicate that the predicted relationship
between sentiment dynamics and future returns only holds for relatively opaque stocks (such
as high risk, small size and low operating profit stocks). These patterns are consistent with
the findings in Chapter 3, which show that opaque stock returns are more prone to investor
sentiment. More importantly, my results further demonstrate that high book-to-market
ratio portfolios are more sensitive to investor sentiment in a bubble episode, while returns
of portfolios with low book-to-market ratios only show significant correlation with investor
sentiment in crisis episodes. Since a stock with a high (low) book-to-market ratio is considered
currently traded undervalued (overvalued), my results imply that undervalued stocks are
more prone to investor sentiment in bubbles while overvalued stocks suffer more from the
sentiment in crises. The economic intuition behind this pattern is that in bubbles, investors
may have greater expectations of an undervalued stock recovering to price equilibrium, while
in crises, investors may expect that stock prices of an overvalued stock will fall back to
equilibrium. This finding is strongly consistent with investors’ beliefs in the mean-reverting
process of stock returns. Also, this finding provides insight into the unpatterned relationship
between investor sentiment and book-to-market portfolios proposed by Baker and Wurgler
(2006) and Berger and Turtle (2012).
I also employ a Markov regime-switching model to capture the sentiment dynamics under
different volatility market conditions. I apply this framework to two real cases of the financial
bubble and crisis: the 1990s High-Tech Bubble in the US stock market and the 2007 Global
Financial Crisis. I find that future returns are positively correlated with investor sentiment in
relatively stable periods (low volatility) but significantly negatively correlated with investor
sentiment under extremely volatile market conditions.
Finally, to investigate the interdependence between stock return and investment sentiment,
I apply a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model to both the High-Tech Bubble and
the Global Financial Crisis. I show that market returns play an essential role in shaping
contemporaneous market sentiment, especially during crisis periods. In addition, my results
indicate that this effect is much stronger in the High-Tech Bubble relative to the Global
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Financial Crisis. A possible explanation for this finding is that the Global Financial Crisis was
not strictly a stock market crisis; instead, it was an economy-wide crisis originating from the
US subprime mortgage market. Hence, the panic in the stock market was caused by investors’
fear for the whole economy, not stock market performance. Besides, the analyses of im-
pulse responses (IRs) and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVDs) confirm my findings.
This empirical chapter contributes to the extant literature in the following aspects. First,
it offers both quantitative and empirical evidence on the role of investor sentiment in the
return-generating process during market bubbles and crises. Since previous studies mainly
focused on testing financial bubbles and crises using theoretical and qualitative approaches,
this chapter provides relatively new results on this research topic. Second, this chapter offers
clear evidence on a path-dependent relationship between investor sentiment and future excess
returns during bubbles and crises. Established on the basis of Berger and Turtle (2015), I
expand the path-dependent dynamic model for bubbles to the case of crises, and discover
significant and intuitive results. Third, unlike the current mainstream literature, which
concentrates on the predictive power of investor sentiment on stock market returns, this
empirical chapter sheds new light on the role of market returns in the formation of investor
sentiment, especially under extreme market conditions. This idea has been briefly touched
on by only a few studies to date. Overall, this empirical chapter offers complementary but
not marginal inference on the role of investor sentiment in financial markets.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 summarises the key studies
relevant to this empirical chapter. Section 5.3 describes the hypotheses addressed in this
chapter. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 introduce the methodologies and data used in the empirical
tests, respectively. Section 5.6 reports all the empirical results achieved by the empirical
tests. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Literature Review
Existing literature has well documented the importance of irrational components in the
formation of market bubbles and crises. For example, many empirical studies find that young
and inexperienced investors, whose trading activities are normally considered as irrationals,
contributed significantly to the formation of market bubbles. In particular, Chevalier and
Ellison (1999) suggested that young investors have more incentives to herd, that is, to follow
others’ investment decisions, especially under extreme market conditions. Vissing-Jorgensen
(2003) showed that young and inexperienced investors generally have higher expectations
about market returns and are more likely to trade aggressively. Brennan (2004) proposed that
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increased stock market participation by individuals with little investment experience was the
primary factor behind the 1990s High-Tech Bubble. Greenwood and Nagel (2009) found that
young managers are more likely to conduct speculative transactions relative to older colleagues.
Besides, other studies have indicated that not just irrationals, rational and sophisticated
investors also contribute to mispricings and financial bubbles. For instance, Kindleberger
(1991) argued that speculation resulting in bubbles or booms and ending in numerous cases,
but not all, in financial crisis, covers broad categories of objects and these objects change
over time. Moreover, Kindleberger indicated that in addition to irrational bubbles, rational
bubbles also do exist and speculative activities from rationals accelerate the formation of
bubbles. A few years later, Lux (1995) also showed that the emergence of bubbles is a
‘self-organising’ process among both rationals and irrationals in the market. Brunnermeier
(2001) found that sophisticated investors (such as hedge fund managers) intentionally ride
the bubble instead of attacking it to make profits from irrationals. Temin and Voth (2004)
indicated that that banks do the same thing to gain abnormal returns caused by irrationals.
Xiong and Yu (2011) studied the behaviour of rational arbitrageurs in the Chinese Warrant
Bubble between 2005 and 2008 and found consistent evidence that rational arbitrageurs were
riding the bubble in that instance too.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) offered an intuitive discussion on the relationship between
behavioural factors, in particular, sentiment, and market bubbles. Specifically, they described
a speculative bubble episode as a mirror image of extremely high-sentiment periods centred
on small, growth, young and unprofitable stocks. During high-sentiment episodes, the high
propensity for speculation allows investors to take the high-end estimation of stock prices,
while when sentiment is low, they place pessimistic valuations on stock prices. They also
suggested that their composite sentiment indexes, as described in previous chapters, visibly
line up with historical accounts of bubbles and crashes.
Given the tremendous effect of financial bubbles and crises, it is of great interest to
further explore these financial issues, but there are two difficulties that may deter researchers’
endeavours to investigate these issues. First, bullish and bearish markets are commonly
observed, while bubbles or crises (recessions) are not. Hence, the onset of a bubble or crisis
cannot be easily discerned. Lux (1995) argued that bubbles or crises are not stationary in
reality. The phenomenon that bubbles grow and burst, followed by crises, will not last forever.
Hence, the specificity of these events increases the difficulties for researchers in studying and
generalising results. The following subsection summarises the most prominent US security
bubbles and crises from the year 1920 to the present. Second, the cut-off points signifying
the start and end of a bubble or crisis are not clearly defined. Lack of forecastability for
bubbles and crises makes it extremely challenging to identify a bubble or when it will burst.
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Most of the evidence or conclusions drawn from historical bubbles or crises by extant studies
have been achieved on an ex post, rather than ex ante, basis.
Previous studies have rarely employed quantitative methods to examine bubbles or crises.
Instead, earlier researchers construct a variety of theoretical frameworks aimed at capturing
the nature of bubbles or crises. For example, the theoretical framework proposed by Lux (1995)
models the mutual mimetic contagion process among speculative investors during bubbles. In
essence, assuming that no other source of information is available to investors except market
prices, a speculator will quickly react to what other investors do in the market, as they believe
that others’ behaviour is influenced by better information about future developments of the
market and thus reveals information. This proposition also applies to crises or recessions.
More recent work by Mikhed and Zemčík (2009) investigated the cointegration between prices
and fundamentals to assess when prices genuinely reflect fundamentals. In theory, if the price
deviates far from fundamentals, it is highly likely there is a bubble in the market.3 Another
paper by Chiang et al. (2011) proposed a similar framework to identify bubbles. In sum, extant
literature offers heuristic ideas to identify speculative bubbles or crises in financial markets,
but few papers have drawn inferable conclusions on the role of sentiment in bubbles and crises.
5.2.1 Market Bubbles and Crises in the History of United
States since the 1920s
Market bubbles and crashes in the US since the 1920s stock market bubble and crash are
always tied together to discuss, as the occurrence of a market crash always follows the burst of
a speculative bubble. Here, I briefly summarise prominent US stock market bubbles and crises
between 1920 and 2015, and for those who are not interested, you can skip this subsection
to the following section of hypothesis development. I start with the Wall Street Crash in
the late 1920s which has been widely considered as one of the most devastating market
crashes in US history, given its extent and the duration of its aftereffects. The 1920s, which
is normally called the ‘Roaring Twenties’, were a golden period in which the US economy
grew fluently and rapidly. Investors were infatuated with the enchanting returns from stock
markets and thus traded stocks aggressively. Overconfidence drove investors to trade on
the margin and pushed stock prices to unexpected highs. However, trading on the margin
significantly increases the leverage level and introduces tremendous risks to investors. In
other words, investors are left highly exposed when stocks prices fall. As a result, when
stock prices started to decline, the vulnerable investors ‘dumped’ their shares, driving down
3This framework is constructed on the basis of Campbell (1987) proposition that stationarity
between financial assets and their cash flows should be of the same order of integration, and, if they are
both non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences, the two series should be cointegrated.
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prices rapidly. Irrational exuberance inflated the speculative bubble and then burst it quickly.
Researchers believe that prices were driven by the optimism/exuberance of investors, instead
of economic fundamentals, during that time.
The next major stock market crisis emerged in 1987. On Monday, October 19th, 1987, the
world’s major stock exchanges experienced a major crash on the same day. The contagious
crash hit the markets around the world hard, leading to significant drops in market indexes.
For example, almost all major stock markets fell by over 20%, and some lost over 60% (such
as the New Zealand stock market). Numerous papers and commission reports have attempted
to investigate what caused the crash. Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) noted that speculative
activities in derivative markets, as well as existing speculative bubbles, accelerated the crash.
After that, the 1990s High Technology Bubble has attracted attention to speculative
transactions in stock markets. With the rapid growth in the usage and adoption of the Inter-
net, the demand for high-tech companies increased sharply, and investors were eager to invest
in the stocks of these companies, pushing up prices to extreme highs. Despite the irrational
trading activities by individual investors, Griffin et al. (2011) and Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2004) revealed that institutional investors ‘rode the bubble’ rather than attacked it. It has
been documented that rational investors make significant contributions to speculative bubbles.
The most recent crisis, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008, is considered the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Originating from the US sub-
prime mortgage market, the rapid expansion of the US subprime mortgage led to incredibly
high default rates, giving rise to colossal bank failure. The housing and credit bubbles made
the financial system increasingly fragile, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers triggered
market panic and fed investor fear. In addition, the collapse in people’s confidence in the
subprime mortgage market spread to banks, stocks, and other financial markets, leading
to widespread liquidations of assets and consequently causes contagious financial market crises.
5.3 Hypotheses Development
I construct my hypotheses based on a basic idea that during financial bubbles and crises, stock
price changes follow a certain path-dependent dynamic, rather than a constant relationship.
First, I predict that investor sentiment generates positive stock returns in the early and
medium stages of bubbles. The intuition behind this proposition is that high buying pressure
from both rational and irrational investors accelerates positive deviations of stock prices,
resulting in higher stock returns. As argued by De Long et al. (1990), rational investors
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normally trade before irrationals, creating a buying signal for irrationals. Also, when investors
experience euphoria from their investment, they tend to conduct more investments, which in
turn attract more investments into the market. Hence, the increasing buying pressure pushes
up stock prices and creates positive stock returns in the short run. Further, Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) showed that rational investors typically choose to ride the bubble
in the early stages, instead of attacking it, to achieve higher returns from irrationals before
the ultimate mispricing correction. Hence, in the early stages of the bubble, an increase in
investor sentiment produces positive future returns.
However, as the bubble persists, future stock returns may be dampened because of
the intense selling pressure from both arbitrageurs and irrationals. In a sense, if rational
arbitrageurs expect a price correction tomorrow, they sell immediately, thus creating a selling
signal for irrational investors, which eventually leads to a fall in stock prices. Hence, in later
periods of speculative bubbles (the long-term stage), stock returns are expected to drop
because of the intense selling pressure.
Hypothesis 1. In bubbles, investor sentiment generates positive stock returns in the early
and medium stages but negative returns in later periods.
Second, when the market falls into crises and recessions, because of the strong risk and
loss aversion of investors, investors intend to liquidate assets as soon as possible in order to
avoid further future losses when they see prices fall. Hence, the high selling pressure from
liquidation drives down stock prices and reduces subsequent returns in the short run. In
later periods of recessions, when the price is low enough, rational arbitrageurs intend to
make enormous profits by ‘fishing the bottom’, that is purchasing undervalued stocks, as
they believe stock prices will bounce back to equilibriums soon because of the mean-reverting
property of stock returns. Hence, the purchasing activities from rationals improve investor
sentiment and drive up stock prices, resulting in stronger buying pressures in the market and
consequently higher future returns.
Hypothesis 2. In crisis and recessions, investor sentiment generates negative stock returns
in the early stages but positive returns in later periods.
Third, when characterising the nature of bubbles and recessions on the basis of market
volatility, I predict that the impact of investor sentiment on stock returns will be most
significant when the market is most volatile and that the effect will be negative. In a general
sense, excessive market volatility is always associated with frequent active trading activities.
During extreme market conditions, excessive speculation (in bubbles) and rapid liquidation
(in recessions) cause a growing number of active trading activities resulting in extra volatility.
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Empirical evidence indicated that in periods of financial bubbles and crises, market volatility
is much higher than during stable periods.4
Assuming the excessive high volatility is caused by speculations, it means investors are
willing to take on excessive risk and conduct more active trades. As excessive speculation
pushes up security prices and lowers subsequent returns, a negative relationship between
investor sentiment and security returns is expected in such periods (late periods of bubbles).
On the other hand, when the extreme volatility comes from excessive liquidation during
recessions, the high selling pressure drives down stock prices quickly and consequently reduces
stock returns. Therefore, during periods of extreme volatility, a negative correlation between
sentiment and security returns is hypothesised. However, this relationship becomes ambiguous
in low volatility periods, as the trading behaviour in these periods is relatively rational.
Hypothesis 3. The impact of investor sentiment on stock returns is most significant when
the market is most volatile, and the effect is negative.
Last, I also investigate the role of market returns on the formation of future investor
sentiment. In particular, I predict that market returns impose a contemporaneously positive
impact on investor sentiment. The positive effect is easy to understand as high market
returns lead to optimistic expectations about the market resulting in high investor sentiment.
Besides, the impact of market returns on investor sentiment should be contemporaneous
rather than lagging as people frequently make immediate responses to stock price changes.
In a general sense, investors collect information from all available sources in the market to
form their valuations. When no other information is available in the market, stock price, as
an essential component of market information, directly affects people’s prediction on future
stock prices, especially for irrational investors. Hence, it is predictable that any shock to stock
market returns will also lead to shocks to investor sentiment. Second, this effect is expected to
be stronger during recession periods relative to bubbles because of the overreaction of investors
to (negative) stock price shocks during extreme market conditions as well as investors’ risk
aversion. Empirical literature indicated that investors always misbehave and overreact to bad
news but underreact to good news (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998).5 Intuitively,
when the market falls into recession, investors become increasingly vulnerable to negative
4Flood and Hodrick (1986, 1990) and Wu (1997) suggested that bubbles lead to excess volatility;
while studies by Black (1976), Whaley (2000), Schwert (1989, 1990) and Schwert and Seguin (1990)
found stock price volatility significantly increases during recessions.
5Other studies also indicated immediate and strong reactions from investors following the release
of breaking news, such as first-day IPO abnormal returns and abnormal returns surrounding earnings
announcements (Bartov et al., 2000; Cornelli et al., 2006; Kadiyala and Rau, 2004; Ljungqvist et al.,
2006).
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news. In particular, investors usually choose to quickly liquidate their assets to avoid further
losses due to their strong aversion to risk and potential losses.
Hypothesis 4. An increase in market returns lead to an contemporaneous increase in
investor sentiment during financial bubbles and crises. This effect is more pronounced when
the market is in crises (recessions) than when the market is in bubbles.
5.4 Models
5.4.1 Path-Dependent Dynamic Model
Bubble
The basic model employed in this empirical chapter is a path-dependent dynamic model
following Berger and Turtle (2015). The idea behind this methodology is to capture the extent
to which multiple periods of sentiment growth affects subsequent returns in a path-dependent
manner.
To measure the path-dependent dynamics, the sum of changes of the sentiment index
throughout month t−1, Sumt−1,∆Sent, is calculated and the value in the initial month is set
to zero. According to Berger and Turtle (2015), if the changes in the sentiment index in the
subsequent month are positive, the value is added to the previous value of Sumt−1,∆Sent; if the
changes in the index are negative, the value of Sumt−1,Sent is reset to zero. Countt−1,∆Sent+
is defined as the number of months of consecutive sentiment increases through month t - 1,
which is also reset to zero for every month following a decrease in sentiment.
Short, Medium and Long-term Episodes of Consecutive Investor Sentiment
On the basis of the count variables, I further create indicators of I+ST,t−1, I
+
MED,t−1 and
I+LT,t−1 which define the length of positive sentiment episodes. In particular, the short-term
indicator I+ST,t−1 takes the value of 1 when sentiment has increased for one-to-two consecutive
months through month t - 1, and 0 otherwise. The medium-term indicator I+MED,t−1 equals
1 if there have been three-to-five months of consecutive increases in sentiment, and the
long-term indicator I+LT,t−1 equals 1 in months in which sentiment has increased for six or
more consecutive months through t - 1. These three indicators are mutually exclusive, such
that any period t located in the short-term episode is not included in medium- or long-term
episodes again.
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The Regression Model in Bubble
Based on my hypothesis about the relationship between investor sentiment and excess returns
during financial bubbles that ’an initial increase in investor sentiment produces positive
returns but as the bubble persists, returns start to decline and become negative’, the following
quadratic function should be able to well capture the potential convex relationship between
the consecutive sentiment increase and excess returns:
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent+,p+β2,pSum2t−1,∆Sent+,p+ep,t (5.1)
where Rp,t represents the excess return to portfolio p during month t. Sumt−1,∆Sent+, in-
dicates the successive sentiment increase, as previously defined, and Sum2t−1,∆Sent+ is its
squared-term. If β1,ps are positive and β2,ps are negative, the hypothesised convex relation is
achieved. This indicates that the excess return of portfolios rises initially as Sumt−1,∆Sent+
increases but turns negative after reaching the maximum.
Crises and Recessions
Similar to the construction in bubbles, I generate a series of sentiment variables to capture the
sentiment dynamics in crises and recessions. In particular, I define the consecutive sentiment
decreases Sum−t−1,∆Sent as the accumulated sentiment changes throughout month t−1. If
the changes in the sentiment index in the subsequent month is negative, the value would be
added to the previous Sum−t−1,∆Sent; if the changes in the index, however, are positive, the
value Sumt−1,Sent is reset to zero. Countt−1,∆Sent− is defined as the number of months of
consecutive sentiment decreases through month t - 1, which resets to zero for every month
following an increase in sentiment.
The Regression Model in Crises and Recessions
The quadratic function employed to describe the relationship between consecutive sentiment
changes and excess returns in crises is shown below:
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pCRISISt−1,p+ep,t (5.2)
where Rp,t represents the excess return to test asset j during month t. Moreover, the variable
CRISIS in the equation represents the squared-term of the accumulated sentiment decreases
throughout month t - 1.
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5.4.2 Markov-Regime Switching Model
I select a three-stage Markov regime-switching model to capture the sentiment dynamics
in real financial bubbles and crises. In essence, statistical parameters such as means and
variances are not always constant, but are changing across episodes (regimes). The major
advantage of this approach is that it takes into account possible multistage relationships
between sentiment and stock returns throughout the bubble and crisis.
By specification, the entire sample is partitioned into three states with different means
and volatilities. Investor sentiment is assumed to be a time-varying variable which changes
across all stages while the market risk factor to be time-invariant, playing a constant role
over time. Hence, my Markov regime-switching model is specified as follows:
Rt = α0+θ1RMt−1+θ2,StSentt−1+ ϵp,t (5.3)
where RMt−1 is market excess return in previous period t -1 and Sentt−1 is the BW sentiment
index in the previous month t - 1. θ1 and θ2,St represent the state-invariant and state-variant
coefficients, respectively.
5.4.3 Structural VAR Model
The last model employed in this chapter is the structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR),
with an objective of examining the contemporaneous inter-dependence between market returns
and investor sentiment. This model overcomes two critical drawbacks of the simple VAR
model. First, the reduced form of the VAR framework allows for arbitrary lags but does
not account for contemporaneous relationships among its variables. Second, error terms, in
general, may be correlated.6
In general, a VAR that allows for contemporaneous relationships among variables may be
written as:
Ayt = C1yt−1+ . . . ,+Cnyt−n+et (5.4)
where yt is a 3 × 1 vector consisting of three elements (the short-term rate, market returns
and investor sentiment) yt−n is the vector for the nth lagged variables. Matrix A× 3 matrix
contains all contemporaneous coefficient estimates and Cn indicates the coefficient vectors
for the nth lagged variable.
6In the analysis of impulse response and forecast error variance decomposition, it is imperative to
maintain the orthogonality of shocks, as if the error terms are correlated, shocks to one particular
equation will affect shocks to other equations, resulting in potential biases in results.
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When A ̸= I, the equation suggests that there truly exists some contemporaneous relation-
ships between the targeted variables. Hence, the matrix A characterises the contemporaneous
relationships among all variables in Yt.
Yt =

ShorttermRate
MarketReturn
InvestorSentiment

Second, to resolve the issue of potential correlation between errors, the error terms are
reconstructed as a linear combination of ‘structural’ shocks, such that:
et =But (5.5)
where B is the coefficient matrix of shocks. Without loss of generality, I restrict E(utu
′
t) = I.
Hence, a structural VAR can be specified as:
Ayt = C1yt−1+ . . . ,+Cnyt−n+But (5.6)
Assuming that A is invertible, then the equation is converted to the following form:
yt =A−1C1yt−1+ . . . ,+A−1Cnyt−k+A−1But (5.7)
which implies the following set of relationships,
A−1Ci =Ai for i= 1,2, . . . ,k (5.8)
and
A−1BB
′
A−1
′ =Σ (5.9)
where Σ is the co-variance matrix of the error term.
Identification
I follow the identification that sets matrix A to be lower triangular and B = I, I successfully
place n(n−1)/2 short-term restrictions on matrix A and n2 restrictions on matrix B.7 Since
7A symmetric co-variance matrix only has n× (n+1)/2 pieces of information but both A and B
have n2 parameters. Hence, n2+n(n−1)/2 restrictions need to be placed in order to identify a valid
structural VAR framework. In the context of my analysis, since I have three variables to analyse,
the total number of restrictions required is 12. Therefore, given my assumptions and hypotheses, I
restrict matrix A to be lower triangular, placing zeros on all entries above the diagonal, and matrix
B to be diagonal, with all entries except diagonals zero. The restrictions are limited to short-run
restrictions only, as I assume that the impact from market returns on sentiment changes is temporary
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matrix A is in the form of lower triangular, shocks to one equation contemporaneously affect
variables below that equation but only affect the lagging variables above that equation.
Moreover, the reduced form error term of each equation is a linear combination of structural
shocks and there is no intercorrelation between them.
Augmented Dickey–Fuller Test and Optimal Lags Determination
The Augmented Dickey–Fuller test is performed before the structural VAR analyses to
examine the stationarity of each time series. This test aims at examining the stationarity of
my time-series variables. If the targeted time-series is not stationary, the SVAR process is at
risk of producing a spurious regression.
Another useful test to perform before the SVAR process is to determine the optimal
number of lags to be included in the process. The selection of the optimal number of lags is
based on a combination of information criteria, including the final prediction error (FPE),
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and
the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC). In addition, the results of a sequence
of likelihood-ratio (LR) test statistics are also reported.
5.5 Data and Summary Statistics
The value and equally-weighted monthly portfolio returns for portfolios of volatility, size,
book-to-market ratios and operating profits used in the following empirical tests are collected
from the Kenneth R. French’s Data Library covering the sample period (January 1987 to
December 2010). The portfolios are constructed based on a collection of firm characteristics.
Also, all securities with a valid characteristic in June of year t are ranked in ascending order
and then split into 10 identical portfolios. Stocks with the lowest characteristics are assigned
and will not last long.
A=
 1 0 0· · · 1 0
· · · · · · 1

B=
· · · 0 00 · · · 0
0 0 · · ·

where · · · refers to parameters which need to be estimated.
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to the first portfolio, defined as the low-end portfolio, and those with the highest characteris-
tics are assigned into the last portfolio, defined as the high-end portfolio. The market return
data are downloaded from the CRSP/Compustat merged database for the NYSE and AMEX
stock exchanges on the basis of both value and equal weights. The short-term risk-free rate
is the one-month Treasury-bill rate, also collected from the Kenneth R. French’s Data Library.
For measurement of investor sentiment, I select the BW composite sentiment index,
defined as the principal component of six well-accepted sentiment proxies, including the
closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, number of IPOs, averaged first-day return
of IPOs, equity share in new issues and dividend premiums.
Table 5.1 displays the summary statistics of the monthly portfolio excess returns. I
report the value- and equally-weighted averaged monthly excess returns of both high- and
low-end portfolios, characterised in terms of several firm characteristics including volatility,
size, book-to-market ratio and operating profit. To identify the cross-sectional differences
in excess returns of these portfolios, I compare and calculate the averaged monthly excess
return between the high- and low-end portfolios.
Table 5.1 shows that portfolios with high risk, small size, high book-to-market ratio and
low profitability have relatively high averaged excess returns. For example, the averaged
excess returns for the equally-weighted small size portfolio is 2.73%, but only 0.67% for port-
folios with large capitalisations. The mean return for the small stock portfolio is more than
four times larger than the mean return of the portfolio with big stocks. Besides, portfolios
with higher averaged returns are associated with higher standard deviations; for example, the
standard deviations for the equally-weighted small and big portfolios are 0.0651 and 0.0485,
respectively. The summary statistics indicate that portfolios with higher variance, smaller
capitalisations, higher book-to-market ratio and lower operating profit exhibit higher sample
means and standard deviations.
Table 5.2 reports the summary statistics of the sentiment variables. Specifically, I report both
positive and negative consecutive sentiment changes, Sumt−1,∆Sent+ and Sumt−1,∆Sent−,
as well as the total number of months for each consecutive sentiment increase or decrease,
Countt−1,∆Sent+ and Countt−1,∆Sent−. Since Sumt−1,∆Sent+ and Sumt−1,∆Sent− are mutu-
ally exclusive, the median of Sumt−1,∆Sent indicates that more than half the total observations
are located in periods with positive sentiment changes. Moreover, the percentiles of both
positive and negative consecutive sentiment changes demonstrate that the range of consecutive
sentiment decrease is wider than that of consecutive sentiment increase. To be specific, the
first percentile in Sumt−1,∆Sent− equals -5.6023 while the 99th percentile on the positive side
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Table 5.1 Pooled Summary Statistics of Monthly Portfolio Excess Returns from January
1987 through December 2010
I display the summary statistics of both equally- and value-weighted averaged monthly excess
returns for the first and last decile portfolios sorted by various firm characteristics such as variance,
size, book-to-market, and operating profit, from January 1987 to December 2010. For each firm
characteristic, all securities are assigned into ten deciles based on their rankings from the lowest to
the highest. In addition, the long-short portfolio return represents the return differential between the
tenth and the first portfolio.
Value-weighted Equally-weighted
Portfolio Mean (%) Median (%) Std (%) Mean (%) Median (%) Std (%)
Market 0.56 1.08 467 0.80 1.27 5.70
σ2low 0.38 0.05 3.26 0.64 0.67 2.77
σ2high 0.44 0.32 9.83 1.01 0.95 9.20
σ2high−low 0.06 -0.86 9.25 0.37 -0.70 8.04
Sizesmall 0.61 1.13 6.31 2.73 2.44 6.51
Sizelarge 0.56 0.85 4.43 0.67 1.13 4.85
Sizelarge−small -0.05 -0.36 4.87 -2.06 -1.85 5.02
BE/MElow 0.56 0.79 5.15 1.01 1.71 7.88
BE/MEhigh 0.87 1.41 6.39 3.20 3.17 6.58
BE/MEhigh−low 0.31 -0.10 4.83 2.19 1.46 4.37
OPlow 0.66 0.93 8.22 0.88 0.75 8.51
OPhigh 0.46 0.91 4.64 0.59 1.45 5.95
OPhigh−low -0.20 0.27 4.76 -0.29 0.19 4.78
of Sumt−1,∆Sent− is only 4.3191. This difference indicates a more substantial variation in
the negative side of consecutive sentiment changes relative to positive consecutive sentiment
changes.
Table 5.3 reports the mean excess returns during period t, conditioning on different
sentiment dynamics through month t - 1. I partition the sample across these six sentiment
indicators during each period t - 1, and report the mean excess returns in the following month
t conditioning on six conditions: I−ST,t−1, I
−
MED,t−1, I
−
LT,t−1, I
+
ST,t−1, I
+
MED,t−1 and I
+
LT,t−1.
In addition, Table 5.3 also reports the F-statistic, testing the equality of conditional means
across all six indicator conditions, all positive sentiment change conditions and all negative
sentiment change conditions. Panels A and B present the conditional mean excess returns
for the value and equally-weighted portfolios, respectively.
The results in Table 5.3 offer several empirical regularities that are consistent with my
hypotheses regarding bubbles and crises. First, the excess monthly returns conditional
on long-term consecutive sentiment increases, ILT,t−1+, are generally lower than returns
following medium-term consecutive sentiment increases, IMED,t−1+. For example, for the
value-weighted size portfolios, the averaged monthly excess returns conditional on ILT,t−1+
are -1.00% and 1.29% in small and large portfolios, respectively, and the return differential
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of Sentiment Variables
This table presents summary statistics for the sentiment variables. The sum, Sumt−1,∆Sent, and
count,Countt−1,∆Sent, of consecutive sentiment increases and decreases are computed based on the
monthly orthogonalised sentiment changes. For month t, Sumt−1,∆Sent represents the sum of all
consecutive sentiment increases/decreases through month t-1, and Countt−1,∆Sent represents the
number of consecutive months in which sentiment has increased/decreased in month t - 1. The
variables take the value of zero following the opposite sentiment change in month t - 1. I denote
the ith percentile of strictly positive realisations for the underlying variables with Pi+ and strictly
negative realisations for the underlying variables with Pi−.
Sumt−1,∆Sent+ Countt−1,∆Sent+ Sumt−1,∆Sent− Countt−1,∆Sent−
Mean 0.6356 0.9167 Mean -0.6723 0.9028
Median 0.0159 1 Median 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.9953 1.2240 Standard Deviation 1.1614 1.2173
P1+ 0 0 P1− -5.6023 0
P5+ 0 0 P5− -3.0525 0
P10+ 0 0 P10− -1.9909 0
P25+ 0 0 P25− -0.9866 0
P75+ 0.9770 3 P75− 0 3
P95+ 2.9874 4 P95− 0 3
P99+ 4.3191 5 P99− 0 5
becomes larger in equally-weighted size portfolios. Similar patterns are also observed in port-
folios with high risk, small size and low operating profits, indicating that the impact is more
significant in sentiment-prone portfolios. The excess return of the market portfolio remains
positive after over six-month consecutive sentiment increases but the magnitude is much
lower relative to the excess returns conditioning on medium-term consecutive positive changes
in sentiment. Interestingly, the conditional excess returns for book-to-market portfolios after
six or more consecutive monthly increases in sentiment remain positive for both low and high
book-to-market portfolios. However, returns of high book-to-market ratio portfolios show
more massive drops from the medium-term to long-term consecutive sentiment increases. For
example, the equally-weighted excess returns in the book-to-market portfolio conditional
onIMED,t−1+ and ILT,t−1+ are 4.36% and 4.20%, respectively, revealing a net difference of
-0.16%, while such difference increases to 3.28% for the high book-to-market portfolios. This
demonstrates that high book-to-market portfolios suffer more significant losses from investor
sentiment in bubbles.
Second, I find that large conditional returns follow short- and medium-term increases in
sentiment, consistent with the hypothesis of building overvaluation during the early portion of
a bubble episode. For example, following a three-to-five month consecutive sentiment increase,
conditional returns to the high and low variance portfolios (equally-weighted) are 4.53% and
1.18%, respectively. Overall, the patterns observed in the excess monthly returns conditioning
on consecutive sentiment increases are consistent with the hypothesis of building overvalua-
tion in the early stages followed by an ultimate correction in the late stage in a bubble episode.
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Table 5.3 Conditional Returns Following Increases and Decreases in Investor Sentiment
This table presents mean excess returns during month t conditional on sentiment dynamics through
month t - 1. I define indicator variables for short-, medium-, and long-term sentiment dynamics,
IST,t−1, IMED,t−1, and ILT,t−1 representing one-to-two, three-to-five, or six-or-more months of
consecutive positive or negative realisations in the orthogonalised sentiment change index, respectively.
The superscripts “+” and “-” denote consecutive increases and decreases in the sentiment changes
index. Portfolios can be found in the initial column. The initial six data columns present conditional
mean excess returns. The final three columns report F-statistics testing equality of conditional
means across all six indicator conditions, all positive sentiment change conditions, and all nega-
tive sentiment change conditions, with ∗ and ∗∗ present the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Portfolio I−ST,t−1 I
−
MED,t−1 I
−
LT,t−1 I
+
ST,t−1 I
+
MED,t−1 I
+
LT,t−1
Across Across Across
All Cond. Pos. cond. Neg. Cond.
Panel A: Value-Weighted
Market -0.36 -0.45 0.56 1.11 1.92 1.74 2.33* 0.72 0.18
σ2low 0.30 1.07 0.53 0.02 0.52 1.13 0.84 0.90 0.81
σ2high -2.48 -3.66 -1.90 2.44 4.09 -1.16 5.94** 0.51 0.29
σ2high−low -3.13 -4.99 -2.93 2.08 3.28 -2.64 7.78** 0.33 0.79
Sizelow -0.88 -1.72 -1.04 1.69 3.36 -1.00 5.89** 2.00 0.26
Sizehigh -0.11 -0.15 1.24 0.86 1.56 1.29 1.29 0.52 0.41
Sizehigh−low 0.41 1.32 1.77 -1.17 -2.08 3.10 4.82** 1.15 0.87
BE/MElow -0.62 -0.72 0.57 1.48 1.94 1.92 2.94* 0.18 0.26
BE/MEhigh -0.78 0.06 1.20 1.44 2.73 3.48 2.57* 1.15 0.57
BE/MEhigh−low -0.52 0.52 0.12 -0.39 0.51 1.17 0.66 0.84 0.80
OPlow -1.45 -2.63 -1.17 1.98 2.99 -2.56 5.66** 0.44 0.42
OPhigh -0.17 0.53 0.79 0.69 1.80 1.79 1.18 1.28 0.39
OPhigh−low 0.93 2.90 1.45 -1.63 -1.47 4.16 9.06** 0.08 2.76*
Panel B: Equally-Weighted
Market -0.56 -1.07 -0.78 1.77 3.13 1.63 5.19** 1.62 0.11
σ2low 0.01 0.92 0.23 0.44 1.18 3.15 3.5** 0.82 1.42
σ2high -1.27 -3.42 -2.11 2.81 4.53 -5.20 6.81** 7.84** 0.95
σ2high−low -1.64 -4.60 -2.86 2.03 3.07 -8.66 7.84** 0.30 2.72*
Sizelow 1.44 0.05 0.81 3.64 5.82 -6.96 6.64* 3.21* 0.70
Sizehigh -0.12 0.15 1.04 0.94 1.74 1.63 1.13 0.64 0.23
Sizehigh−low -1.91 -0.17 -0.28 -3.05 -4.36 -5.72 5.92** 1.97 2.72*
BE/MElow -0.91 -2.28 -1.52 2.93 4.36 4.20 6.75** 0.75 0.44
BE/MEhigh 2.01 0.96 1.68 3.74 6.07 2.79 5.25** 4.07** 0.37
BE/MEhigh−low 2.57 2.99 2.70 0.47 1.43 3.19 3.46** 2.86* 0.14
OPlow -1.21 -3.00 -2.11 2.77 4.50 -5.13 7.31** 0.98 0.77
OPhigh -0.47 -0.56 -0.68 1.56 3.28 3.79 4.07** 2.34* 0.01
OPhigh−low 0.38 2.18 0.92 -1.55 -1.50 -8.74 5.89** 0.01 3.15**
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Further, across the negative sentiment states, I find negative excess returns in opaque
portfolios (such as high risk, small size, low book-to-market ratio and low operating profit)
conditioning on the short-term consecutive sentiment decrease. For example, following a one-
to-two period consecutive sentiment decrease, the conditional return to the equally-weighted
low and high operating profit portfolios are -1.21% and -0.47%, respectively. Also, the
medium-term (three-to-five months) consecutive sentiment decreases strengthen the negative
returns. For example, the excess returns of a three-to-five-month consecutive sentiment
decrease in the low operating profit portfolio significantly reduce to -3.00%. However, a
long-term (over six months) consecutive sentiment decrease causes an increase in future excess
returns given the positive coefficient estimates. These patterns confirm my prediction on the
relationship between consecutive sentiment decreases and portfolio returns during crises that
short-term consecutive sentiment decreases reduce portfolio returns but long-term sentiment
decreases produce positive returns. These estimates appear economically meaningful as
short-term bearish markets encourage rapid market liquidation, resulting in lower subsequent
returns, while as crises and the ensuing recessions persist for over a six-month period, investors
tend to ‘fish the bottom’ to obtain higher future returns, leading to higher subsequent returns.
I also report the F-statistics that test the equality of conditional means across economic
states. According to the results, I strongly reject the null hypothesis of mean equality across
all sentiment conditions for almost all portfolios as well as the long-short portfolios. For
example, for the equally-weighted portfolio indexes, only the large size portfolio shows an
insignificant F-statistic, while others are all statistically significant at the 5% level. More-
over, I reject the null hypothesis of mean equality across positive sentiment conditions for
equally-weighted portfolios with high variance, small size, high book-to-market ratio and
high operating profits. Except for the high operating profit portfolio, all these portfolios
are considered opaque, and thus, this finding indicates strong cross-sectional variations in
portfolio returns across positive sentiment conditions. However, I fail to reject the null
hypothesis of the equal mean across negative sentiment conditions for most portfolios. Hence,
the price dynamics in crises and the ensuing recessions may not be as apparent as that in
bubble episodes, and thus, require further demonstration.
5.6 Empirical Results
5.6.1 Mispricing Correction and Accumulated Sentiment Changes
The empirical tests in this chapter focus on discerning the periods in which stock prices are
inflated above or deflated below fundamental values. My empirical analyses begin with a
path-dependent model developed by Berger and Turtle (2015). In essence, this framework is
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constructed on the basis of a bubble model proposed by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003),
which allows for the establishment of price overvaluation before mispricing is corrected by
the market.
The major benefit of the path-dependent approach is that it captures potential price
dynamics within a given period. As argued by Berger and Turtle (2015), the final mispricing
correction depends on the total level of overvaluation accumulated in previous periods, such
that stock returns should be a path-dependent function of the accumulated sentiment changes,
instead of a single period change in (or level of) sentiment. Given the assumption that a
bubble (recession) is the extreme case of continuous accumulation of positive (negative)
sentiment and thus positive speculation (negative liquidation), this framework should work
well in capturing the path-dependent accumulation of sentiment dynamics.
5.6.2 The Non-Linear Relationship Between Sentiment Changes and Excess
Return
I predict a non-linear relationship between investor sentiment and subsequent market returns.
In particular, I hypothesise that, in bubbles, initial positive changes in sentiment predict
future positive returns but as the bubble persists, the increased selling pressure from both
rationals and irrationals drives down market prices, leading to lower future returns. In
contrast, in crises and the ensuing recessions, I hypothesise that initial decreases in investor
sentiment generate significant negative returns but as the recession persists, stock prices
bounce back because of the strong purchasing pressure from investors.
To examine the hypothesised relationship in bubbles, I estimate the following quadratic
regression:
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent+,p+β2,pSum2t−1,∆Sent+,p+ep,t
where all variables are as previously defined. If β1,ps are positive and β2,ps are negative,
it implies that the excess portfolio return increases initially as Sumt−1,∆Sent+,p increases but
decrease after reaching the maximum.8
8In algebra, a simple second-degree polynomial function with a positive coefficient for the first-
degree indeterminate and a negative coefficient for the second degree should have a maximum point,
and as long as the independent variable moves beyond this point, the value of the dependent variable
starts to drop.
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Table 5.4 Relationships Between Future Excess Return and Positive Sentiment Dynamics
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent+,p+β2,pSum2t−1,∆Sent+,p+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios identified in the
initial column. Sumt−1,∆Sent+ represents the sum of consecutive increases in the orthogonalised BW
sentiment changes index. The table also reports the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2.
* and ** present the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent+ Sum2t−1,∆Sent+ Adjusted R2
Market 0.0026 0.0179** -0.0049* 0.0076
0.61 2.02 -1.75
σ2low 0.0051 0.0021 -0.0002 -0.0045
2.48 0.48 -0.17
σ2high -0.0028 0.0324** -0.0080* 0.0117
-0.41 2.26 -1.88
σ2high−low -0.0113 0.0308** -0.0079** 0.0144
-1.88 2.45 -2.13
Sizelow 0.0188 0.0243** -0.0052* 0.0190
3.88 2.40 -1.73
Sizehigh 0.0047 0.0046 -0.0010 -0.0054
1.30 0.61 -0.45
Sizehigh−low -0.0175 -0.0192** 0.0040* 0.0209
-4.67 -2.46 1.74
BE/MElow 0.0038 0.0230* -0.0063* 0.0052
0.65 1.87 -1.72
BE/MEhigh 0.0222 0.0273** -0.0056* 0.0266
4.55 2.68 -1.87
BE/MEhigh−low 0.0150 0.0047 0.0005 0.0142
4.58 0.69 0.25
OPlow -0.0009 0.0275** -0.0066* 0.0094
-0.14 2.07 -1.67
OPhigh 0.0040 0.0173* -0.0047* 0.0051
0.91 1.86 -1.71
OPhigh−low 0.0015 -0.0097 0.0017 0.0033
0.41 -1.30 0.78
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Table 5.4 reports the coefficient estimates of Sumt−1,∆Sent+ and Sum2t−1,∆Sent+ obtained
from Eq.5.1 for the equally-weighted portfolios.9 The coefficient estimates in the initial row
reveal that both Sumt−1,∆Sent+ and Sum2t−1,∆Sent+ are statistically significant in explaining
market portfolio returns. In particular, the parameter estimates for the consecutive sentiment
increase and its squared-term are 0.0179 (with a t-statistic of 2.02) and -0.0046 (with a
t-statistic of -1.75), respectively. This result indicates that an initial positive sentiment
accumulation increases future market returns, but as the consecutive change in sentiment
becomes larger, future market returns turn negative because of the negative coefficient
of the squared-term. This result is consistent with my hypothesis of building overvalua-
tion in the early stage, followed by an ultimate correction in the late stage in a bubble episode.
In terms of other portfolios, my results indicate that the coefficient estimates are only
significant for portfolios with high volatility, small market capitalisations, high book-to-
market ratios or low operating profitability. This result is consistent with my finding in
Chapter 3 indicating that firms with higher opacity are more exposed to investor senti-
ment. Also, for this type of portfolios, the signs are consistently positive for the coefficient
estimates of consecutive sentiment increases but negative for the coefficient estimates of
the squared term. For example, β1,σ2
high
and β2,σ2
high
for the high volatility portfolio are
0.0324 (with a t-statistic of 2.26) and -0.0080 (with a t-statistic of -1.88), respectively (both
significant at the 5% level). These results clearly demonstrate that for both the market
portfolio and opaque portfolios (such as high volatility, small market capitalisations, high
book-to-market ratio or low operating profitability), an initial accumulation of positive
sentiment changes generates positive excess returns but the return diminishes as sentiment
continues to grow in later periods. Interestingly, my results also show that returns of high,
not low, book-to-market portfolios are significantly correlated with consecutive sentiment
increases. This result is contrary to other empirical suggestions, which argue that growth
stocks are more exposed to investor sentiment than value stocks (Baker and Wurgler, 2006,
2007; Berger and Turtle, 2012). In addition, these results indicate that returns of stocks
with high book-to-market ratios are more prone to consecutive increases in investor sentiment.
Further, the negative coefficient estimates of the squared-term imply that the relative
overvaluation will be ultimately corrected in the later period of a bubble episode. My results
imply that a potential pricing bubble is more likely to occur in opaque portfolios for two
reasons. First, the onset of the bubble in opaque portfolios is difficult to discern in opaque
9For the rest of my empirical analyses, I also estimate the regressions for all value-weighted
portfolios but the results for the value-weighted indexes are less favourable as the results for the
equally-weighted portfolio. Therefore, I include the results of the value-weighted index in Appendix
A for the interested reader. The less significant results for the value-weighted index confirm the
importance of small stocks in sentiment-related analyses.
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portfolios. Second, it is also challenging to correct the misvaluation in such portfolios, because
of the higher unpredictability of future prices and higher transaction costs.
Besides, I also link my empirical tests to the mainstream sentiment-related literature by
including the level index of investor sentiment in my regression model Eq.5.1. Specifically, I
incorporate the level index of sentiment as a control variable in Eq 5.1 to account for the
impact of investor sentiment at every stage. Table 5.5 reports the test results of coefficient
estimates for the equally-weighted portfolios.
Table 5.5 shows that after including sentiment level in the equation, the parameter
estimates β1,p remain significantly positive for the majority of opaque portfolios. For example,
incorporating the level sentiment index slightly decreases the magnitude of the coefficient
estimate of the consecutive sentiment increase in portfolios with high variances, from 0.0324
to 0.0250, but does not reduce the significance of the parameter estimate. This relationship
holds for most long-short portfolios. Moreover, the squared term of the consecutive sentiment
increase remains negative and significant for opaque portfolios. For instance, β2,smallsize for
the small size portfolio is -0.0036 with a t-statistic of -1.88. For all portfolios, level sentiment
is negatively priced at the 5% significance level. For example, the parameter estimate for the
market portfolio of β3,mkt is -0.0139 with a t-statistic of -2.11. This result indicates lower
future excess returns at higher levels of investor sentiment. Hence, it can be concluded that
the lower future excess returns of opaque portfolios in bubbles are not only attributed to the
consecutive sentiment increase but rely on the given level of sentiment index and a high level
of investor sentiment, resulting in much lower future portfolio returns.
My empirical findings are aligned with the interpretation that initial increases in sentiment
lead to significant positive subsequent returns as overvaluation builds. However, as the bubble
persists, the growth rate of returns decreases and stock prices drop. Moreover, the subsequent
returns also depend on the current level of investor sentiment, and higher levels of sentiment
lead to lower future returns. The economic intuition behind this is that in the short run,
the buying pressure from investors produces a possible indicator for positive future returns
and thus attracts more investors to purchase; as the bubble persists, however, the increased
selling pressure from rational arbitrageurs slows the growth rate of the bubble and ultimately
leads to negative returns as the mispricing gets resolved. Alternatively, the overreaction from
investors in later periods of bubbles, which pushes up stock prices but at a slower rate, may
also result in negative returns.
To capture the price dynamics in crises and ensuing recessions, I repeat the above tests
but replace the cumulative positive sentiment with corresponding consecutive sentiment
decreases, measured as Sumt-1,∆Sent− Therefore, I estimate the following regression model
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Table 5.5 Relationships Between Future Excess Return, Positive Sentiment Dynamics
and Sentiment Levels
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent+,p+β2,pSum2t−1,∆Sent+,p+β3,pSentt−1+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios identified in the
initial column. Sumt−1,∆Sent+ represents the sum of consecutive increases in the orthogonalised
BW sentiment index and Sum2t−1,∆Sent+ is the squared sum of consecutive changes. The table also
reports the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. * and ** present the 95% and 99%
significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent+ Sum2t−1,∆Sent+ Sentt−1 Adjusted R2
Market 0.0040 0.0144 -0.0033 -0.0139** 0.0195
0.93 1.65 -1.83 -2.11
σ2low 0.0051* 0.0022 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0079
2.42 0.49 -0.20 0.14
σ2high 0.0000 0.0250* -0.0053 -0.0286** 0.0329
0.00 2.03 -1.93 -2.69
σ2high−low -0.0084 0.0232 -0.0052 -0.0294** 0.0449
-1.41 1.85 -1.37 -3.18
Sizelow 0.0204** 0.0200 -0.0036 -0.0167* 0.0323
4.20 1.96 -1.88 -2.22
Sizehigh 0.0062 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0146** 0.0146
1.69 0.11 0.16 -2.60
Sizehigh−low -0.0176** -0.0188* 0.0039 0.0017 0.0177
-4.65 -2.36 1.62 0.29
BE/MElow 0.0064 0.0164 -0.0039 -0.0260** 0.0295
1.09 1.32 -1.04 -2.85
BE/MEhigh 0.0238** 0.0232* -0.0041 -0.0159* 0.0381
4.84 2.25 -1.95 -2.10
BE/MEhigh−low 0.0140** 0.0072 -0.0004 0.0097 0.0232
4.26 1.05 -0.19 1.91
OPlow 0.0019 0.0203 -0.0039 -0.0279** 0.0334
0.30 1.52 -1.79 -2.83
OPhigh 0.0050 0.0147 -0.0037 -0.0102 0.0090
1.12 1.56 -1.33 -1.47
OPhigh−low -0.0002 -0.0053 0.0001 0.0173** 0.0333
-0.07 -0.70 0.05 3.13
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Table 5.6Relationships Between Future Excess Return and Negative Sentiment Dynamics
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pCRISISt−1,p+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios identified in the
initial column. Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p represents the sum of the consecutive decrease in the orthogonalised
BW sentiment index, CRISISt−1,p is the squared-term of negative consecutive sentiment changes
through month t - 1. I also report the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. * and **
present the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent+ CRISISt−1,p Adjusted R2
Market 0.0092* 0.0076 -0.0019 0.0007
2.22 1.16 -1.45
σ2low 0.0065** -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0055
3.19 -0.01 -0.30
σ2high 0.0099 0.0177 0.0048* 0.0115
1.48 1.67 2.20
σ2high−low 0.0001 0.0177 0.0050** 0.0207
0.02 1.93 2.65
Sizelow 0.0295** 0.0122 0.0032* 0.0098
6.20 1.64 2.11
Sizehigh 0.0083* 0.0059 0.0010 -0.0030
2.36 1.05 0.90
Sizehigh−low -0.0245** -0.0064 -0.0022** 0.0102
-6.66 -1.11 -1.85
BE/MElow 0.0124* 0.0165 0.0047* 0.0187
2.17 1.84 2.54
BE/MEhigh 0.0344** 0.0092 0.0020 -0.0012
7.11 1.22 1.28
BE/MEhigh−low 0.0186** -0.0073 -0.0026** 0.0300
5.88 -1.47 -2.61
OPlow 0.0106 0.0163 0.0043* 0.0105
1.71 1.67 2.16
OPhigh 0.0099* 0.0051 0.0011 -0.0048
2.28 0.75 0.78
OPhigh−low -0.0041 -0.0112* -0.0032** 0.0258
-1.17 -2.05 -2.86
for each portfolio:
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pCRISISt−1,p+ep,t
Table 5.6 reports the coefficient estimates of negative consecutive changes in investor
sentiment. The results indicate that both Sumt−1,∆Sent− and CRISISt−1 are significantly
priced at the 5% significance level for most portfolios that display opaque characteristics such
as high variance, small capitalisation and low operating profit. For example, the coefficient
estimate of Sumt−1,∆Sent− for the high variance portfolio is 0.0177 with a t-statistic of 1.67
and the parameter estimate, β2,σhigh2 , for the quadratic term is 0.0048 with a t-statistic of
5.6 Empirical Results 131
2.20. Second, the signs for both consecutive sentiment decrease and the squared-term are
positive, indicating that in crisis, initial drops in investor sentiment decrease future returns
but further reductions of sentiment in later periods increase security returns. Intuitively,
when the market crashes into recession, the initial reduction of sentiment impels investors to
liquidate their assets to avoid further losses. Consequently, the intense selling pressure from
investors decreases future returns. Moreover, as the recession persists for an extended period,
investors who hold a belief that stock prices will soon bounce back to equilibrium start to
‘fish the bottom’, leading to an increase in stock returns.
Further, results in Table 5.6 show that the coefficient estimates of Sumt−1,∆Sent− and
CRISISt−1 are statistically significant for the low, not high, book-to-market ratio portfolio.
For example, β1,p and β2,p are 0.0165 (with a t-statistic of 1.84) and 0.0047 (with a t-statistic
of 2.54), respectively, for the low book-to-market ratio portfolio, indicating that both of these
variables are significant at the 5% level. However, the high book-to-market portfolio displays
insignificant coefficient estimates for these two variables. In contrast to the pattern observed
in bubbles, my result indicates that low book-to-market ratio portfolios are more prone to
sentiment drops in crises and recessions. Combining the patterns observed in book-to-market
portfolios from both Tables 5.5 and 5.6, the findings can be briefly summarised as that
undervalued stocks are more exposed to positive sentiment accumulation while the overvalued
suffer more from the sentiment risk in recessions. Also, these findings are closely aligned
with the mean-reverting property of stock prices, which expects the price of a stock to move
around its average value. When investors think that the current price is exorbitant and
market sentiment is low, they are more inclined to believe that stock prices will soon fall and
thus, they will liquidate their assets as quickly as possible. In contrast, in the high sentiment
regime, when a stock is perceived to be undervalued, investors will buy in cheap and wait for
appreciation to achieve higher future capital gains. In this sense, my results not only coexist
with extant literature but provide inferable information about the sentiment dynamics in
both bubbles and recessions, distinct from the impacts of sentiment levels.
Table 5.7 reports a new set of estimated results which accounts for the effect of the
level sentiment index. The results show that incorporating the variable of sentiment level
decreases both the magnitude and significance of the first-degree sentiment dynamics for all
portfolios. For example, the value of the coefficient estimate β1,OPLow for the low operating
profit portfolio drops to 0.0104 (with a t-statistic of 1.07) from its original 0.0163 (with a
t-statistic of 1.67) before including sentiment levels. Besides, the significance of the quadratic
term remains for all opaque portfolios. For instance, the parameter estimate β2,σ2high in
the high variance portfolio is 0.0045 with a t-statistic of 2.12, indicating that the coefficient
estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the variable of sentiment level
is also statistically significant across all opaque portfolios, with negative signs demonstrating
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Table 5.7 Relationships Between Future Excess Return, Negative Sentiment Dynamics
and Sentiment Levels
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pCRISISt−1,p+β3,pSentt−1+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios identified in the initial
column. Sumt−1,∆Sent− represents the sum of consecutive decrease in the orthogonalised sentiment
index, CRISISt−1,p is the squared-term of negative consecutive sentiment changes through month t
- 1 and Sentt−1 represents the level sentiment index during the period of t - 1. I also report the
associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. * and ** present the 95% and 99% significance
levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent− CRISISt−1,p Sentt−1 Adjusted R2
Market 0.0086* 0.0046 -0.0018 -0.0174* 0.0200
2.07 0.70 -1.37 -2.56
σ2low 0.0065** 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0086
3.20 0.05 -0.29 0.34
σ2high 0.0086 0.0115 0.0045* -0.0358** 0.0446
1.30 1.09 2.12 -3.29
σ2high−low -0.0013 0.0112 0.0047* -0.0375** 0.0697
-0.23 1.23 2.57 -3.99
Sizelow 0.0287** 0.0087 0.0031* -0.0206** 0.0305
6.08 1.16 2.04 -2.66
Sizehigh 0.0078* 0.0033 0.0009 -0.0145* 0.0154
2.21 0.60 0.82 -2.52
Sizehigh−low -0.0243** -0.0054 -0.0022* 0.0055 0.0096
-6.58 -0.93 -1.81 0.91
BE/MElow 0.0111 0.0108 0.0045* -0.0331** 0.0582
1.98 1.20 2.46 -3.59
BE/MEhigh 0.0337** 0.0061 0.0019 -0.0181* 0.0136
7.00 0.80 1.21 -2.29
BE/MEhigh−low 0.0191** -0.0048 -0.0025* 0.0145** 0.0531
6.12 -0.96 -2.54 2.82
OPlow 0.0093 0.0104 0.0041* -0.0338** 0.0453
1.53 1.07 2.08 -3.37
OPhigh 0.0094* 0.0029 0.0010 -0.0128 0.0030
2.17 0.42 0.72 -1.80
OPhigh−low -0.0033 -0.0076 -0.0031** 0.0204** 0.0664
-0.96 -1.41 -2.79 3.65
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that higher levels of investor sentiment result in lower future returns. Overall, my results in
Table 5.7 imply that in an episode of crisis or recession, the future excess return of a portfolio
is only associated with significant consecutive sentiment decreases and the current level of
investor sentiment.
5.6.3 Sentiment-Related Overvaluation and Price Corrections
This subsection examines the dynamic relationship between the magnitude of cumulative
sentiment changes and subsequent returns conditioning on the length of a positive or negative
sentiment episode. Statistically, conditioning on the length of a positive or negative sentiment
episode allows me to identify the impacts of sentiment dynamics at different stages of a
bubble or a crisis. I hypothesise that future excess returns are positively related to short- or
medium-term sentiment increases but negatively related to long-term sentiment increases. In
contrast, I hypothesise a negative relationship between future excess returns and short-term
sentiment drops but a positive relation for long-term sentiment reductions.
To test this hypothesis in a bubble episode, I specify the following model:
Rp,t = αp+β1p,ST I+ST,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent++β2p,MEDI
+
MED,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent++
β3p,LT I
+
LT,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent++β4p,SentSentt−1+ep,t
where all variables are as previously defined. In this specification, the parameter estimates
β1p,ST , β2p,MED, and β3p,LT describe the possible path dependence between sentiment and
returns for consecutive increases in sentiment over one-to-two, three-to-five, and six-or-more
months, respectively. The sentiment level variable, Sentt−1, is also included in the model to
differentiate the impact of sentiment levels and sentiment dynamics. I report the regression
results in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8 reveals the following patterns. First, for most opaque portfolios, subsequent
portfolio returns are significantly positive for medium-term sentiment increases. In particular,
the parameter estimates β2p,MED for the high risk, small size, high book-to-market ratio
and low operating profit portfolios are all positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level. This finding aligns with my prediction that a three-to-five month increase in investor
sentiment results in excessive subsequent returns. However, my results demonstrate that
short-term sentiment dynamics provide no signals to investors, as none of β1p,ST s are statisti-
cally significant. For example, the parameter estimate β1p,ST in the high variance portfolio
is 0.0056 with a t-statistic of 0.77, which suggests that I cannot reject the null hypothesis.
This pattern can be explained by investors relative risk aversion to uncertainties. Specifically,
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Table 5.8 Short-, Medium- and Long-dynamics and Subsequent Returns - Positive Senti-
ment Dynamics
I report the coefficient estimates for the positive short, medium and long dynamics from the following
regression:
Rp,t= α0+β1,pI+ST,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent++β2,pI
+
MED,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent++β3,pI
+
LT,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent+
+β4,pSentt−1+ep,t
where Rp,t is the excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios identified in the initial
column. Indicator variables I+ST,t−1, I
+
MED,t−1 , and I
+
LT,t−1 take the value of one following
one-to-two, three-to-five, or six-or-more consecutive increases in sentiment, respectively, and take the
value of zero otherwise. Sumt−1,∆Sent+ is the sum of consecutive increases in the orthogonalised BW
sentiment index through month t−1, and Sentt−1 is the BW orthogonalised sentiment level index. I
also report the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. ∗ and ∗∗ present the 95% and 99%
significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio α0 β1,p β2,p β3,p β4,p Adjusted R2
Market 0.0059 0.0023 0.0075 0.0028 -0.0149* 0.0132
1.48 0.51 1.43 0.41 -2.27
σ2low 0.0055** -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0072* 0.0006 0.0049
2.86 -0.37 0.29 -2.24 0.17
σ2high 0.0030 0.0056 0.0143* -0.0055* -0.0301** 0.0271
0.47 0.77 1.70 -2.52 -2.86
σ2high−low -0.0058 0.0064 0.0138 -0.0018 -0.0310** 0.0417
-1.05 1.01 1.89 -0.20 -3.39
Sizelow 0.0224** 0.0051 0.0148* -0.0072** -0.0171* 0.0303
4.98 0.99 2.50 -1.95 -2.29
Sizehigh 0.0060* 0.0020 0.0015 0.0029 -0.0145** 0.0111
1.78 0.51 0.33 0.49 -2.61
Sizehigh−low -0.0197** -0.0032 -0.0131** -0.0045 0.0022 0.0164
-5.63 -0.78 -2.84 -0.77 0.37
BE/MElow 0.0085 0.0040 0.0081 -0.0006 -0.0274** 0.0245
1.55 0.63 1.13 -0.07 -3.04
BE/MEhigh 0.0262** 0.0055 0.0164** -0.0112 -0.0164* 0.0361
5.77 1.05 2.74 -1.68 -2.18
BE/MEhigh−low 0.0144* 0.0015 0.0085* 0.0118* 0.0107** 0.0327
4.77 0.44 2.14 2.33 2.14
OPlow 0.0041 0.0050 0.0138 -0.0055* -0.0286** 0.0299
0.69 0.74 1.79 -2.05 -2.94
OPhigh 0.0072 0.0016 0.0057 0.0019 -0.0116* 0.0009
1.73 0.33 1.05 0.27 -1.69
OPhigh−low -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0079* -0.0037 0.0166** 0.0325
-0.05 -0.89 -1.81 -0.66 3.04
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since the onset of a bubble is normally difficult to discern, the short-term positive sentiment
increase is not necessarily an indicator for a bubble to most investors. In addition, investors
require a longer period of time to confirm that the current market prosperity is not temporary,
and thus, they tend to ‘hold’ until they believe their investment is ‘safe’. Therefore, in
contrast to medium-term sentiment increases, short-term consecutive increases in sentiment
only insignificantly predict future excess returns.
Moreover, the long-run parameter acts as a reliable contrarian indicator to subsequent
returns. Consider the parameter estimates β3p,LT for portfolios with high variance, small
size, high book-to-market ratio or low operating profit portfolios, I find that all β3p,LT are
significantly negative at the 10% significance level. For example, β3p,LT of the high variance
portfolio is -0.0055 with a t-statistic of -2.52. Such parameter estimates for long-term sen-
timent dynamics can be interpreted as the ultimate mispricing correction in late periods
of bubble episodes. In contrast, the coefficient estimates in less opaque portfolios indicate
insignificant relationships between sentiment dynamics and future excess returns. Hence, my
results imply that high variance, small size, high book-to-market ratio or low operating profit
portfolios are more susceptible to investor sentiment, especially during bubbles, exhibiting
the greatest mispricing in the periods of moderate increases in sentiment, followed by large
corrections caused by a persistent accumulation of investor sentiment.
Last, Table 5.8 shows that the sentiment level in the previous period also explains a
proportion of future portfolio returns. Specifically, I find that the coefficient estimates of the
level index of sentiment are significantly negative across almost all portfolios. For example,
the parameter estimates β4p in the low and high-profitability portfolios are -0.0286 (with a
t-statistic of -2.94) and -0.0116 (with a t-statistic of -1.69), respectively. This result implies
that higher levels of investor sentiment generate negative future returns in general, which is
consistent with most sentiment-related studies (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Berger and Turtle,
2012; Neal and Wheatley, 1998).
Next, I examine the dynamic relationship between the magnitude of the cumulative
sentiment change and subsequent returns conditioning on the length of negative sentiment
episode. To capture the path-dependent dynamics in a crisis or recession episode, I estimate
the following regression:
Rp,t = αp+β1p,ST I−ST,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2p,MEDI
−
MED,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p+
β3p,LT I
−
LT,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p+ep,t
where I−ST,t−1, I
−
MED,t−1 and I
−
LT,t−1 represent the indicators for short-, median- and long-
term consecutive decreases in investor sentiment, respectively. The results of the coefficient
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estimates are reported in Table 5.9.
Differing from the patterns observed in bubbles, results in Table 5.9 reveal that subsequent
stock returns of opaque portfolios are negatively related to short-term sentiment decreases,
rather than those in the medium-term. For example, the parameter estimate β1p in the small
size portfolio is -0.1087 with a t-statistic of -1.68 and -0.0182 with a t-statistic of -2.04 in
the portfolio with low profitability. The sign of the coefficient estimate indicates that future
excess returns decrease as short-term investment sentiment drops. This pattern reflects
investors’ strong aversion to potential losses in a crisis episode; in particular, when investors
expect the market to fall soon, they tend to close their position or liquidate their assets as
soon as possible to avoid further losses. Moreover, the effect of the medium-term decreases of
sentiment is only significant for long-short portfolios. For instance, the parameter estimate
β2p for the long-short portfolio of size (large minus small) equals 0.0056 with a t-statistic of
1.88. Long-term consecutive sentiment decrease shows little effect on future excess returns,
as the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant in any case. However, it can be
observed that the sign of the coefficient estimate for long-term sentiment drops is negative,
indicating that a decrease of sentiment in the long run, in fact, increases future returns, which
is consistent with my prediction. These insignificant results may be caused by the lack of
data points, as there are only one or two episodes of long-term consecutive sentiment decrease.
Further, the impact of level index of sentiment on future excess returns is also statistically
significant across nearly all portfolios, but the effect is more prominent on returns of opaque
portfolios. For example, the parameter estimates β4p for the low- and high-profitability
portfolios are -0.0353 (with a t-statistic of -3.49) and -0.0133 (with a t-statistic of -1.87),
respectively. Hence, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate in the low-profitability portfolio
is twice as large as that of the high-profitability portfolio. Moreover, the sign for the coefficient
estimates of sentiment levels is consistently negative across all portfolios, which indicates
that higher levels of sentiment result in lower future returns.
Therefore, to summarise the findings in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, I find that in a bubble episode,
future returns of opaque portfolios positively react to medium-term consecutive increases of
sentiment but are negatively correlated with a longer-term accumulation of sentiment. This
pattern confirms my prediction of building overvaluation followed by an ultimate mispricing
correction. The economic intuition behind this finding is that investors usually underreact to
good news in the first place, but overreact when they confirm the news is ‘safe’ for investment.
Also, this pattern explains why short-term sentiment dynamics have little impact on future
returns, as short-term consecutive sentiment increases are not sufficient for investors to
confirm a bullish market, and thus, they tend to ‘hold’ for a longer period, until they believe
the current appreciation is not temporary. However, observing a persistent increase in the
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Table 5.9 Short-, Medium- and Long-dynamics and Subsequent Returns - Negative Sen-
timent Dynamics
I report the coefficient estimates for the negative short, medium and long dynamics from the following
regression:
Rp,t= α0+β1,pI−ST,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pI
−
MED,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β3,pI
−
LT,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p
+β4,pSentt−1+ep,t
where Rp,t is the excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios identified in the initial
column. Indicator variables I−ST,t−1, I
−
MED,t−1 , and I
−
LT,t−1 take the value of one following
one-to-two, three-to-five, or six-or-more consecutive decreases in sentiment, respectively, and take the
value of zero otherwise. Sumt−1,∆Sent− is the sum of the consecutive decreases in the orthogonalised
sentiment index through month t− 1, and Sentt−1 is the orthogonalised sentiment level index. I
also report the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. ∗ and ∗∗ present the 95% and 99%
significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio α0 β1,p β2,p β3,p β4,p Adjusted R2
Market 0.0054 0.0105 -0.0017 -0.0047 -0.0181** 0.0168
1.39 -1.74 -0.51 -0.61 -2.66
σ2low 0.0066** 0.0004 0.0012 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0121
3.44 0.12 0.74 0.11 0.35
σ2high 0.0019 0.0197* -0.0063 -0.0060 -0.0373** 0.0323
0.29 -2.04 -1.17 -0.48 -3.41
σ2high−low 0.0081 0.0182* -0.0079 -0.0056 -0.0391** 0.0519
-1.49 -2.40 -1.69 -0.52 -4.12
Sizelow 0.0243** 0.0109 -0.0041 -0.0021 -0.0216** 0.0164
5.42 -1.68 -1.06 -0.24 -2.77
Sizehigh 0.0056 0.0071 0.0019 -0.0092 -.0148** 0.0260
1.71 -1.39 0.68 -1.41 -2.58
Sizehigh−low -0.0220** -0.0037 0.0056 -0.0064 0.0062 0.0043
-6.32 0.70 1.88 -0.92 1.02
BE/MElow 0.0045 0.0198* -0.0067 -0.0072 -.0347** 0.0427
0.84 -2.40 -1.45 -0.68 -3.72
BE/MEhigh 0.0305** .0292* -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0188* 0.0099
6.70 -2.31 -0.14 -0.24 -2.38
BE/MEhigh−low 0.0226** 0.0106* 0.0057* 0.0057 0.0152** 0.0316
7.57 2.29 2.24 0.97 2.93
OPlow 0.0032 0.0182* -0.0057 -0.0044 -0.0353** 0.0339
0.55 -2.04 -1.15 -0.38 -3.49
OPhigh 0.0072 0.0087 0.0070 -0.0059 -0.0133* 0.0058
1.75 -1.38 0.20 -0.73 -1.87
OPhigh−low 0.0006 -0.0094 0.0060* -0.0008 0.0214** 0.0432
0.18 1.88 2.16 -0.12 3.77
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market for a longer period provides risk-averse investors a piece of information that a ‘bubble’
is on its way to bursting. Hence, once these investors observe a signal to sell, they liqui-
date their assets rapidly, leading to high selling pressure, which, in turn, reduces future returns.
In an episode of crisis, future excess returns are positively correlated with short-term
drops in sentiment (though not medium-term), which reflects investors’ strong aversion to
potential future losses. However, the sign of the long-term consecutive sentiment drops shows
that an over six-month decrease in sentiment increases future returns. Intuitively, when a
crisis and ensuing recession last for more than six months, investors who believe the market
will soon recover, and thus the price of a stock will bounce back to its equilibrium tend to
‘fish the bottom’, resulting in higher buying pressure. Hence, the trading behaviour of these
investors pushes up stock prices and generates positive stock returns. My results indicate
that the impact of investor sentiment in a bubble or crisis episode should be treated as a
path-dependent, rather than as a simple contrarian indicator to subsequent returns.
5.6.4 Sentiment Dynamics in the Markov-Regime Switching Model
Although the empirical results in the preceding subsection provide inferable suggestions on
the role of investor sentiment in bubbles and crises, it provides no discussion on the real
bubble or crisis cases. In this subsection, I select another dynamic framework, the Markov
regime-switching model, to analyse real financial cases.
In essence, the Markov regime-switching model involves multiple structures (equations)
that characterise the time series behaviours in different regimes. By permitting switching
between these structures, this model can capture more complex dynamic patterns. In the
context of my research, I am interested in exploring the sentiment dynamics in different
regimes of a bubble or crisis.
I apply this framework to real financial cases of bubbles and crises, including the 1990s
High-Tech Bubble and the 2007 Global Finance Crisis, to achieve implications for real financial
events. The empirical results obtained from the path-dependent dynamics indicate investor
sentiment behaves quite differently in the episodes with positive and negative consecutive
sentiment changes; hence, it might be advantageous to further investigate the role of investor
sentiment in real financial events via the Markov regime-switching model.
I select a three-state baseline to identify a Markov regime-switching framework. In
particular, the sample is partitioned into three states, low (State 1), medium (State 2) and
high (State 3). Also, I assume that in different episodes of bubbles and crises, both mean
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Table 5.10 Regression of Market returns on investor sentiment in different stages – the
1999 High-Tech Bubble and the 2007 Global Financial Crisis
This table reports the coefficient estimate of investor sentiment at different stages
from the following regression for the High-Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis
Rt = α0 + θ2RMt−1 + θ2,StSentt−1 + ϵp,t where RMt−1 and Sentt−1 represent previous month
market risk premium and previous month investor sentiment, respectively. θ2 is a time-invariant
coefficient for the market risk premium while θ2,St is the time-varying coefficient for investor
sentiment at each state St. In addition, Σ is the total standard deviation of market excess returns
in that state. Prij is the probability that the market moves to state j conditioning on the current state i.
High-Tech Bubble GFC
1993m2 - 2002m10 2003m2 - 2010m8
RMt−1 0.06 0.26**
0.53 2.58
State 1
Sentimentt−1 0.04** -0.04**
2.33 -3.16
Σ (%) 2.37 2.87
Pr11 0.23 0.36
Pr12 0.10 0.00
State 2
Sentimentt−1 -0.03** -0.12**
-4.02 -2.11
Σ (%) 2.70 3.40
Pr21 0.53 0.00
Pr22 0.07 0.98
State 3
Sentimentt−1 -0.06** -0.14**
-4.35 -3.70
Σ (%) 6.09 4.13
Pr31 0.31 0.42
Pr32 0.12 0.03
and variance change across states and each state indicates a regime with a certain level of
averaged market volatility and averaged returns. Moreover, I assume that the market risk
factor in the previous period imposes a constant impact on current excess returns, and thus,
it is treated as a state-invariant control variable. In contrast, investor sentiment is considered
a state-variant variable as I predict that investor sentiment has different impacts across stages.
Hence, my model is specified as:
Rt = α0+θ2RMt−1+θ2,StSentt−1+ ϵp,t
where Rt is the market excess return at month t, RMt−1 and Sentt−1 represent the
market risk factor and the level sentiment index in the previous month, respectively. θ1
indicates the state-invariant coefficient for the past market return premium while θ2,St refers
to a state-variant coefficient for investor sentiment.
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Table 5.10 reports the estimate results for the relationship between sentiment and sub-
sequent returns in different regimes for the 1999 High-Tech Bubble and the 2007 Global
Financial Crisis. The sample period for the High-Tech Bubble spans February 1993 – March
2002, and the Global Financial Crisis spans January 2003 – December 2010.10 As previously
described, the market risk premium in previous month RMt−1 is a time-invariant variable
while Sentt−1 varies across states. The first column indicates the state in which the re-
lationship is examined, and the third and fourth columns list the estimate results for each state.
Table 5.10 shows that for both the High-Tech Bubble and Global Financial Crisis, investor
sentiment produces negative future excess returns in periods with relatively high volatility.
For example, during the High-Tech Bubble, State 3 has overall volatility of 6.09% and
coefficient estimate for past sentiment of -0.0566 with a t-statistic of -4.35, indicating that a
unit increase in investor sentiment decreases future returns by approximately 5.66%. However,
the averaged market volatility of State 1 drops to only 2.37%, indicating a relatively stable
period. Within this stage, the impact of investor sentiment is significantly positive at the
1% level, with a value of 0.0362. This pattern demonstrates that higher investor sentiment
produces positive future returns in stable periods but negative subsequent returns under
extremely volatile market conditions.
In regards to the results for the Global Financial Crisis, Table 5.12 shows that investor
sentiment persistently produces negative subsequent returns across all three states. For
example, the coefficient estimate of investor sentiment equals -4.49% (with a t-statistic
of -3.16) in State 1 and further reduces to -13.57% (with a t-statistic of -3.70) in State 3.
Interestingly, it can be observed that there is no significant difference in the averaged volatility
across the three states in the Global Financial Crisis. To be specific, the difference of the
averaged volatility between stable (State 1) and extremely volatile (State 3) periods in the
Global Financial Crisis is only 1.26% (2.87% in State 1 and 4.13% in State 3). This difference,
however, increases to 3.72% in the High-Tech Bubble (2.37% in State 1 and 6.09% in State
3), approximately three times larger than the volatility difference in the Global Financial
Crisis. This pattern indicates that the Global Financial Crisis exhibits consistently high
volatility across all states while the High-Tech Bubble presents more substantial variations in
volatility between states. Hence, these patterns confirm my prediction that investor sentiment
generates negative returns during high volatility periods. Moreover, the magnitude of the
coefficient estimates for investor sentiment reveals that investor sentiment has a stronger
impact during the Global Financial Crisis than the High-Tech Bubble. For example, the
coefficient estimates of investor sentiment in State 3 in the High-Tech Bubble and Global
Financial Crisis are -0.0566 and -0.1357, respectively, indicating that a unit increase in
10The selection of the sample period for these two events was based on the timeline of each of the
events (Tables 5.13 and 5.14), as elaborated in the following subsections.
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investor sentiment causes an approximate 13.57% reduction in market returns in extremely
volatile periods during the Global Financial Crisis but only generates a 5.66% decrease in
the High-Tech Bubble.
Next, I further investigate if this relationship holds when the tested sample period expands
to the entire sample. Hence, I apply the Markov regime-switching framework to the whole
sample period, which covers January 1987 – December 2010. Table 5.11 reports the results
of the coefficient estimates for both equally and value-weighted market indexes.
Table 5.11 Relationship Between Investor Sentiment and Market Returns at Different
States - Whole Sample
This table reports the coefficient estimate of investor sentiment at different stages from the following
regression for the whole sample: Rt = α0+θ2RMt−1+θ2,StSentt−1+ ϵp,t where RMt−1 and Sentt−1
represent previous month market risk premium and previous month investor sentiment, respectively.
θ2 is a time-invariant coefficient for the market risk premium while θ2,St is the time-varying coefficient
for investor sentiment at each state St. In addition, Σ is the total standard deviation of market excess
returns in that state. Prij is the probability that the market moves to state j conditioning on the
current state i.
Equally-Weighted Value-Weighted
RMt−1 0.2680** 0.1695**
5.09 2.55
State 1
Sentimentt−1 0.02 -0.03
1.38 -1.40
Σ 1.02 0.39
Pr11 0.04 0.35
Pr12 0.77 0.09
State 2
Sentimentt−1 -0.00 -0.02
-0.1 -1.60
Σ (%) 2.24 0.95
Pr21 0.26 0.41
Pr22 0.73 0.59
State 3
Sentimentt−1 -0.01 0.01
-1.57 1.36
Σ 3.28 2.95
Pr31 0.00 0.63
Pr32 0.00 0.04
The estimated results of Table 5.11 suggest that when expanding to the whole sample
period, the role of investor sentiment becomes less influential across all three states. For
instance, the t-statistics of parameter estimates for investor sentiment in State 3 for the
equally and value-weighted indexes are -1.57 and 1.36, respectively, far below the critical
value for the 10% significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected according
to the t-statistics. Further, although the coefficient estimates are not necessarily significant,
142
Investment Sentiment and Market Instability: An Investigation into Financial Bubbles
and Crises
the signs of the coefficient estimates show that investor sentiment produces positive returns
in stable periods but reduces future returns in extremely volatile periods. For example, the
coefficient estimate of investor sentiment in state 1 is 0.2188 but falls to -0.0149 in state 3 for
the equally-weighted index. Hence, while this pattern confirms that higher investor sentiment
predicts lower future returns under extremely volatile market conditions, it also indicates
that the effect significantly diminishes through the whole sample period.
5.6.5 Contemporaneous Interdependence between Sentiment
and Market Returns in Bubbles and Recessions
In extension to my preceding analyses regarding the predictive power of investor sentiment on
future returns during bubbles and recessions, the following empirical tests aim at addressing
the inverse and contemporaneous relationship between investor sentiment and market returns;
in other words, I attempt to explore if shocks to market returns can also affect the formation
of investor sentiment.
To examine the contemporaneous relationship between sentiment and market returns,
I perform a series of SVAR analyses. The tests are performed on the basis of both the
1999 High-Tech Bubble and the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. Besides, I further split each
event into two stages, bubble and crisis, based on the proposition of Minsky (1992) of the
five-stage credit cycle, as well as the timeline of each event described below. In brief, the stage
‘bubble’ reflects periods in which the market performs well and attracts more investment and
speculative activities, while ‘crisis’ indicates periods in which the market falls into recession.
Table 5.12 summarises the key features of each stage.
Table 5.12 Breakdown of the Bubble/Crisis and the Feature of Each Stage
Stage Name Feature
1 Bubble The high-performing market attracts investors to invest and accelerates speculation activities;
stock prices rise because of the high purchasing pressure from investors
2 Crisis The bubble bursts and the market crashes;
stock prices fall because of the high selling pressure from investors.
Background and Timeline for the High-Tech Bubble and Global Financial
Crisis
Following a five-stage credit cycle suggested by Minsky (1992), which portrays the relationship
between financial instability and the economy, I construct two timelines for both the High-
Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis, to identify different economic stages within
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each event. In essence, the pattern of a bubble is consistent with a credit cycle, despite
variations in how the cycle is interpreted. The five stages are described as:
1. Displacement: Investors start to realise the introduction or development of some
new product, technology or other innovation. These innovations attract considerable
attention from investors and encourage them to invest.
2. Boom: Stock prices of these firms start to rise, sending investors a sound signal of
potential growth, and then create momentum in stock prices as more investors enter
the market. In addition, there is an overall sense of fear of failing to jump in, causing
even more people to start buying assets.
3. Euphoria: Investors experience euphoria from rising prices, and thus more investment
is conducted and asset prices skyrocket, with little caution about the bubble.
4. Profit taking: It is difficult to predict when the bubble will burst but those who ‘see’
a signal chooses to close off his or her position by selling off assets.
5. Panic: The strong selling pressure from the fourth stage drives down prices rapidly,
leading to a slump. Investors and others move to liquidate, at any price.
On the basis of this five-stage framework, I examine each event and pick out several
important issues through the event to demonstrate the progression of the High-Tech Bubble
and the Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, I re-structure the five-stage model to a simpler
two-stage framework, by combining the stages of Displacement, Boom and Euphoria into one
stage, termed ‘bubble’, within which investors push up stock prices and inflate the bubble.
In addition, I combine the stages Profit taking and Panic to represent a period of ‘crisis’.
Moreover, within each table, I also sort these events into my two-phase framework for both
the High-Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis.
In a general sense, the 1999 High-Tech Bubble was triggered by excessive speculation
in technology securities in the US stock market. In particular, the booming of internet
technology encouraged aggressive speculation and investment in internet-based companies.
Rapidly increasing stock prices in the high-technology sector, together with the overconfidence
towards the economy, lured enormous speculations and ultimately led to the stock market
bubble. Table 5.13 lists the critical issues throughout the High-Tech Bubble, which help to
identify the stages of the bubble.
Therefore, in the following empirical analyses, the bubble stage of the 1999 High-Tech
Bubble starts from February 1993 and ends in March 2000, while the crisis stage covers the
11Telecommunications Act of 1996, Title 3, sec. 301.
12Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub.L. 105–34.
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Table 5.13 Timeline for the 1999 High-Tech Bubble
Date Critical Events Stage
1993m2 Mosaic web browser makes it easier for people to access worldwide websites.
Stage 1
1996m2 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was officially signed into law by President Clinton, with a goal
to ‘let anyone enter any communications business’11
1997m8 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 relaxed the marginal capital gains tax, attracting more speculative activities.12
2000m3 The Nasdaq Composite Stock Market Index reached a peak of over 5,000 points relative to its original
level of under 1,000 in 1995.
2000m4 The Nasdaq Composite Stock Market Index dropped by 25% within one week.
Stage 22001m9 The 9.11 Terrorist Attack accelerated the market drop.
2002m10 The Nasdaq Composite Stock Market Index dropped to 1,114 points.
period from April 2000 to October 2010.
The 2007 Global Financial Crisis is considered as the most influential crisis since the
Great Depression by many economists (Eigner and Umlauft, 2014; Temin, 2010). Unlike the
1990s High-Tech Bubble, this crisis did not originate in the US stock market. Instead, it is
considered as an economy-wide crisis originating from the US subprime mortgage market. In
particular, the crisis was directly triggered by the high default rate in the subprime mortgage
sector in the US between 2007 and 2008. The booming of the US subprime mortgage
market in the early 2000s encouraged an enormous amount of borrowing for the housing
market, pushing up house prices. As housing prices declined, however, large banks that
had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime instruments reported significant losses. The
bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble quickly dried up the liquidity of the financial
sector, leading to the banking crisis. Table 5.12 reports the critical issues throughout the crisis.
Table 5.14 Timeline for the 2007 Global Financial Crisis
Date Critical Events Stage
2003m2 The mortgage standard is relaxed because of the shift of market power from securitisers to originators
Stage 1
as well as the more intense competition among private securitisers.
2005m8 The Community Reinvestment Act encourages banks to issue mortgage loans to higher risk borrowers.
2006m12 The US housing bubble reaches its peak at the end of 2006. 13
2007m7 House prices start to fall and the subprime mortgage market collapses.
2008m9 The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and failure of other financial institutions indicate that the banking
Stage 2crisis is reaching its peak. The economy falls into recession.
2009m2 - 2010m7 A series of Acts is signed by the US President to facilitate the recovery of the economy.14
The bubble stage of the Global Financial Crisis covers the period February 2003 – July
2007, while the ensuing crisis stage begins in August 2007 and ends in August 2010.
13Sources: ’Quarterly Homeownership Rates and Seasonally Adjusted Homeownership Rates for the
United States: 1997–2014’, from the US Census.
14The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was signed in February 2009, the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 was signed in May 2009 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 was enacted in July 2010. All these acts are signed to
facilitate financial stability.
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Table 5.15 The Augmented Dickey–Fuller Unit Root Test For Time Series in the Sample
Period of the High-Tech Bubble
This table reports the results of the Augmented Dickey–Fuller Unit Root Test for a set of time series
at both bubble and crisis stages of the High-Tech Bubble. The time series include the equally-weighted
market index, value-weighted index, logarithm of the equally-weighted market index, logarithm of the
value-weighted market index, short-term interest rate and investor sentiment. In addition, D represents
the order of differencing for each time series. For example, D = 1 displays the time series of the
first differences of the original time series. I also report the p-values and stationarity of each time series.
Bubble (1993m2 - 2000m3) Crisis (2000m4 - 2002m10)
Variables D Test Statistics P-Value Stationarity Test Statistics P-Value Stationarity
Equally-weighted Index 0 1.14 1.00 Non-Stationary -2.80 0.06 Non-Stationary1 -6.97 0.00 Stationary -5.24 0.00 Stationary
Value-weighted Index 0 1.42 1.00 Non-Stationary -1.18 0.68 Non-Stationary1 -9.36 0.00 Stationary -6.31 0.00 Stationary
log(equally-weighted Index) 0 0.11 0.97 Non-Stationary -2.76 0.06 Non-Stationary1 -7.52 0.00 Stationary -5.30 0.00 Stationary
log(Value-weighted Index) 0 0.51 0.99 Non-Stationary -0.93 0.78 Non-Stationary1 -9.62 0.00 Stationary -6.11 0.00 Stationary
Short-term Rate 0 -3.00 0.04 Non-Stationary -0.74 0.84 Non-Stationary1 -15.04 0.00 Stationary -7.48 0.00 Stationary
Investor Sentiment 0 -0.71 0.84 Non-Stationary -0.15 0.94 Non-Stationary1 -8.42 0.00 Stationary -5.19 0.00 Stationary
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit-Root Test and Optimal Lags
Before performing the structural VAR analyses, I conduct a series of tests to ensure my
results are valid and efficient. I first examine the stationarity of my time series by apply-
ing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for each subsample period. The purpose of
this test is to remove any potential biases caused by heteroscedasticity and spurious regression.
Table 5.15 and 5.16 report the results of the ADF unit root tests for several time-series
variables, including the equally-weighted index, the value-weighted index, the logarithm
of the equally-weighted index, the logarithm of the value-weighted index, the short-term
rate and investor sentiment during the High-Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis,
respectively. Both tables also report the test statistics of both the bubble and crisis stages,
as previously clarified. For each variable, I test the stationarity of the raw index and the
first difference (D) of each time series. Results from Tables 5.15 and 5.16 show that all
index-level time series have p-values greater than 1%, implying that the null hypothesis of
unit roots cannot be rejected. For example, for the High-Tech Bubble, the test statistics of
the equally-weighted index in the bubble stage equals 1.14 with a p-value of 1.00. As the
p-value is too large to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk process, the time series of
the equally-weighted index is not stationary at this stage. However, after taking the first
difference of each time series, my results show that all variables are significantly stationary
at the 1% level. Therefore, I select the geometric returns of the market index, measured as
the first difference of the logarithm of the market index, changes in the short-term rate and
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Table 5.16 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test For Time Series Within the
Sample Period of the Global Financial Crisis
This table reports the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for a set of time-series
variables at both the bubble and crisis stage in the Global Financial Crisis. The time-series variables
include the equally-weighted market index, value-weighted index, logarithm of the equally-weighted
market index, logarithm of the value-weighted market index, the short-term interest rate and investor
sentiment. In addition, D represents the order of differencing for each time series. For example, D = 1
displays the time series of the first differences of the original time series. I also report p-values and
stationarity of each time series.
Bubble (2003m2 - 2007m7) Crisis (2007m8 - 2010m8)
Variables D Test Statistics P-Value Stationarity Test Statistics P-Value Stationarity
Equally-weighted Index 0 -1.81 0.37 Non-Stationary -1.25 0.65 Non-Stationary1 -5.50 0.00 Stationary -4.23 0.00 Stationary
Value-weighted Index 0 -1.01 0.75 Non-Stationary -1.35 0.61 Non-Stationary1 -6.47 0.00 Stationary -4.41 0.00 Stationary
log(equally-weighted Index) 0 -3.10 0.03 Non-Stationary -1.21 0.67 Non-Stationary1 -4.89 0.00 Stationary -3.90 0.00 Stationary
log(Value-weighted Index) 0 -1.90 0.33 Non-Stationary -1.34 0.61 Non-Stationary1 -6.35 0.00 Stationary -4.25 0.00 Stationary
Short-term Rate 0 -0.40 0.91 Non-Stationary -2.70 0.07 Non-Stationary1 -10.84 0.00 Stationary -5.51 0.00 Stationary
Investor Sentiment 0 -1.46 0.56 Non-Stationary -2.11 0.24 Non-Stationary1 -7.62 0.00 Stationary -6.62 0.00 Stationary
changes in investor sentiment as my target variables.
The following test determines the optimal number of lags of each variable to be incor-
porated in the SVAR framework at different stages. The information criterion for choosing
the optimal number of lags includes the final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information
criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), the Hannan and Quinn
information criterion (HQIC) as well as a sequence of likelihood ratio (LR) tests. Given the
limited subsample periods at each stage, the maximum number of lags for each stage was set
to four. The results of the information criterion for each stage are reported in Table 5.18.
Table 5.18 reveals that the optimal number of lags for the bubble and crisis stages in the
High-Tech Bubble are 1 and 3, respectively. For example, the information criterion of LR,
FPE, AIC and HQIC all suggest an optimal lag of one during the period between February
1993 and March 2000. However, the optimal number of lags for the Global Financial Crisis is
debatable as the information criteria offer different recommendations. For example, for the
stage of the bubble in the Global Financial Crisis, FPE and AIC suggest an optimal number
of lags of 1, whereas HQIC and SBIC both selected a model with zero lags.15 Following the
15I also perform the tests following the identification of information criteria introduced by Lütkepohl
(2005), which differ slightly from the standard definitions of the original version in that the constant
term is removed from the calculation process of log likelihood; the recommended number of optimal
lags for the two stages in the Global Financial Crisis remains unchanged.
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Table 5.17 Information Criteria for Selecting the Optimal Number of Lags
This table reports a set of information criteria for selecting the optimal number of lags at each stage
of the High-Tech Bubble and the GFC. The information criteria include the final prediction error
(FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), the
Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) as well as a sequence of likelihood ratio (LR) test.
An * indicates the suggested optimal lag under this criterion.
Lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
Panel A: The High-Tech Bubble
Stage 1: Bubble (1993m2 - 2000m3)
0 38.7547 0.0015 -0.8082 -0.7623 -0.6941*
1 45.6080 13.7070* 4 0.01 0.0014* -0.8746* -0.7827* -0.6463
2 48.0434 4.8708 4 0.30 0.0015 -0.8382 -0.7004 -0.4958
3 49.1286 2.1704 4 0.70 0.0016 -0.7704 -0.5867 -0.3138
4 50.2644 2.2716 4 0.69 0.0017 -0.7038 -0.4741 -0.1330
Stage 2: Crisis (2000m4 - 2002m3)
0 -12.0320 0.0131 1.3360 1.3881 1.5323*
1 -10.0429 3.9783 4 0.41 0.0155 1.5036 1.6078 1.8963
2 -2.9678 14.1500 4 0.01 0.0122 1.2473 1.4036 1.8364
3 4.5910 15.1180* 4 0.00 0.0094* 0.9507* 1.1591* 1.7361
4 7.5812 5.9803 4 0.20 0.0107 1.0349 1.2954 2.0166
Panel B: The GFC
Stage 1: Bubble (2003m2 - 2007m7)
0 53.3274 0.0006 -1.7937 -1.7373* -1.6477*
1 57.5894 8.5241 4 0.07 0.0006* -1.8033* -1.6903 -1.5113
2 59.8246 4.4705 4 0.35 0.0006 -1.7391 -1.5697 -1.3011
3 61.8734 4.0975 4 0.39 0.0006 -1.6681 -1.4423 -1.0842
4 64.8237 5.9006 4 0.21 0.0068 -1.6300 -1.3477 -0.9000
Stage 2: Crisis (2007m8 - 2010m8)
0 -14.6837 0.0094* 1.0099 1.0713* 1.1841*
1 -10.6730 8.0213 4 0.09 0.0094 1.0094* 1.1322 1.3577
2 -8.0774 5.1912 4 0.27 0.0102 1.0853 1.2695 1.6077
3 -3.8320 8.4908 4 0.08 0.0101 1.0720 1.3176 1.7686
4 -2.4687 2.7267 4 0.61 0.0119 1.2145 1.5215 2.0853
Criterion ’LL’ refers to the log likelihood.
’df’ indicates the degree of freedom and p is the p-value.
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information criterion of FPE and AIC, I select a model with one lag in the bubble stage of
the Global Financial Crisis, while in the second stage, the optimal number of lags is selected
to be zero.
Identification and Short-term Constraints of SVAR
As previously defined, constructing a SVAR framework requires the placement of n2+n×
(n−1)/2 constraints, where n represents the number of variables. Since I have three variables
(market returns, short-term rates and investor sentiment), the total restrictions required
for both matrices A and B is 12. On the basis of the fundamental assumptions, I set the
following short-run constraints on both matrices A and B:
1. Since the short-term rate is always controlled by the Reserve, shocks to stock market
returns or investor sentiment should have no any direct influence on the short-term
rate.
2. Changes in investor sentiment have no contemporaneous effects on the current geometric
market returns.16
3. Current geometric market returns are affected by variations in short-term rates, as the
short-term rate acts as a signal to investors about the economy.
4. Both short-term rates and current market returns contemporaneously affect the forma-
tion of investor sentiment in the short run.
5. The error terms of these variables are not correlated.
Based on these assumptions, matrices A and B can be written as the following, where
A21, A31 and A32 represent the coefficient estimates for the contemporaneous effect and B11,
B22 and B33 are the coefficient estimates for structural shocks to changes in short-term rates,
geometric market returns and changes in investor sentiment, respectively:
A=

1 0 0
A21 1 0
A31 A32 1

B=

B11 0 0
0 B22 0
0 0 B33

16Since changes in investor sentiment can only be realised at the end of each period, I assume that
it has no direct effect on current geometric returns.
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Empirical Results
Table 5.18 reports the contemporaneous relationship among sentiment, market returns and
short-term rates during the High-Tech Bubble in the 1990s. Panels A and B report the
coefficient estimates in the bubble and crisis stage, respectively.
Intuitively, investors collect all available information in the market to form their valua-
tions. When access to other sources of information is limited, investors place valuations of an
asset solely based on market prices or simply follow the market trend. Previous literature
indicates that investors exhibit strong herding behaviour during market bubbles and crises
(Bhattacharya and Yu, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2001; Dass et al., 2008; Devenow and Welch,
1996). Besides, investors also misbehave in response to different types of market information.
For example, Barberis et al. (1998) found that stock prices reflect investors’ underreaction
to news such as earnings announcements and overreaction to a series of good or bad news.
Brown et al. (1988) showed that investors overreact to news following dramatic financial
events; more importantly, they indicated that stock prices react more strongly to bad news
than good news. Specifically, investors favour avoiding losses over acquiring equivalent gains.
Hence, market price, as an essential component of market information, should have a direct
impact on the formation of market sentiment.
Table 5.18 indicates that in the first stage of the High-Tech Bubble, both stock market
returns and short-term rates contributed to the formation of market sentiment. In particular,
both market returns and changes in short-term rates imposed positive contemporaneous
effects on investor sentiment.17 For example. the coefficient estimates of short-term rates and
market returns, A31 and A32, are 4.66 (with a t-statistic of 2.12) and 11.17 (with a t-statistic
of 5.71), respectively. Both of these effects are statistically significant at the 5% level. This
pattern indicates in the bubble stage, positive shocks to market returns and short-term rates
give rise to instant positive shocks to investor sentiment. In addition, as the market progresses
from bubble to crisis, the impact from short-term rates becomes positive and less significant.
For example, the coefficient estimate of short-term rates drops to -6.25, which means that
higher short-term rates result in lower sentiment in crises and recessions. Intuitively, rises
in short-term rates indicate a decrease in short-term bill prices. During periods of stock
market recession, investors prefer relative ‘safe’ investments to risky investments, so they
switch from the equity market to bonds, leading to higher selling pressure on equities and
consequent lower market returns. Further, the magnitudes of market returns in both stages
demonstrate that market returns impose a more significant influence on investor sentiment
17As matrix A is created on the left-hand side of the equation system, converting the original
equations to the reduced form requires moving all elements of matrix A to the right-hand side of each
corresponding equation. Hence, the sign of the coefficient estimates changes accordingly.
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Table 5.18 Contemporaneous Relationships among Market Returns, Investor Sentiment
and Short-term Rates in the Bubble and Crisis Stages of the High-Tech Bubble
This table reports the contemporaneous coefficient estimates of geometric market returns, changes in
investor sentiment and changes in short-term rates for the High-Tech Bubble (matrix A). Panels A
and B display the results in the bubble and crisis stages, respectively. I also report the associated
t-statistic under each coefficient estimate. * and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Bubble (1993m2 - 2000m3)
Contemporaneous Coefficient
Short-term Rate Market Return Investor Sentiment
Short-term Rate 1 0 0
(constrained) (constrained) (constrained)
Market Return 0.09 1 0
0.78 (constrained) (constrained)
Investor Sentiment -4.65* -11.17** 1
-2.12 -5.71 (constrained)
Panel B: Crash (2000m4 - 2002m3)
Contemporaneous Coefficient
Short-term Rate Market Return Investor Sentiment
Short-term Rate 1 0 0
(constrained) (constrained) (constrained)
Market Return -0.34 1 0
-1.26 (constrained) (constrained)
Investor Sentiment 6.25 -17.13** 1
1.65 -6.13 (constrained)
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Table 5.19 Contemporaneous Relationships among Market Returns, Investor Sentiment
and Short-term Rates in the Bubble and Crisis Stages of the Global Financial Crisis
This table reports the contemporaneous coefficient estimates of geometric market returns, changes in
investor sentiment and changes in short-term rates for the Global Financial Crisis (matrix A). Panels
A and B display the results in the bubble and crisis stages, respectively. I also report the associated
t-statistic under each coefficient estimate. * and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Bubble (2003m2 - 2007m7)
contemporaneous Coefficient
Short-term Rate Market Return Investor Sentiment
Short-term Rate 1 0 0
(constrained) (constrained) (constrained)
Market Return 0.09 1 0
0.42 (constrained) (constrained)
Investor Sentiment 3.42 -0.26 1
0.94 -0.11 (constrained)
Panel B: Crash (2007m8 - 2010m8)
Contemporaneous Coefficient
Short-term Rate Market Return Investor Sentiment
Short-term Rate 1 0 0
(constrained) (constrained) (constrained)
Market Return -0.46 1 0
-1.18 (constrained) (constrained)
Investor Sentiment 6.58* -2.02 1
1.02 -0.77 (constrained)
during crises and recessions than in bubbles. Specifically, the coefficient estimates of market
returns increase from 11.18 in the bubble stage to 17.13 in crisis. This pattern reveals that
the same shock to market returns causes larger variations in investor sentiment in the crisis
stage, which is strictly consistent with the notion of investor loss aversion. Overall, my
results demonstrate that market returns have persistently positive impacts on the formation
of investor sentiment and this impact is more prominent during market downturns relative to
bubbles.
However, Table 5.19 shows that the patterns observed in the High-Tech Bubble do not
apply to the Global Finance Crisis. In particular, neither short-term rates nor market returns
exhibit significant impacts on market sentiment in either stage of the Global Financial Crisis.
For example, the coefficient estimates of market returns in the bubble and crisis stages are
0.2560 and 2.0247, respectively. Although the t-statistics suggest insignificant correlations
between market returns and investor sentiment in the Global Financial Crisis, the signs
and the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates display similar patterns to the High-Tech
Bubble. In particular, the results show that market returns have positive impacts on investor
sentiment at both stages, but the impact is greater in the second stage of the Global Financial
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Table 5.20 Contemporaneous Relationships among Market Returns, Investor Sentiment
and Short-term Rates for the Whole Sample Period: January 1987-December 2010
This table reports the contemporaneous coefficient estimates of geometric market returns, changes in
investor sentiment and changes in short-term rates for the whole sample covering the period January
1987 to December 2010 (matrix A). I also report the associated t-statistic under each coefficient
estimate. * and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Whole Sample Period: 1987m1 - 2010m12
contemporaneous Coefficient
Short-term Rate Market Return Investor Sentiment
Short-term Rate 1 0 0
(constrained) (constrained) (constrained)
Market Return 0.09 1 0
1.23 (constrained) (constrained)
Investor Sentiment -0.54 -6.72** 1
-0.42 -6.72 (constrained)
Crisis (the crisis stage). This insignificant relationships between market returns and investor
sentiment in the Global Financial Crisis can be explained by the inherent nature of the
Global Financial Crisis. Unlike the High-Tech Bubble, the Global Financial Crisis was not
purely a stock market crisis; instead, it was a contagious economic-wide crisis originating
from the subprime mortgage market and spreading to the whole economy. Hence, investors
felt less sensitive to stock market returns as there were no clear signals for a booming stock
market. Alternatively, the prosperity in the housing market engrossed enormous investments
into the housing market, thereby giving rise to a relatively lower influx of investment in the
stock market.
In extension to the discussions above, I also generalise my results by applying the tests to
the whole sample period ranging from January 1987 to December 2010.18 Table 5.20 reports
the contemporaneous coefficient estimates. As revealed in the table, market returns have pos-
itive instant impacts on investor sentiment, with a value of 6.7222. This pattern implies that
holding everything else constant, a unit increase in market returns raises investor sentiment
by 6.7222 units. This relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the
magnitude of the coefficient estimate for market returns in the general case is lower than
that in the High-Tech Bubble, which indicates that market returns play a vital role in the
formation of market sentiment in extreme market conditions, especially in crises and recessions.
18The optimal number of lags selected for the whole sample period is 1, as recommended by the
information criteria.
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Impulse Response and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
To further illustrate how one of the variables reacts in response to an impulse from another
variable in the hypothesised system, I carry out the following impulse response (IR) and
forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analyses. In particular, I am interested in how
one exogenous shock to market returns affects investor sentiment in the short run. Moreover,
I also want to investigate how much of the forecast error variance of investor sentiment can
be explained by shocks from market returns.
To facilitate the demonstration of IR and FEVD, I generate several combined figures
for every stage of both the High-Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis. Each figure
consists of two IR and two FEVD graphs. Within each figure, graphs at the top reveal
the effect of IRs, while those at the bottom present the variance decomposition analyses.
Moreover, for the IR graphs, I plot both the orthogonalised and structural IRs, while graphs
of FEVD consist of the original and the structural FEVD.
Comparing the upper-left graph in Figures 5.1 and 5.3, shocks from market returns in the
bubble stage impose initial positive impacts on sentiment in the short run, but this effect dies
out after roughly three periods. However, this effect is more conspicuous in the High-Tech
Bubble relative to the Global Financial Crisis. In particular, Figure 5.1a shows that the
original shock from market returns on investor sentiment is approximately 0.5, indicating
that a unit structural shock to market returns results in a 50% increase in marginal sentiment
changes. However, the unit structural shock in market returns only explains 10% of sentiment
shocks in the Global Financial Crisis, as shown by Figure 5.3a. The graphs of short-term
rates in the bubble stage (5.1b and 5.3b) indicate that the impact of shocks in short-term
rates starts from the positive side and exhibit large variations in the initial few steps during
the High-Tech Bubble. In contrast, the short-term rate imposes negative initial effects on
investor sentiment during the Global Financial Crisis.
The upper-left portions of Figures 5.2 and 5.4 present the performance of structural shocks
from market returns in the crisis stage for the High-Tech Bubble and the Global Financial
Crisis, respectively. It can be observed that during the crisis period of the High-Tech Bubble,
the shock from market returns starts from an initial point of approximately 0.7 but drops to
- 0.5 immediately after one period and then begins to increase, and again, decrease. Such
fluctuation continues for a few steps and vanishes after the fifth step. However, the shocks
from market returns in the Global Financial Crisis cause only a 10% initial variation in market
sentiment on market sentiment, and the effect quickly disappears after a few steps. The
graphs of the IRs indicate a robust positive impact of market returns on investor sentiment
in the High-Tech Bubble but little effect in the Global Financial Crisis. In addition, the
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positive impact shows that any positive shocks to market returns cause a positive shock on
market sentiment change.
The graphs located at the bottom of each figure present the analyses for the FEVD.
These graphs measure the percentage the total variation in the error term of one variable
that is explained by shocks from other variables. It can be seen that in the bubble stage,
shocks from geometric market returns explain approximately 25% of the total variation in the
error term of investor sentiment but only explain about 0.03% in the Global Financial Crisis.
Further, when switching to the crisis stage, the shocks from market returns explain more
than 40% of the error variances in sentiment changes during the High-Tech Bubble, while for
the Global Financial Crisis, the explanatory power of return shocks remains constantly low.
Moreover, it can be noted that within the crisis stage, shocks from short-term rates predict
around 15% of variations in investor sentiment, as shown by Figure 2d, but the explanatory
power of short-term rates remains relatively low in other graphs.
Therefore, the IR and FEVD analyses provide the robust evidence to the role that
market returns play in shaping the market sentiment across stages in bubbles and crises.
In particular, shocks from market returns impose a significant short-term impact on the
contemporaneous investor sentiment. Moreover, shocks from market returns explain a large
proportion of the variations in the error terms of investor sentiment. Last, my results also
indicate that such impact is more profound during the High-Tech Bubble as the explana-
tory power of shocks from market returns significantly attenuate in the Global Financial Crisis.
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5.7 Conclusion
This empirical chapter investigates the relationship between investor sentiment and finan-
cial market instability. Unlike most existing related literature, my results indicate that
stock returns should be a path-dependent function of investor sentiment during bubbles
and crises, instead of a single period of change in (or level of) sentiment. Besides, by con-
structing sentiment dynamics, I find that consecutive sentiment increases produce initial
positive returns but reduce future returns when such consecutive increases in sentiment last
longer. This pattern is consistent with Berger and Turtle’s (2015) proposition of building
overvaluation in the early stage of the bubble followed by an ultimate correction at a later
stage. In contrast, this pattern completely reverses in the suppositional crisis periods. In
particular, I find that initial drops in investor sentiment result in lower future returns, but as
the consecutive sentiment decrease persists for longer periods, the excess return turns positive.
Moreover, after conditioning the subsequent returns on the length of a positive sentiment
episode, I find that future excess returns are positively correlated with medium-term (three-
to-five months) consecutive sentiment increases but negatively correlated with long-term (six
months or more) consecutive sentiment increases. In addition, I further indicate that future
excess returns are only exposed to short-term (one-to-two months) consecutive sentiment
drops when the returns are conditioned on the length of a negative sentiment episode.
I employ a Markov regime-switching model to capture the sentiment dynamics in cases
of real financial bubbles and crises. I find that higher levels of investor sentiment produce
positive future returns in relatively stable periods but lead to negative excess returns in
extremely volatile market conditions.
Finally, another important contribution of this empirical chapter is that I find a significant
inverse contemporaneous relationship between market returns and investor sentiment. In
other words, I show that market returns play an essential role in shaping the instant market
sentiment. By applying a SVAR model at both the bubble and crisis stages of the High-Tech
Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis, I find that market returns significantly predict
contemporaneous investor sentiment in the High-Tech Bubble but have weaker explanatory
power in the Global Financial Crisis. This discovery also leaves a new research issue for
future studies, which is when returns can truly predict investor sentiment.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
This research thesis has explored three heated issues in conventional finance, including
the cross-sectional variation in equity returns, the skewness preference and mean-variance
proposition as well as the asset valuation in financial market bubbles and crises, from the new
aspect of investor sentiment. This thesis has extended the previous literature by providing
novel insights into and implications of these financial puzzles.
First, this thesis posits an alternative explanation for the cross-sectional variations in
equity returns by discussing the relationship between investor sentiment and firm opacity. In
practice, since higher levels of firm opacity increase both investors’ difficulty in valuation and
arbitrageurs’ difficulty in arbitraging, the prices of opaque stocks are more likely to suffer
from misvaluations. By employing multiple conditional models, I find that securities with
higher opacity (such as those with high volatility, small capitalisations, low profitability, low
dividend, low intangibility, low growth rates and high book-to-market ratios) exhibit greater
exposure to investor sentiment. Moreover, I find that these stocks generate comparatively
higher subsequent returns in bearish markets but lower future returns in bullish markets
relative to translucent stocks. This finding indicates that the larger variations in opaque
stocks are closely related to investor sentiment. Also, it implies that the cross-sectional pre-
miums associated with opaque stocks only exist in low-sentiment periods, and are completely
eliminated by sentiment traders in bullish markets. As demonstrated by the empirical results
in Chapter 4, lower (higher) levels of investor sentiment predict higher (lower) investor risk
aversion. Results in Chapter 3 also indicate that the cross-sectional premiums in equity
returns, in fact, reflect the risk premium reward for investors for bearing this type of stock in
low-sentiment periods.
My research not only complements existing literature on the relationship between market
sentiment and stock returns with certain firm characteristics such as size, risk, profitability,
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dividend, and tangibility, but also resolves many of the existing conflicts in the results of the
current literature. For example, few studies have indicated a clear pattern in the relationship
between market sentiment and book-to-market value portfolios. Specifically, although Baker
and Wurgler (2006) have proved that there is a strong connection between stock returns with
different book-to-market ratios and investor sentiment, they did not elaborate on the exact
nature of the relationship. Meanwhile, Berger and Turtle (2012) indicated a persistent but
unpatterned book-to-market effect on stock return across different levels of the sentiment
index, which suggests a lesser degree of opacity impact. My empirical results provide support-
ive evidence to the cross-sectional premium associated with the book-to-market portfolio (i.e.,
the value factor introduced by Fama and French (1993)).1 More importantly, my research
shows that less fairly valued stocks are more susceptible to investor sentiment.2
Second, I demonstrate the role of skewness preference in asset pricing from the perspective
of investor sentiment. Starting from the verification of the efficiency of the mean-variance
relationship in security returns, I find that the classical positive mean-variance trade-off
remains efficient only in bearish markets (periods of high risk aversion) but breaks down in
bullish markets (periods of low risk aversion). My results further indicate that this pattern
can be explained by investors’ time-varying risk aversion. In particular, the breakdown of
the mean-variance relationship in high-sentiment periods is attributed to the collapse of the
risk-aversion assumption in bullish markets. Moreover, I find the low-sentiment premiums
associated with (co-)variance in size and book-to-market portfolios are relatively constant
across portfolios, which implies that (co-)variance itself is not necessarily sufficient to explain
the cross-sectional variations in equity returns, which leads to the discussion on the higher
moment of stock returns; that is, skewness.
Harvey and Siddique (2000) argued that (co-)skewness complements (co-)variance in ex-
plaining both time-series and cross-sectional variations in security returns. This thesis draws
similar conclusions after accounting for the effect of investor sentiment. In particular, I find
(co-)skewness significantly predicts future returns in both high- and low-sentiment regimes
but in opposite directions. Specifically, (co-) skewness is positively priced in low-sentiment
periods but negatively priced in high-sentiment periods. This thesis further indicates that
models incorporating (co-)skewness outperform the conventional mean-variance framework
in explaining both the time-series and cross-sectional variations in equity returns. While my
results demonstrate that (co-)skewness is a significant pricing factor in the future return-
1My results indicate that the marginal performance of sentiment is greater in high book-to-market
portfolios during low sentiment periods. This finding is consistent with the value risk factor of Fama
and French (1993).
2In consequent chapters, I further illustrate that both value and growth stocks have higher
sensitivities to market sentiment but the sensitivity depends on the current sentiment regimes.
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generating process, I find the greater variations in returns of stocks with small size and
high book-to-market ratios can be, at least partly, explained by (co-)skewness, and the
underperformance of small size and high book-to-market ratio portfolios in high-sentiment
periods is mainly attributable to (co-)skewness, not (co-)variance.
Results in Chapters 3 and 4 emphasise the importance of investor sentiment in explaining
both cross-sectional and time-series variations of stock returns. The last empirical chapter
extends the discussion on investor sentiment to more practical issues of financial market
bubbles and crises. Economists argue that speculative bubbles and the ensuing market crises
are attributable to both rational and irrational activities (e.g. Blanchard and Watson, 1982;
Phillips et al., 2011; Shiller, 2000b); this thesis sheds new light on the importance of irrational
exuberance in both financial bubbles and crises via investor sentiment.
This thesis indicates that the role of investor sentiment in explaining asset returns follows
path-dependent dynamics in bubbles and crises. In particular, initial consecutive sentiment
increases produce positive returns; however, persistent accumulation of positive sentiment
changes lead to lower and negative future returns. This pattern is consistent with Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003) and Berger and Turtle (2015) proposition of building overvaluation in
the early stage of the bubble, followed by an ultimate correction at a later stage. Moreover, I
show that in an episode of crisis, initial drops in investor sentiment result in lower excess
returns. In contrast, sizable consecutive sentiment decreases result in ultimately positive
stock returns.
Further, after conditioning the subsequent returns on the length of positive or negative sen-
timent changes, I find that future excess returns are positively correlated with medium-term
(three-to-five month) consecutive sentiment increases but negatively correlated with long-term
(six months or more) consecutive sentiment increases. In contrast, I show that future excess
returns are only exposed to short-term (one-to-two month) consecutive sentiment drops
when the returns are conditioned on the length of a negative sentiment episode. Moreover,
my results indicate that the predicted relationship between sentiment dynamics and future
returns only holds for relatively opaque stocks (such as high risk, small size and low operating
profit stocks), which is consistent with my findings in Chapter 3 showing that opaque stock
returns are more prone to investor sentiment.
More importantly, my results further demonstrate that high book-to-market ratio portfo-
lios are more sensitive to investor sentiment in a bubble episode, while returns of portfolios
with low book-to-market ratios only show significant correlation with investor sentiment in an
episode of crisis. Since a stock with a high (low) book-to-market ratio is considered currently
traded undervalued (overvalued), my results imply that undervalued stocks are more prone
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to investor sentiment in bubbles, while overvalued stocks suffer more from the sentiment
in crises. This finding provides insight into the unpatterned relationship between investor
sentiment and book-to-market portfolios proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Berger
and Turtle (2012).
By applying a classical Markov regime-switching model to two real cases of financial
bubble and crisis, the 1990s High-Tech Bubble in the US stock market and the 2007 Global
Financial Crisis, I find that future returns are positively correlated with investor sentiment in
relatively stable periods (low volatility) but significantly negatively correlated with investor
sentiment under extremely volatile market conditions.
Finally, this thesis sheds new light on the role of market returns in the formation of
investor sentiment during bubbles and crises. Employing a SVAR model for both the High-
Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis, I show that market returns play an important
role in shaping contemporaneous market sentiment, especially during the crisis periods. Also,
my results indicate that this effect is much stronger in the High-Tech Bubble relative to the
Global Financial Crisis. A possible explanation for this finding is that the Global Financial
Crisis was not strictly a stock market crisis, but rather, an economy-wide crisis originating
from the US subprime mortgage market. Hence, the panic in the stock market was caused by
investor fear regarding the whole economy, not stock market performance.
Implications for Further Research
My results suggest useful implications and directions for future research. First, my results
offer additional evidence for the notion that investor sentiment is a systematic, rather than
idiosyncratic, risk factor. Therefore, future asset-pricing studies should be cautious regarding
investor sentiment, as it may affect both future returns of an asset and the risk premiums
associated with other risk factors.
Second, this thesis indicates that investor risk aversion varies with investor sentiment
across time. Since many earlier finance studies are based on the assumption of full rationality
and constant risk aversion, results derived therein may be inaccurate in depicting real market
performance. Hence, revisions of these studies might be required.
Third, this thesis demonstrates that many of cross-sectional as well as time-series market
anomalies can be explained appropriately by investor sentiment. Hence, it might be advanta-
geous for future asset-pricing studies that concentrate on solving market anomalies to include
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investor sentiment in their pricing models.
Fourth, I shed light on the relationship between investor sentiment and security returns
during extreme market conditions, such as market bubbles and crises. However, given the
great infrequency and instability of these financial events, it is challenging to formulate a
precise relationship between sentiment and returns. Therefore, further efforts need to be
made in this research area.
Last, since I use a consistent sentiment proxy, the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment
index, through the whole thesis, the accuracy of my empirical results might highly depend
on the efficiency of this sentiment measure. Future research could continue the investigation
into a more ’accurate’ proxy for investor sentiment.

References
Aboody, D., Even-Tov, O., Lehavy, R., and Trueman, B. (2018). Overnight returns and
firm-specific investor sentiment. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pages
1–21.
Aboody, D. and Lev, B. (2000). Information asymmetry, r&d, and insider gains. The journal
of Finance, 55(6):2747–2766.
Abreu, D. and Brunnermeier, M. K. (2002). Synchronization risk and delayed arbitrage.
Journal of Financial Economics, 66(2-3):341–360.
Abreu, D. and Brunnermeier, M. K. (2003). Bubbles and crashes. Econometrica, 71(1):173–
204.
Adrian, T. and Rosenberg, J. (2008). Stock returns and volatility: Pricing the short-run and
long-run components of market risk. The journal of Finance, 63(6):2997–3030.
Aissia, D. B. (2014). Ipo first-day returns: Skewness preference, investor sentiment and
uncertainty underlying factors. Review of Financial Economics, 23(3):148–154.
Antoniou, C., Doukas, J. A., and Subrahmanyam, A. (2010). Investor sentiment and price
momentum. SSRN eLibrary.
Arditti, F. D. (1967). Risk and the required return on equity. The Journal of Finance,
22(1):19–36.
Arditti, F. D. (1971). Another look at mutual fund performance. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 6(3):909–912.
Arrow, K. J. (1982). Risk perception in psychology and economics. Economic inquiry,
20(1):1–9.
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. (2006). Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns.
The Journal of Finance, 61(4):1645–1680.
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. (2007). Investor sentiment in the stock market. Journal of
economic perspectives, 21(2):129–152.
Bams, D., Honarvar, I., and Lehnert, T. (2017). Risk aversion, sentiment and the cross
section of stock returns.
Banz, R. W. (1981). The relationship between return and market value of common stocks.
Journal of financial economics, 9(1):3–18.
168 References
Barber, B. M., Odean, T., and Zhu, N. (2008). Do retail trades move markets? The Review
of Financial Studies, 22(1):151–186.
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998). A model of investor sentiment1. Journal of
financial economics, 49(3):307–343.
Bartov, E., Radhakrishnan, S., and Krinsky, I. (2000). Investor sophistication and patterns
in stock returns after earnings announcements. The Accounting Review, 75(1):43–63.
Bekiros, S., Jlassi, M., Lucey, B., Naoui, K., and Uddin, G. S. (2017). Herding behavior,
market sentiment and volatility: Will the bubble resume? The North American journal of
economics and finance, 42:107–131.
Berger, D. and Turtle, H. (2012). Cross-sectional performance and investor sentiment in a
multiple risk factor model. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(4):1107–1121.
Berger, D. and Turtle, H. J. (2015). Sentiment bubbles. Journal of Financial Markets,
23:59–74.
Bergman, N. K. and Roychowdhury, S. (2008). Investor sentiment and corporate disclosure.
Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5):1057–1083.
Bhattacharya, U. and Yu, X. (2008). The causes and consequences of recent financial market
bubbles: An introduction. The Review of Financial Studies, 21(1):3–10.
Black, F. (1976). Stuedies of stock price volatility changes.
Black, F. (1986). Noise. The journal of finance, 41(3):528–543.
Blanchard, O. J. and Watson, M. W. (1982). Bubbles, rational expectations and financial
markets.
Blau, B., Hsu, J., and Whitby, R. (2016). Skewness preferences and gambling cultures.
Blau, B. M. (2017). Skewness preferences, asset prices and investor sentiment. Applied
Economics, 49(8):812–822.
Brandt, M. W. and Kang, Q. (2004). On the relationship between the conditional mean
and volatility of stock returns: A latent var approach. Journal of Financial Economics,
72(2):217–257.
Brennan, T. (2004). The transmission of affect. Cornell University Press.
Brown, G. W. (1999). Volatility, sentiment, and noise traders. Financial Analysts Journal,
55(2):82–90.
Brown, G. W. and Cliff, M. T. (2004). Investor sentiment and the near-term stock market.
Journal of empirical finance, 11(1):1–27.
Brown, G. W. and Cliff, M. T. (2005). Investor sentiment and asset valuation. The Journal
of Business, 78(2):405–440.
Brown, K. C., Harlow, W. V., and Tinic, S. M. (1988). Risk aversion, uncertain information,
and market efficiency. Journal of financial Economics, 22(2):355–385.
References 169
Brunnermeier, M. and Nagel, S. (2004). Hedge funds and the technology bubble. The Journal
of Finance, 59(5):2013–2040.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2001). Asset pricing under asymmetric information: Bubbles, crashes,
technical analysis, and herding. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Campbell, J. Y. (1987). Stock returns and the term structure. Journal of financial economics,
18(2):373–399.
Campbell, J. Y., Hilscher, J., and Szilagyi, J. (2008). In search of distress risk. The Journal
of Finance, 63(6):2899–2939.
Campbell, J. Y. and Kyle, A. S. (1993). Smart money, noise trading and stock price behaviour.
The Review of Economic Studies, 60(1):1–34.
Canterbery, E. R. (1999). Irrational exuberance and rational speculative bubbles. The
International Trade Journal, 13(1):1–33.
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of finance,
52(1):57–82.
Chari, V. V., Jagannathan, R., and Ofer, A. R. (1988). Seasonalities in security returns: The
case of earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Economics, 21(1):101–121.
Chevalier, J. and Ellison, G. (1999). Career concerns of mutual fund managers. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114(2):389–432.
Chiang, M.-C., Tsai, I.-C., and Lee, C.-F. (2011). Fundamental indicators, bubbles in
stock returns and investor sentiment. The Quarterly review of Economics and finance,
51(1):82–87.
Chiang, T. C. and Zheng, D. (2010). An empirical analysis of herd behavior in global stock
markets. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(8):1911–1921.
Christopherson, J. A., Ferson, W. E., and Glassman, D. A. (1998). Conditioning manager
alphas on economic information: Another look at the persistence of performance. The
Review of Financial Studies, 11(1):111–142.
Collins, D. W., Maydew, E. L., and Weiss, I. S. (1997). Changes in the value-relevance of
earnings and book values over the past forty years. Journal of accounting and economics,
24(1):39–67.
Conine, T. E. and Tamarkin, M. J. (1981). On diversification given asymmetry in returns.
The journal of finance, 36(5):1143–1155.
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., and Schill, M. J. (2008). Asset growth and the cross-section of
stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 63(4):1609–1651.
Cornell, B., Landsman, W., and Stubben, S. (2017). Accounting information, investor
sentiment, and market pricing.
Cornelli, F., Goldreich, D., and Ljungqvist, A. (2006). Investor sentiment and pre-ipo markets.
The Journal of Finance, 61(3):1187–1216.
170 References
Da, Z., Engelberg, J., and Gao, P. (2014). The sum of all fears investor sentiment and asset
prices. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(1):1–32.
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., and Subrahmanyam, A. (1998). Investor psychology and security
market under-and overreactions. the Journal of Finance, 53(6):1839–1885.
Dass, N., Massa, M., and Patgiri, R. (2008). Mutual funds and bubbles: The surprising role
of contractual incentives. The Review of Financial Studies, 21(1):51–99.
De Bondt, W. F. and Thaler, R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact? The Journal of
finance, 40(3):793–805.
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., and Waldmann, R. J. (1990). Noise trader risk
in financial markets. Journal of political Economy, 98(4):703–738.
Devenow, A. and Welch, I. (1996). Rational herding in financial economics. European
Economic Review, 40(3-5):603–615.
Dittmar, R. F. (2002). Nonlinear pricing kernels, kurtosis preference, and evidence from the
cross section of equity returns. The Journal of Finance, 57(1):369–403.
Eigner, P. and Umlauft, T. S. (2014). Mta–elte crises history research group.
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., and Busse, J. A. (1998). Do investors care about sentiment?
The Journal of Business, 71(4):477–500.
Ely, K. and Waymire, G. (1999). Intangible assets and stock prices in the pre-sec era. Journal
of Accounting Research, 37:17–44.
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The journal of Business, 38(1):34–
105.
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and
bonds. Journal of financial economics, 33(1):3–56.
Fama, E. F. and MacBeth, J. D. (1973). Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests.
Journal of political economy, 81(3):607–636.
Ferson, W. E. and Schadt, R. W. (1996). Measuring fund strategy and performance in
changing economic conditions. The Journal of finance, 51(2):425–461.
Flood, R. P. and Hodrick, R. J. (1986). Asset price volatility, bubbles, and process switching.
The Journal of Finance, 41(4):831–842.
Flood, R. P. and Hodrick, R. J. (1990). On testing for speculative bubbles. Journal of
economic perspectives, 4(2):85–101.
Fong, W. M. (2015). Market-wide sentiment and market returns. Journal of Asset Manage-
ment, 16(5):316–328.
Francis, J. and Schipper, K. (1999). Have financial statements lost their relevance? Journal
of accounting Research, 37(2):319–352.
Frazzini, A. and Lamont, O. A. (2008). Dumb money: Mutual fund flows and the cross-section
of stock returns. Journal of financial economics, 88(2):299–322.
References 171
Friedman, M. (1953). The methodology of positive economics.
Froot, K. A. and Obstfeld, M. (1991). Exchange-rate dynamics under stochastic regime shifts:
A unified approach. Journal of International Economics, 31(3-4):203–229.
Golec, J. and Tamarkin, M. (1998). Bettors love skewness, not risk, at the horse track.
Journal of political economy, 106(1):205–225.
Green, T. C. and Hwang, B.-H. (2011). Ipos as lotteries: Skewness preference and first-day
returns.
Greenwood, R. and Nagel, S. (2009). Inexperienced investors and bubbles. Journal of
Financial Economics, 93(2):239–258.
Griffin, J. M., Harris, J. H., Shu, T., and Topaloglu, S. (2011). Who drove and burst the
tech bubble? The Journal of Finance, 66(4):1251–1290.
Harvey, C. R. (2001). The specification of conditional expectations. Journal of Empirical
Finance, 8(5):573–637.
Harvey, C. R. and Siddique, A. (2000). Conditional skewness in asset pricing tests. The
Journal of Finance, 55(3):1263–1295.
Hirshleifer, D., Hou, K., Teoh, S. H., and Zhang, Y. (2004). Do investors overvalue firms
with bloated balance sheets? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 38:297–331.
Ho, C. and Hung, C.-H. (2009). Investor sentiment as conditioning information in asset
pricing. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(5):892–903.
Hong, H., Lim, T., and Stein, J. C. (2000). Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage,
and the profitability of momentum strategies. The Journal of Finance, 55(1):265–295.
Huang, D., Jiang, F., Tu, J., and Zhou, G. (2015). Investor sentiment aligned: A powerful
predictor of stock returns. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(3):791–837.
Jean, W. H. (1971). The extension of portfolio analysis to three or more parameters. Journal
of financial and Quantitative Analysis, 6(1):505–515.
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (1993). Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implica-
tions for stock market efficiency. The Journal of finance, 48(1):65–91.
Jha, R., Korkie, B., and Turtle, H. J. (2009). Measuring performance in a dynamic world:
Conditional mean–variance fundamentals. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(10):1851–
1859.
Kabir, M. H. and Shakur, S. (2018). Regime-dependent herding behavior in asian and latin
american stock markets. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 47:60–78.
Kadiyala, P. and Rau, P. R. (2004). Investor reaction to corporate event announcements:
underreaction or overreaction? The Journal of Business, 77(2):357–386.
Kandel, S. and Stambaugh, R. F. (1995). Portfolio inefficiency and the cross-section of
expected returns. The Journal of Finance, 50(1):157–184.
172 References
Kaniel, R., Saar, G., and Titman, S. (2008). Individual investor trading and stock returns.
The Journal of Finance, 63(1):273–310.
Kapadia, N. (2006). The next microsoft? skewness, idiosyncratic volatility, and expected
returns.
Katzenbach, N. (1987). An overview of program trading and its impact on current market
practices. New York Stock Exchange.
Kelly, M. (1995). All their eggs in one basket: Portfolio diversification of us households.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 27(1):87–96.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The general theory of money, interest and employment. Reprinted in
The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, 7.
Kim, J. S., Ryu, D., and Seo, S. W. (2014). Investor sentiment and return predictability of
disagreement. Journal of Banking & Finance, 42:166–178.
Kindleberger, C. P. (1991). Bubbles. In The World of Economics, pages 20–22. Springer.
Kindleberger, C. P. and Manias, P. (1989). Crashes: A history of financial crises, revised
edition.
Konno, H. and Suzuki, K.-i. (1995). A mean-variance-skewness portfolio optimization model.
Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 38(2):173–187.
Kothari, S. P. and Shanken, J. (1997). Book-to-market, dividend yield, and expected market
returns: A time-series analysis. Journal of Financial economics, 44(2):169–203.
Kraus, A. and Litzenberger, R. H. (1976). Skewness preference and the valuation of risk
assets. The Journal of Finance, 31(4):1085–1100.
Krishnaswami, S. and Subramaniam, V. (1999). Information asymmetry, valuation, and the
corporate spin-off decision. Journal of Financial economics, 53(1):73–112.
Kumar, A. and Lee, C. (2006). Retail investor sentiment and return comovements. The
Journal of Finance, 61(5):2451–2486.
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, pages 1315–1335.
Lai, K. K., Yu, L., and Wang, S. (2006). Mean-variance-skewness-kurtosis-based portfo-
lio optimization. In Computer and Computational Sciences, 2006. IMSCCS’06. First
International Multi-Symposiums on, volume 2, pages 292–297. IEEE.
Lai, M.-M. and Lau, S.-H. (2004). Herd behavior and market stress: the case of malaysia.
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 8(3):85.
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1994). Contrarian investment, extrapolation,
and risk. The journal of finance, 49(5):1541–1578.
Lease, R. C., Lewellen, W. G., and Schlarbaum, G. G. (1974). The individual investor:
attributes and attitudes. The Journal of Finance, 29(2):413–433.
References 173
Lee, C., Shleifer, A., and Thaler, R. H. (1991). Investor sentiment and the closed-end fund
puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 46(1):75–109.
Lee, W. Y., Jiang, C. X., and Indro, D. C. (2002). Stock market volatility, excess returns,
and the role of investor sentiment. Journal of banking & Finance, 26(12):2277–2299.
Lemmon, M. and Portniaguina, E. (2006). Consumer confidence and asset prices: Some
empirical evidence. The Review of Financial Studies, 19(4):1499–1529.
LeRoy, S. F. and Porter, R. D. (1981). The present-value relation: Tests based on implied
variance bounds. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 555–574.
Lintner, J. (1965). Security prices, risk, and maximal gains from diversification. The journal
of finance, 20(4):587–615.
Livnat, J. and Petrovits, C. (2009). Investor sentiment, post-earnings announcement drift,
and accruals.
Ljungqvist, A., Nanda, V., and Singh, R. (2006). Hot markets, investor sentiment, and ipo
pricing. The Journal of Business, 79(4):1667–1702.
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J. R. (1995). The new issues puzzle. The Journal of finance,
50(1):23–51.
Lucas Jr, R. E. (1978). Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, pages 1429–1445.
Lütkepohl, H. (2005). New introduction to multiple time series analysis. Springer Science &
Business Media.
Lux, T. (1995). Herd behaviour, bubbles and crashes. The economic journal, pages 881–896.
Malliaris, A. G. and Urrutia, J. L. (1992). The international crash of october 1987: causality
tests. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(3):353–364.
Markowitz, H. (1952). Portfolio selection. The journal of finance, 7(1):77–91.
McLean, R. D. and Zhao, M. (2014). The business cycle, investor sentiment, and costly
external finance. The Journal of Finance, 69(3):1377–1409.
Merton, R. C. (1980). On estimating the expected return on the market: An exploratory
investigation. Journal of financial economics, 8(4):323–361.
Mikhed, V. and Zemčík, P. (2009). Do house prices reflect fundamentals? aggregate and
panel data evidence. Journal of Housing Economics, 18(2):140–149.
Miller, M. H., Scholes, M., and Jensen, M. C. (1972). Studies in the theory of capital markets.
Minsky, H. P. (1992). The financial instability hypothesis.
Mitton, T. and Vorkink, K. (2007). Equilibrium underdiversification and the preference for
skewness. The Review of Financial Studies, 20(4):1255–1288.
Modigliani, F. and Cohn, R. A. (1979). Inflation, rational valuation and the market. Financial
Analysts Journal, 35(2):24–44.
174 References
Muth, J. F. (1960). Optimal properties of exponentially weighted forecasts. Journal of the
american statistical association, 55(290):299–306.
Neal, R. and Wheatley, S. M. (1998). Do measures of investor sentiment predict returns?
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33(4):523–547.
Nelson, D. B. (1991). Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A new approach.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 347–370.
Novy-Marx, R. (2010). Operating leverage. Review of Finance, 15(1):103–134.
Pástor, L. and Stambaugh, R. F. (2003). Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Journal
of Political economy, 111(3):642–685.
Philippas, N., Economou, F., Babalos, V., and Kostakis, A. (2013). Herding behavior in reits:
Novel tests and the role of financial crisis. International Review of Financial Analysis,
29:166–174.
Phillips, P. C., Wu, Y., and Yu, J. (2011). Explosive behavior in the 1990s nasdaq: When
did exuberance escalate asset values? International economic review, 52(1):201–226.
Pontiff, J. (1997). Excess volatility and closed-end funds. The American Economic Review,
pages 155–169.
Prieto, P. M. and Perote, J. (2017). Agents’ behavior in market bubbles: Herding and
information effects. Economics, 5(1):44–51.
Pritchett, L. and Summers, L. H. (1996). Wealthier is healthier. Journal of Human resources,
pages 841–868.
Ravi, R. and Hong, Y. (2014). Firm opacity and financial market information asymmetry.
Journal of Empirical Finance, 25:83–94.
Richardson, V. J. (2000). Information asymmetry and earnings management: Some evidence.
Review of quantitative finance and accounting, 15(4):325–347.
Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long-run performance of initial public offerings. The journal of
finance, 46(1):3–27.
Roll, R. and Ross, S. A. (1994). On the cross-sectional relation between expected returns
and betas. The Journal of Finance, 49(1):101–121.
Rubinstein, M. E. (1973). A comparative statics analysis of risk premiums. The Journal of
Business, 46(4):605–615.
Samuelson, P. A. (1975). The fundamental approximation theorem of portfolio analysis in
terms of means, variances and higher moments. In Stochastic Optimization Models in
Finance, pages 215–220. Elsevier.
Schwert, G. W. (1989). Why does stock market volatility change over time? The journal of
finance, 44(5):1115–1153.
Schwert, G. W. (1990). Stock volatility and the crash of’87. The Review of Financial Studies,
3(1):77–102.
References 175
Schwert, G. W. and Seguin, P. J. (1990). Heteroskedasticity in stock returns. the Journal of
Finance, 45(4):1129–1155.
Scott, R. C. and Horvath, P. A. (1980). On the direction of preference for moments of higher
order than the variance. The Journal of Finance, 35(4):915–919.
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions
of risk. The journal of finance, 19(3):425–442.
Shiller, R. C. (2000a). Irrational exuberance. Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly, 20(1):18–
23.
Shiller, R. J. (1981). The use of volatility measures in assessing market efficiency. The
Journal of Finance, 36(2):291–304.
Shiller, R. J. (2000b). Measuring bubble expectations and investor confidence. The Journal
of Psychology and Financial Markets, 1(1):49–60.
Shleifer, A. and Summers, L. H. (1990). The noise trader approach to finance. Journal of
Economic perspectives, 4(2):19–33.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997). The limits of arbitrage. The Journal of Finance,
52(1):35–55.
Shu, H.-C. and Chang, J.-H. (2015). Investor sentiment and financial market volatility.
Journal of Behavioral Finance, 16(3):206–219.
Simkowitz, M. A. and Beedles, W. L. (1978). Diversification in a three-moment world. Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 13(5):927–941.
Stambaugh, R. F., Yu, J., and Yuan, Y. (2012). The short of it: Investor sentiment and
anomalies. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(2):288–302.
Temin, P. (2010). The great recession & the great depression. Daedalus, 139(4):115–124.
Temin, P. and Voth, H.-J. (2004). Riding the south sea bubble. American Economic Review,
94(5):1654–1668.
Turner, C. M., Startz, R., and Nelson, C. R. (1989). A markov model of heteroskedasticity,
risk, and learning in the stock market. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(1):3–22.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.
Science, 211(4481):453–458.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representa-
tion of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 5(4):297–323.
Van Horne, J. C., Blume, M. E., and Friend, I. (1975). The asset structure of individual
portfolios and some implications for utility functions. The Journal of Finance, 30(2):585–
603.
Venkatesh, P. and Chiang, R. (1986). Information asymmetry and the dealer’s bid-ask
spread: A case study of earnings and dividend announcements. The Journal of Finance,
41(5):1089–1102.
176 References
Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2003). Perspectives on behavioral finance: Does" irrationality" disap-
pear with wealth? evidence from expectations and actions. NBER macroeconomics annual,
18:139–194.
Whaley, R. E. (2000). The investor fear gauge. The Journal of Portfolio Management,
26(3):12–17.
Whitelaw, R. F. (1994). Time variations and covariations in the expectation and volatility of
stock market returns. The Journal of Finance, 49(2):515–541.
Wolff, C., Lehnert, T., and Lin, Y. (2014). Skewness risk premium: Theory and empirical
evidence.
Wu, Y. (1997). Rational bubbles in the stock market: accounting for the us stock-price
volatility. Economic Inquiry, 35(2):309.
Xiong, W. and Yu, J. (2011). The chinese warrants bubble. American Economic Review,
101(6):2723–53.
Yu, J. and Yuan, Y. (2011). Investor sentiment and the mean–variance relation. Journal of
Financial Economics, 100(2):367–381.
Yuan, Y. (2005). Investor sentiment predicts stock returns. Unpublished working paper,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
Appendix A
This Appendix A offers additional empirical evidence which complement the results in the
main part of my thesis. In particular, tables displayed in this Appendix A provide the
regression results of the value-weighted portfolios related to the empirical tests covered in
Chapter 4 and 5. From all these tables, I find less significant results in the value-weighted
index relative to the equally-weighted index, as discussed in the thesis. A possible explanation
for the insignificant relation between investor sentiment and future portfolio returns is that
the value-weighted index significantly mitigates the importance of small stocks, which exhibits
greater exposure to investor sentiment (as shown by the thesis). Hence, these tables are
presented for anyone who is in case interested in.
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Table A.1 Significance of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in Different Sentiment Regimes
- Value-Weighted Sentiment- Based Portfolios
This table reports the coefficient estimates of both co-variance and co-skewness for the value-weighted
sentiment-based portfolios in high- and low-sentiment regimes. The baseline models are from Eq.4.13
to Eq.4.16 : Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+ ϵt (4.13)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+ ϵt (4.14)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+ ϵt (4.15)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+β2Dt−1COSt−1+ ϵt (4.16)
To control for the effect of both co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime, interaction
terms for each variable with the dummy sentiment indicator are constructed. The dependent variable
is the value-weighted monthly excess return for each sentiment-based portfolio. βCOV and βCOS
represent the coefficient estimates of co-variance and co-skewness for each portfolio’s return to the
value-weighted market return, respectively. β1 and β2 are coefficient estimates for the interaction
term of co-variance and co-skewness, respectively. a1 is the parameter estimate for the dummy
sentiment variable alone. * and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Equations α0 t-stat βCOV t-stat βCOS t-stat a1 t-stat β1 t-stat β2 t-stat Adj. R2 (%)
(4.13) 0.0122** 3.24 0.0875 0.15 -0.0036
Portfolio 1 (4.14) 0.0113* 2.37 2.1370** 2.86 0.0027 0.38 -4.7653** -4.16 0.0578
(4.15) 0.0137** 3.65 -0.5542 -0.89 109.6766** 2.66 0.0184
(4.16) 0.0121** 2.66 1.8379** 2.57 309.0627** 4.28 0.0072 1.00 -6.5111** -5.12 -144.7255 -1.78 0.1419
(4.13) 0.0089* 2.56 0.3774 0.65 -0.0022
Portfolio 2 (4.14) 0.0087* 1.97 2.7904** 3.68 0.0002 0.03 -5.1877** -4.65 0.0806
(4.15) 0.0097** 2.74 0.0258 0.04 43.6416 1.30 0.0004
(4.16) 0.0091* 2.12 2.7410** 3.74 202.7571** 3.52 0.0047 0.70 -7.3391** -5.50 -74.5989 -1.01 0.1400
(4.13) 0.0103 3.16 -0.4095 -0.70 -0.0019
Portfolio 3 (4.14) 0.0071 1.67 1.9735* 2.51 0.0070 1.09 -4.9368** -4.36 0.0595
(4.15) 0.0109** 3.24 -0.6847 -0.99 22.6691 0.74 -0.0036
(4.16) 0.0084* 2.02 1.3679 1.75 215.7581** 3.69 0.0089 1.38 -5.9946** -4.15 -140.8107* -1.96 0.1090
(4.13) 0.0066** 2.27 1.0122 1.95 0.0102
Portfolio 4 (4.14) 0.0076 1.94 1.5872* 2.31 -0.0020 -0.34 -1.3294 -1.27 0.0120
(4.15) 0.0077** 2.62 0.4410 0.76 66.6702* 2.14 0.0231
(4.16) 0.0083* 2.17 1.3354* 1.99 237.0610** 3.66 -0.0001 -0.02 -2.4066 -1.86 -165.3363* -2.12 0.0614
(4.13) 0.1037 1.07 0.0540 0.02 -0.0038
Portfolio 5 (4.14) 0.1804 1.40 -0.0447 -0.02 -0.1690 -0.82 -2.6886 -0.10 -0.0083
(4.15) 0.1040 1.07 0.0928 0.03 -170.5498 -0.18 -0.0074
(4.16) 0.1802 1.39 -0.0201 -0.01 -707.7856 -0.32 -0.1644 -0.76 -4.7745 -0.12 816.4601 0.31 -0.0156
(4.13) 0.0074* 2.25 -0.1640 -0.27 -0.0035
Portfolio 6 (4.14) 0.0059 1.36 1.7018* 2.02 0.0030 0.46 -3.8377** -3.17 0.0292
(4.15) 0.0079* 2.36 -0.4355 -0.62 24.4663 0.80 -0.0049
(4.16) 0.0060 1.43 1.8069* 2.19 200.9116** 2.84 0.0075 1.12 -6.3680** -4.07 -97.6849 -1.18 0.0708
(4.13) 0.0122* 3.45 -0.2922 -0.44 -0.0030
Portfolio 7 (4.14) 0.0107* 2.32 2.1187* 2.37 0.0027 0.40 -5.0862** -3.92 0.0501
(4.15) 0.0125** 3.45 -0.4672 -0.60 17.1641 0.43 -0.0060
(4.16) 0.0119** 2.61 1.5257 1.68 228.7292** 2.71 0.0045 0.64 -6.0265** -3.72 -146.6686 -1.48 0.0770
(4.13) 0.0130** 3.50 0.1677 0.26 -0.0034
Portfolio 8 (4.14) 0.0139** 2.78 1.4314 1.53 -0.0031 -0.42 -2.2912 -1.81 0.0070
(4.15) 0.0147** 3.86 -0.6276 -0.83 70.8218 1.89 0.0060
(4.16) 0.0155 3.12 0.7103 0.74 167.9884** 2.66 -0.0019 -0.26 -2.8948 -1.87 -90.1220 -1.11 0.0335
(4.13) 0.0114** 3.18 -0.0712 -0.11 -0.0036
Portfolio 9 (4.14) 0.0112* 2.37 1.6545 1.94 0.0004 0.05 -3.7381** -2.98 0.0268
(4.15) 0.0114** 3.16 -0.1223 -0.19 4.4004 0.94 -0.0040
(4.16) 0.0110* 2.31 1.6297 1.92 4.2072 0.91 0.0035 0.48 -5.1005** -3.22 -70.7181 -1.35 0.0300
(4.13) 0.0206** 3.91 0.6035 0.66 -0.0021
Portfolio 10 (4.14) 0.0231** 3.40 3.0835** 2.58 -0.0052 -0.50 -5.5230** -3.06 0.0391
(4.15) 0.0198** 3.67 0.9899 0.93 29.0097 0.71 -0.0039
(4.16) 0.0243** 3.59 2.5700* 2.14 295.0110** 2.62 -0.0053 -0.49 -5.4884* -2.33 -277.9317* -2.22 0.0564
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Table A.2 Significance of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in Different Sentiment Regimes
- Value-Weighted Size Portfolios
This table reports the coefficient estimates of both co-variance and co-skewness for the value-weighted
Size portfolios in high- and low-sentiment regimes. The baseline models are from Eq.4.13 to Eq.4.16 :
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+ ϵt (4.13)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+ ϵt (4.14)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+ ϵt (4.15)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+β2Dt−1COSt−1+ ϵt (4.16)
To control for the effect of both co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime, interaction
terms for each variable with the dummy sentiment indicator are constructed. The dependent variable
is the value-weighted monthly excess return for each size portfolio. βCOV and βCOS represent the
coefficient estimates of co-variance and co-skewness for each portfolio’s return to the value-weighted
market return, respectively. β1 and β2 are coefficient estimates for the interaction term of co-variance
and co-skewness, respectively. a1 is the parameter estimate for the dummy sentiment variable alone.
* and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Equations α0 t-stat βCOV t-stat βCOS t-stat a1 t-stat β1 t-stat β2 t-stat Adj. R2 (%)
(4.13) 0.0057 1.47 -1.9955 -0.27 -0.0033
Portfolio 1 (4.14) 0.0131* 2.48 -5.2600 -0.71 -0.0178* -2.26 49.9195 1.38 0.0101
(4.15) 0.0057 1.48 -1.4590 -0.20 9.6144 0.35 -0.0065
(4.16) 0.0125* 2.38 8.8424 0.78 272.8255 1.65 -0.0173* -2.20 36.3744 0.97 -269.6569 -1.61 0.0128
(4.13) 0.0067 1.66 -5.6619 -1.04 0.0003
Portfolio 2 (4.14) 0.0119* 2.17 -7.5640 -1.36 -0.0138 -1.66 36.1044 1.26 0.0051
(4.15) 0.0066 1.66 -4.4466 -0.79 22.0662 0.90 -0.0004
(4.16) 0.0100 1.82 6.7404 0.89 263.9547** 2.72 -0.0119 -1.43 22.3536 0.77 -258.3765** -2.58 0.0244
(4.13) 0.0070 1.86 -3.1128 -0.60 -0.0023
Portfolio 3 (4.14) 0.0128* 2.48 -5.0895 -0.95 -0.0145 -1.86 27.9149 1.19 0.0043
(4.15) 0.0070 1.85 -2.1194 -0.39 17.2711 0.72 -0.0040
(4.16) 0.0107* 2.09 11.5520 1.44 294.3692** 2.77 -0.0125 -1.61 11.4689 0.48 -292.1236** -2.68 0.0245
(4.13) 0.0062 1.68 -3.8372 -0.67 -0.0020
Portfolio 4 (4.14) 0.0111* 2.22 -5.7683 -0.98 -0.0126 -1.64 24.7622 1.01 0.0013
(4.15) 0.0062 1.68 -2.7934 -0.48 18.2827 0.90 -0.0027
(4.16) 0.0093 1.85 8.8479 1.11 280.0461** 2.70 -0.0107 -1.41 11.4425 0.46 -271.3715* -2.56 0.0206
(4.13) 0.0069 1.93 -2.0171 -0.38 -0.0031
Portfolio 5 (4.14) 0.0124* 2.53 -3.6241 -0.66 -0.0131 -1.75 17.6572 0.80 0.0009
(4.15) 0.0069 1.93 -1.3704 -0.25 11.2786 0.57 -0.0055
(4.16) 0.0105 2.13 12.2164 1.58 295.7079** 2.86 -0.0111 -1.50 1.8640 0.08 -295.3323** -2.81 0.0229
(4.13) 0.0065* 1.99 -1.7126 -0.32 -0.0032
Portfolio 6 (4.14) 0.0112* 2.50 -3.0998 -0.56 -0.0107 -1.59 11.3606 0.58 -0.0013
(4.15) 0.0065* 1.99 -1.0293 -0.19 11.0563 0.69 -0.0051
(4.16) 0.0095* 2.12 11.2916 1.42 274.1589* 2.49 -0.0091 -1.35 -2.0143 -0.10 -268.5592* -2.41 0.0141
(4.13) 0.0069* 2.15 0.1941 0.04 -0.0036
Portfolio 7 (4.14) 0.0115** 2.64 -1.2642 -0.24 -0.0110 -1.65 14.6156 0.69 -0.0009
(4.15) 0.0069* 2.15 0.7276 0.14 8.5336 0.60 -0.0059
(4.16) 0.0102* 2.33 9.6456 1.32 213.5714* 2.14 -0.0097 -1.47 4.9476 0.22 -208.6444* -2.07 0.0089
(4.13) 0.0066* 2.05 -1.3884 -0.27 -0.0033
Portfolio 8 (4.14) 0.0111* 2.53 -2.7703 -0.52 -0.0106 -1.59 12.6391 0.62 -0.0014
(4.15) 0.0066* 2.05 -0.6799 -0.13 10.9836 0.85 -0.0043
(4.16) 0.0099* 2.23 6.7987 0.95 194.3451* 2.02 -0.0095 -1.42 5.4505 0.26 -186.0132 -1.91 0.0074
(4.13) 0.0066* 2.26 -0.8163 -0.17 -0.0035
Portfolio 9 (4.14) 0.0107** 2.66 -1.5658 -0.32 -0.0089 -1.44 4.5348 0.23 -0.0028
(4.15) 0.0066* 2.26 -0.1389 -0.03 10.1195 0.96 -0.0038
(4.16) 0.0093* 2.32 7.5805 1.18 189.5384* 2.22 -0.0077 -1.25 -1.8780 -0.09 -182.1902* -2.12 0.0094
(4.13) 0.0055* 2.02 -5.7855 -1.17 0.0014
Portfolio 10 (4.14) 0.0095* 2.56 -6.1439 -1.19 -0.0084 -1.46 -0.3197 -0.02 0.0034
(4.15) 0.0055 2.04 -4.7160 -0.95 15.0804 1.76 0.0089
(4.16) 0.0090* 2.40 -2.1919 -0.34 89.5644 1.04 -0.0081 -1.41 0.7918 0.04 -75.5018 -0.87 0.0094
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Table A.3 Significance of Co-Variance and Co-Skewness in Different Sentiment Regimes
- Value-Weighted Book-to-Market Portfolios
This table reports the coefficient estimates of both co-variance and co-skewness for the value-weighted
book-to-market portfolios in high- and low-sentiment regimes. The baseline models are from Eq.4.13
to Eq.4.16 : Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+ ϵt (4.13)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+ ϵt (4.14)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+ ϵt (4.15)
Rp,t = α0+βCOV COVt−1+βCOSCOSt−1+a1Dt−1+β1Dt−1COVt−1+β2Dt−1COSt−1+ ϵt (4.16)
To control for the effect of both co-variance and co-skewness in the high-sentiment regime, interaction
terms for each variable with the dummy sentiment indicator are constructed. The dependent variable
is the value-weighted monthly excess return for each book-to-market portfolio. βCOV and βCOS
represent the coefficient estimates of co-variance and co-skewness for each portfolio’s return to the
value-weighted market return, respectively. β1 and β2 are coefficient estimates for the interaction
term of co-variance and co-skewness, respectively. a1 is the parameter estimate for the dummy
sentiment variable alone. * and ** represent the 95% and 99% significance level, respectively.
Equations α0 t-stat βCOV t-stat βCOS t-stat a1 t-stat β1 t-stat β2 t-stat Adj. R2 (%)
(4.13) 0.0047 1.47 -0.1061 -0.02 -0.0036
Portfolio 1 (4.14) 0.0108* 2.50 -0.4981 -0.08 -0.0127 -1.94 -1.4226 -0.08 0.0052
(4.15) 0.0046 1.46 0.6541 0.11 12.0147 1.01 -0.0035
(4.16) 0.0101* 2.32 4.4911 0.57 105.7436 1.00 -0.0122 -1.84 -4.5332 -0.24 -95.7292 -0.90 0.0041
(4.13) 0.0058* 2.02 -0.7476 -0.14 -0.0035
Portfolio 2 (4.14) 0.0093* 2.39 -1.8192 -0.32 -0.0082 -1.36 8.6524 0.42 -0.0040
(4.15) 0.0058* 2.02 0.5018 0.09 17.0710 1.64 0.0026
(4.16) 0.0089* 2.25 1.4268 0.20 70.2023 0.74 -0.0083 -1.36 12.5202 0.58 -52.9170 -0.55 0.0002
(4.13) 0.0069* 2.34 -4.0138 -0.71 -0.0018
Portfolio 3 (4.14) 0.0097* 2.41 -4.2888 -0.72 -0.0056 -0.90 -1.5586 -0.07 -0.0052
(4.15) 0.0069* 2.35 -2.9659 -0.52 13.5080 1.34 0.0011
(4.16) 0.0087* 2.16 1.7230 0.24 136.0612 1.49 -0.0051 -0.82 -1.1033 -0.05 -124.104 -1.35 0.0004
(4.13) 0.0062* 2.13 -4.6707 -0.97 -0.0002
Portfolio 4 (4.14) 0.0083 2.09 -5.3472 -1.06 -0.0051 -0.83 6.4223 0.34 -0.0050
(4.15) 0.0062 2.15 -3.5376 -0.73 16.4005 1.68 0.0062
(4.16) 0.0074 1.86 1.5820 0.25 160.5048 1.80 -0.0046 -0.75 6.0854 0.31 -144.8868 -1.62 0.0082
(4.13) 0.0068 2.39 -7.1958 -1.60 0.0056
Portfolio 5 (4.14) 0.0097* 2.49 -6.9865 -1.51 -0.0052 -0.86 -8.9135 -0.45 0.0037
(4.15) 0.0068* 2.40 -6.0933 -1.34 16.0249 1.55 0.0106
(4.16) 0.0082* 2.12 4.3574 0.72 242.9799** 2.83 -0.0041 -0.69 -14.6480 -0.71 -231.1699** -2.68 0.0293
(4.13) 0.0075** 2.72 -5.6947 -1.09 0.0007
Portfolio 6 (4.14) 0.0091* 2.42 -6.9046 -1.27 -0.0047 -0.81 14.8162 0.72 -0.0035
(4.15) 0.0075** 2.72 -5.0509 -0.96 11.2272 1.01 0.0008
(4.16) 0.0084* 2.23 -2.0727 -0.34 133.9546 1.73 -0.0042 -0.73 13.6391 0.65 -123.7943 -1.68 0.0030
(4.13) 0.0057 1.92 -3.6393 -0.83 -0.0011
Portfolio 7 (4.14) 0.0100* 2.44 -3.8791 -0.86 -0.0085 -1.36 -4.2827 -0.22 0.0004
(4.15) 0.0057 1.94 -2.6004 -0.58 15.7152 1.56 0.0040
(4.16) 0.0088 2.15 4.2747 0.66 152.5338 1.78 -0.0075 -1.20 -8.2122 -0.40 -139.4902 -1.66 0.0104
(4.13) 0.0078** 2.66 -14.2386** -3.89 0.0482
Portfolio 8 (4.14) 0.0103* 2.54 -14.9463** -4.02 -0.0070 -1.11 20.3293 0.84 0.0463
(4.15) 0.0079* 2.66 -13.7750** -3.71 8.0471 0.75 0.0467
(4.16) 0.0087* 2.16 -3.9358 -0.74 213.2037** 2.86 -0.0055 -0.88 10.9862 0.45 -208.5489** -2.77 0.0679
(4.13) 0.0098** 3.15 -6.9886 -1.67 0.0064
Portfolio 9 (4.14) 0.0149** 3.52 -7.2305 -1.70 -0.0101 -1.54 -7.0419 -0.32 0.0112
(4.15) 0.0099** 3.20 -5.9574 -1.41 18.4203 1.60 0.0120
(4.16) 0.0135** 3.22 3.0947 0.58 224.8688** 3.09 -0.0088 -1.36 -13.1836 -0.59 -213.0074** -2.89 0.0410
(4.13) 0.0100** 2.57 -11.1061** -2.44 0.0175
Portfolio 10 (4.14) 0.0145** 2.72 -12.4361** -2.69 -0.0123 -1.50 28.8720 1.11 0.0197
(4.15) 0.0100** 2.59 -10.153* -2.19 16.7991 1.08 0.0181
(4.16) 0.0114* 2.19 4.7257 0.80 338.5892** 4.40 -0.0092 -1.15 13.2677 0.51 -333.1823** -4.25 0.0782
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Table A.4 Relationships Between Value-Weighted Future Excess Return and Positive
Sentiment Dynamics
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent+,p+β2,pSum2t−1,∆Sent+,p+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the the value-weighted excess return to portfolio p during month t for
portfolios identified in the initial column. Sumt−1,∆Sent+ represents the sum of consecutive
increases in the orthogonalised BW sentiment changes index. The table also reports the associated t-
statistics as well as the adjusted R2. * and ** present the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent+,p Sum2t−1,∆Sent+,p Adjusted R2
Market 0.0030 0.0099 -0.0030 -0.0002
0.86 1.36 -1.38
σ2low 0.0044 -0.0041 0.0016 -0.0019
1.82 -0.80 1.08
σ2high -0.0060 0.0352* -0.0114* 0.0148
-0.82 2.30 -2.51
σ2high−low -0.0139* 0.0398** -0.0131** 0.0260
-2.01 2.77 -3.09
Sizesmall 0.0000 0.0210* -0.0055 0.0091
0.01 2.14 -1.89
Sizelarge 0.0034 0.0060 -0.0015 -0.0042
1.04 0.88 -0.74
Sizelarge−small -0.0000 -0.0145 0.0039 0.0057
-0.01 -1.90 1.70
BE/MElow 0.0048 0.0053 -0.0022 -0.0032
1.26 0.66 -0.92
BE/MEhigh 0.0025 0.0208* -0.0053 0.0087
0.52 2.09 -1.78
BE/MEhigh−low -0.0058 0.0160* -0.0032 0.0151
-1.60 2.12 -1.45
OPlow -0.0014 0.0189* -0.0061 0.0047
-0.25 2.01 -1.83
OPhigh 0.0060 0.0049 -0.0022 -0.0019
1.74 0.68 -1.01
OPhigh−low 0.0040 -0.0135 0.0038 0.0045
1.11 -1.81 1.73
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Table A.5 Relationships Between Value-Weighted Future Excess Return, Positive Senti-
ment Dynamics and Sentiment Levels
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent+,p+β2,pSum2t−1,∆Sent+,p+β3,pSentt−1+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the the value-weighted excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios
identified in the initial column. Sumt−1,∆Sent+ represents the sum of consecutive increases in the
orthogonalised BW sentiment index and Sum2t−1,∆Sent+ is the squared sum of consecutive changes.
The table also reports the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. * and ** present the 95%
and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent+,p Sum2t−1,∆Sent+,p Sentt−1 Adjusted R2
Market 0.0044 0.0062 -0.0016 -0.0142** 0.0202
1.26 0.86 -0.75 -2.63
σ2low 0.0049* -0.0054 0.0021 -0.0051 0.0010
2.00 -1.04 1.37 -1.35
σ2high -0.0025 0.0261 -0.0081 -0.0356** 0.0448
-0.35 1.70 -1.76 -3.15
σ2high−low -0.0108 0.0319* -0.0103* -0.0309** 0.0508
-1.57 2.21 -2.38 -2.90
Sizesmall 0.0011 0.0182 -0.0045 -0.0109 0.0133
0.24 1.82 -1.50 -1.48
Sizelarge 0.0048 0.0024 -0.0002 -0.0141** 0.0185
1.45 0.35 -0.10 -2.75
Sizelarge−small 0.0003 -0.0154* 0.0042* -0.0035 0.0035
0.09 -1.98 1.80 -0.61
BE/MElow 0.0067 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0187** 0.0271
1.74 0.07 -0.18 -3.14
BE/MEhigh 0.0030 0.0193 -0.0047 -0.0058 0.0074
0.63 1.90 -1.56 -0.78
BE/MEhigh−low -0.0070 0.0192* -0.0044 0.0123* 0.0285
-1.93 2.52 -1.93 2.22
OPlow 0.0015 0.0115 -0.0034 -0.0290** 0.0422
0.27 1.01 -1.01 -3.48
OPhigh 0.0070* 0.0022 -0.0012 -0.0105 0.0078
2.02 0.31 -0.54 -1.94
OPhigh−low 0.0022 -0.0088 0.0021 0.0182** 0.0379
0.61 -1.18 0.95 3.29
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Table A.6 Relationships Between Value-Weighted Future Excess Return and Negative
Sentiment Dynamics
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pCRISISt−1,p+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the value-Weighted excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios
identified in the initial column. Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p represents the sum of consecutive decrease in
the orthogonalised BW sentiment index, CRISISt−1,p is the squared-term of negative consecutive
sentiment changes through month t - 1. I also report the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted
R2. * and ** present the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p CRISISt−1,p Adjusted R2
Market 0.0067* 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0033
1.98 0.43 0.03
σ2low 0.0047* -0.0019 -0.0011 0.0106
2.02 -0.52 1.43
σ2high 0.0018 0.0039 0.0007 -0.0066
0.25 0.34 -0.31
σ2high−low -0.0063 0.0058 0.0018 -0.0038
-0.93 0.54 -0.83
Sizesmall 0.0061 0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0065
1.32 0.28 0.36
Sizelarge 0.0071* 0.0029 -0.0000 -0.0011
2.21 0.58 0.01
Sizelarge−small -0.0024 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0008
-0.66 0.16 -0.44
BE/MElow 0.0068 0.0044 -0.0008 -0.0050
1.80 0.75 0.65
BE/MEhigh 0.0079 -0.0076 0.0026 0.0077
1.69 -1.03 -1.71
BE/MEhigh−low -0.0022 -0.0120* 0.0033** 0.0267
-0.64 -2.19 -2.96
OPlow 0.0043 0.0054 -0.0008 -0.0054
0.80 0.65 0.48
OPhigh 0.0068* -0.0011 0.0008 -0.0018
2.01 -0.21 -0.71
OPhigh−low -0.0008 -0.0065 0.0016 -0.0001
-0.24 -1.18 -1.40
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Table A.7 Relationships Between Value-Weighted Future Excess Return, Negative Senti-
ment Dynamics and Sentiment Levels
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression,
Rp,t = αp+β1,pSumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pCRISISt−1,p+β3,pSentt−1+ep,t
R(p,t) represents the value-weighted excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios
identified in the initial column. Sumt−1,∆Sent− represents the sum of consecutive decrease in the
orthogonalised BW sentiment index, CRISISt−1,p is the squared-term of negative consecutive
sentiment changes through month t - 1 and Sentt−1 represents the level sentiment index during the
period of t - 1. I also report the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. * and ** present
the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio Intercept Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p CRISISt−1,p Sentt−1 Adjusted R2
Market 0.0062 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0147** 0.0177
1.83 -0.05 0.12 -2.66
σ2low 0.0047* -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0022 0.0082
1.98 -0.61 1.45 -0.55
σ2high 0.0001 -0.0038 0.0004 -0.0434** 0.0383
0.01 -0.33 -0.18 -3.78
σ2high−low -0.0076 -0.0016 0.0015 -0.0424** 0.0433
-1.19 -0.15 -0.71 -3.87
Sizesmall 0.0056 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0146* 0.0029
1.20 -0.07 0.30 -1.92
Sizelarge 0.0066* 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0132* 0.0174
2.06 0.12 -0.08 -2.52
Sizelarge−small -0.0023 0.0010 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0042
-0.65 0.18 -0.43 0.13
BE/MElow 0.0060 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0203** 0.0294
1.61 0.16 0.54 -3.33
BE/MEhigh 0.0076 -0.0087 0.0026* -0.0063 0.0066
1.63 -1.16 -1.74 -0.82
BE/MEhigh−low -0.0017 -0.0097 0.0032** 0.0134* 0.0418
-0.49 -1.75 -2.89 2.34
OPlow 0.0030 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0328** 0.0410
0.58 -0.03 0.36 -3.84
OPhigh 0.0064 -0.0030 0.0009 -0.0109* 0.0084
1.89 -0.56 -0.79 -1.98
OPhigh−low -0.0000 -0.0028 0.0014 0.0213** 0.0447
-0.00 -0.52 -1.29 3.78
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Table A.8 Short-, Medium- and Long-dynamics and Value-Weighted Subsequent Returns
- Positive Sentiment Dynamics
I report the coefficient estimates for the positive short, medium and long dynamics from the following
regression:
Rp,t= α0+β1,pI+ST,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent++β2,pI
+
MED,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent++β3,pI
+
LT,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent+
+β4,pSentt−1+ep,t
where Rp,t is the the value-weighted excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios
identified in the initial column. Indicator variables I+ST,t−1, I
+
MED,t−1 , and I
+
LT,t−1 take the value of
one following one-to-two, three-to-five, or six-or-more consecutive increases in sentiment, respectively,
and take the value of zero otherwise. Sumt−1,∆Sent+ is the sum of consecutive increases in the
orthogonalised BW sentiment index through month t− 1, and Sentt−1 is the orthogonalised BW
sentiment level index. I also report the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. ∗ and ∗∗
present the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio α0 β1,p β2,p β3,p β4,p Adjusted R2
Market 0.0054 0.0002 0.0021 0.0017 -0.0148** 0.0152
1.67 0.06 0.49 0.31 -2.77
σ2low 0.0039 0.0015 -0.0019 0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0004
1.71 0.58 -0.63 1.40 -1.21
σ2high 0.0021 -0.0017 0.0078 -0.0036 -0.0385** 0.0343
0.30 -0.22 0.87 -0.32 -3.43
σ2high−low -0.0051 -0.0033 0.0099 -0.0091 -0.0344** 0.0371
-0.80 -0.45 1.18 -0.85 -3.25
Sizesmall -0.0119 0.0005 0.0097* -0.0038 0.0037 0.0076
-1.63 0.11 1.67 -0.51 0.84
Sizelarge 0.0050 0.0012 0.0020 0.0030 -0.0140** 0.0153
1.63 0.33 0.49 0.58 -2.77
Sizelarge−small -0.0021 0.0006 -0.0075 -0.0009 -0.0026 -0.0037
-0.60 0.15 -1.65 -0.16 -0.45
BE/MElow 0.0070* -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0188** 0.0236
1.96 -0.27 -0.16 -0.05 -3.20
BE/MEhigh 0.0060 -0.0005 0.0092 -0.0088 -0.0068 0.0031
1.34 -0.11 1.55 -1.18 -0.92
BE/MEhigh−low -0.0043 0.0006 0.0102* 0.0090 0.0116* 0.0248
-1.28 0.15 2.30 1.61 2.10
OPlow 0.0033 -0.0015 0.0059 -0.0020 -0.0296** 0.0388
0.67 -0.27 0.90 -0.24 -3.60
OPhigh 0.0078* -0.0032 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0106* 0.0050
2.42 -0.86 -0.00 0.02 -1.99
OPhigh−low 0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0056 0.0020 0.0187** 0.0359
0.35 -0.43 -1.30 0.36 3.42
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Table A.9 Short-, Medium- and Long-dynamics and Value-Weighted Subsequent Returns
- Negative Sentiment Dynamics
I report the coefficient estimates for the negative short, medium and long dynamics from the following
regression:
Rp,t= α0+β1,pI−ST,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β2,pI
−
MED,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p+β3,pI
−
LT,t−1Sumt−1,∆Sent−,p
+β4,pSentt−1+ep,t
where Rp,t is the value-weighted excess return to portfolio p during month t for portfolios identified
in the initial column. Indicator variables I−ST,t−1, I
−
MED,t−1 , and I
−
LT,t−1 take the value of one
following one-to-two, three-to-five, or six-or-more consecutive decreases in sentiment, respectively,
and take the value of zero otherwise. Sumt−1,∆Sent− is the sum of consecutive decreases in the
orthogonalised BW sentiment index through month t− 1, and Sentt−1 is the orthogonalised BW
sentiment level index. I also report the associated t-statistics as well as the adjusted R2. ∗ and ∗∗
present the 95% and 99% significance levels, respectively.
Portfolio α0 β1,p β2,p β3,p β4,p Adjusted R2
Market 0.0050 -0.0077 0.0034 -0.0084 -0.0149** 0.0374
1.59 -1.59 1.25 -1.35 -2.72
σ2low 0.0054 -0.0007 0.0042* -0.0032 -0.0020 0.0103
2.40 -0.22 2.17 -0.73 -0.51
σ2high -0.0035 -0.0267** 0.0001 -0.0126 -0.0451** 0.0567
-0.52 -2.62 0.02 -0.96 -3.91
σ2high−low -0.0122 -0.0260** -0.0044 -0.0086 -0.0437** 0.0536
-1.95 -2.70 -0.82 -0.70 -4.01
Sizesmall 0.0037 -0.0118* -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0152* 0.0085
0.85 -1.77 -0.09 -0.34 -2.01
Sizelarge 0.0057 -0.0048 0.0038 -0.0092 -0.0133* 0.0359
1.89 -1.04 1.49 -1.56 -2.55
Sizelarge−small -0.0014 0.0070 0.0038 -0.0056 0.0014 0.0003
-0.42 1.34 1.30 -0.83 0.23
BE/MElow 0.0040 -0.0096* 0.0011 -0.0105 -0.0206** 0.0428
1.14 -1.79 0.35 -1.53 -3.40
BE/MEhigh 0.0083 -0.0126 0.0077* -0.0070 -0.0065 0.0254
1.89 -1.87 2.05 -0.81 -0.85
BE/MEhigh−low 0.0095 -0.0030 0.0062* 0.0042 0.0135* 0.0205
0.29 -0.60 2.19 0.64 2.34
OPlow -0.0001 -0.0188* 0.0018 -0.0110 -0.0336** 0.0624
-0.02 -2.52 0.43 -1.15 -3.98
OPhigh 0.0065* -0.0041 0.0032 -0.0083 -0.0108* 0.0178
2.05 -0.84 1.18 -1.32 -1.96
OPhigh−low 0.0032 0.0146** 0.0010 0.0035 0.0222** 0.0588
0.99 2.96 0.37 0.55 3.97
